Leader Groups in American Law
Max Rheinsteint

If one surveys the major legal systems of the world, he finds that each
has been molded by a particular group of leaders. Private gentlemen of
leisure and, later on, high-ranking officers of the administration left
their imprint on the law of ancient Rome. Theologians like Islamic
mullahs, Jewish rabbis, and Hindu Brahmins shaped the sacred laws
of their secular communities. The law of England was made by the
judges of the royal courts. European continental laws received their
characteristic features through the work of learned scholars, from the
days of Irnerius down to the Pandectists of the nineteenth century. Max
Weber, who traced these influences on a worldwide scale,1 called these
shapers of the law the Rechtshonoratioren (honoratiores of the law).
In his inquiry into the roles played by judges and scholars in structuring the legal systems of England, France, and Germany, John P.
Dawson speaks of the Oracles of the Law.2 Such unfamiliar terms may
be useful to describe so novel a concept. A common term like "leader
groups" may easily evoke erroneous ideas. But I still prefer it, and the
meaning with which it is used here will, I hope, emerge from the
following discussion of familiar facts of American history.
Heinrich Triepel3 in Germany and Karl N. Llewellyn 4 and Gerhard
0. W. Mueller 5 in this country have shown that characteristic styles
exist in legal systems as well as in art and literature. One would expect
such differing patterns since creation, application, and development
of law partake of the character of art. The style by which the legal art
is characterized depends, just as in painting or in poetry, on the identity
t Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law Emeritus. The University of Chicago. A
German version of this article was presented to the Gesellschaft ftir Rechtsvergleichung
(Society of Comparative Law) at its September, 1969 meeting in Regensburg, Bavaria, and
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of the artists. The words of Rudolph Wifith6lter recently reminded me
of the diversity of legal styles: "We do not have to harbor any fear that
members of the legal system will bring about a change of the social
order. Quite the contrary, society is being stabilized and the status quo
is maintained primarily by means of the law and the lawyers."'6
As to Germany, this proposition may contain a grain of truth. For
a considerable period it also would have been applicable to England.
But it certainly does not apply to the United States or, to speak more
correctly, to the present third phase of the legal development of the
United States. In that development each of three successive phases is
characterized by the leadership of a particular branch of the legal profession. The impact of these groups is shown so clearly that it provides
a striking illustration of the general role of legal leader groups.
I
The first phase of the legal development of the United States extends
approximately to the Civil War. During this period the leading branch
of the profession was the same as it had been in England, namely the
judiciary. The law that was created by the lordly judges at Westminster
was meant to serve the needs of the big landowners, of big business,
and of the City of London. Until recently the common law of England
had little interest in the needs of little people. Access to the administration of justice was impeded by the high cost. The spirit of the common
law was conservative; the judges saw themselves as representatives of
what has now come contemptuously to be called the Establishment.
Did any Establishment exist in the early period of the United
States? It certainly did in the South where economic, political, and
social power lay with the slave-owning planters of cotton and tobacco.
Perhaps one could also find an Establishment in New York, Philadelphia, or Boston where a commercial community had begun to play
an economically and politically significant role. However, the North
and even more the Western frontier, as they continuously increased
in population density and prosperity, were wide open geographically
and socially. The society in these regions fluctuated and vacillated between the anarchic inclinations of the adventurers and the desire for
a fixed order of those settlers of the cities and farms who had attained
prosperity.
Generally, American society was colorful, tumultuous, anti-authoritarian, and passionately adverse to privileges of birth or status. This
social climate was reflected in the spirit of the legal profession and
consequently in that of the bench, the major part of which emerged
6 DEE SPIEGF.L, No. 32, 1969, at 99.
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through popular election. Only reluctantly can one apply the term

"jurist" or even "lawyer" to the large and heterogenous fold of the
bench and bar in the period around 1840. The major part of its members were craftsmen of legal practice, and their training was that of
craftsmen. The typical lawyer began his career as an apprentice in the
office of an attorney, was used as a messenger boy, clerk, or office helper,
watched the "master" in court, and copied more or less established
forms of contracts, conveyances, and wills. In addition, he perhaps read
the four volumes of the American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries. When he felt ready for the bar examination, which was not
overly difficult, he made a first try and as many repeated efforts as necessary. After admission to the bar he practiced more or less ably, engaged
in politics, and, once the necessary contacts with influential persons
had been established, he ran for political or judicial office.
The law and its administration underwent a transformation from an
esoteric art into a popular craft. But the astonishing fact is that the
law did not become chaotic. Continuity with the common law of
England was preserved even though the law had to be adapted to the
needs of a rapidly developing country of different geographic, political,
and social conditions. A great majority of the judges combined the
technique of the common law, which they had acquired through practical observation and training, with the fine finger-tip sense for the
needs of a given situation which they had developed through experience in political life. In addition, the members of the bar and the
bench also comprised quite a few men who had received solid legal
training in England and who, in one of the growing number of American colleges, had acquired the humanistic education that was required
of the upper classes. John Marshall, Joseph Story, Lemuel Shaw,
Roger Taney, Daniel Webster, and Rufus Choate are just a few outstanding examples. Such persons attained leadership through their
intellectual superiority, through their ability clearly to express their
thoughts in cultured English, and through their knowledge of the
world, including the legal culture of the European continent.
The confluence of these various elements produced a judge-made
law that often widely differed from the English model. The command
of the binding effect of precedent was taken less seriously than in
England, and legal thinking did not move exclusively along the channels of strict case analogy. Philosophical and technical concepts, at
times of broad generality, came to be used. Decisions, especially innovative ones, tended to be justified by reference to principles of natural
law or political theory. Both branches of the common law, the English
and the American, were made essentially by judges. However, Amer-
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ican judges were different from their English counterparts, and consequently the law that they created assumed a style which diverged from
that of the law of England.
II

With the victory of the increasingly industrialized North over the
capitalist-agrarian South, American legal life entered the second phase,
in which leadership shifted to a new group. As the land was opened
and the growth of industry accelerated, the high financiers and industrialists became progressively more powerful. Positions on the bench
became less attractive. Men of vitality and creative energy, attracted by
the economy, devoted themselves to developing the resources of the
country. For the legal mind of outstanding ability it became more
attractive and rewarding to place himself at the service of business, and
thus to occupy a leading position in the economy. Candidacy for judicial office was left to mediocre lawyers who were dependent on
political bosses.
This change in the type of leaders influenced the character and
operation of the legal system in two ways. Legal thinking, which until
this time had been highly dynamic and creative, became more rigid.
The law became conservative. Its style as well as its content was altered
in the process. In a pattern similar to that which simultaneously evolved
in England, precedents came no longer to be treated as evaluations of
concrete sets of facts. Weight was given to those conceptual formulations that found expression in judicial opinions. The conceptualistic
style of thinking of the German Pandectists had found its way into
England through the Hanoverian university of Gbttingen. American
legal thought presented that very same trend toward conceptualism or,
to use Weber's terminology, toward formal-rational thinking. The
penetration of this method into American law at the turn of the century confirms Weber's thesis that formal-rational thinking is especially
compatible with the economic system of capitalism. It results in a high
degree of stability of judicial practice, in predictability of judicial decisions, and consequently in the possibility of long-range private economic
planning of credit and investment.
The judges were helpful to capitalist employers not only in the
style of their thinking but also in the contents with which they filled
the legal system. Such active support was consistent with the temper
prevailing among the American people. To them the country presented unlimited possibilities of space, of natural resources, and of
chances, through personal and entrepreneurial initiative, rapidly to
obtain unlimited wealth, or equally rapidly to lose it. Open the door
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to the able, and woe to the unfortunate. He who was rolled over by
the wave was lost. There was no room for a policy of social security or
of help for the weak. The demand was for freedom to build up the
country through courageous enterprise, and the judges answered that
demand. John Roche has shown how well the content of the legal system corresponded to this trend of the times. 7 The leading position in
the legal profession was occupied not by the judges but by the legal
advisors of industry and finance who molded the law, both in content
and form. Although from his vantage point as a French comparatist,
Edouard Lambert believed that the period was characterized by the
government of judges, in fact it was characterized by the government
of general counsel.8
But the transformation of the method, the change from materialrational to formal-rational thinking, was also connected with the rise
of a new group of co-leaders of the law, the academic teachers and
scholars-the professors. Through them American law has been impregnated with traits which are well known in the classical professorial
law of the European continent, especially Germany. They developed
a trend toward clear concepts, consistent definitions, and systematic arrangement. The growth of the professorial influence in the United
States is partly explained by the same factor that gave the continental
European law its character of a book law, a professorial law. In the
United States, as in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, an
area of uniform culture has been split into a multitude of territories,
each with its own law. And as in Europe, there has existed no superior
court with the power to bring these separate legal systems into uniformity.
The task of preserving the basic unity of American law is served by
such organizations as the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, and it is assisted
by the personal contacts arising from the multitude of meetings of the
American Bar Association. But the danger of American law being split
up into fifty or more different compartments is being overcome more
effectively by the university law schools and their professors. Until far
into the nineteenth century the English system of apprenticeship
training was the normal system of American legal education. But, building upon foundations laid in the eighteenth century, universities began the task of systematic legal education in the nineteenth century.
Today, although some remnants of the apprentice system persist, and
7 Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 103 (1963); Roche,
EntrepreneurialLiberty and the Commerce Power, 80 U. CH. L. RPv. 680 (1963).
8 E. LAMBERT, Ln GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES (1921).
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part-time study at night school is not uncommon, the normal course of
legal studies is attendance at a university law school. In many university
law schools the students are drawn from the school's own geographic
area, and the local law plays a major role in the curriculum. But nowhere is it taught exclusively. And what is taught in those great national law schools, the students of which are drawn from all parts of
the nation? An attempt to teach the law of every jurisdiction not only
would be impossible, it would be sheer nonsense. What must be cultivated is American law, which is a law that, as such, is in effect everywhere and nowhere. The curriculum necessarily must concentrate on
those elements which are common to the laws of all the states. That
means concentration on the common law tradition-on the principles
and, above all, the method of common law thinking. In stressing these
factors, present-day American legal education resembles European legal
education of the eighteenth century and German legal education of
the nineteenth.
For counsel and guidance the practitioners of the local courts look
to the legal scholars. These scholars are united in a nationwide organization; many of them move from state to state. For all of them American law constitutes the subject matter of their scholarly and teaching
activities. Because the professors are not only the teachers of the
practicing branch of the legal profession but also the guides and advisors, American law, as actually practiced, has begun to assume some
of the traits of a professorial law. It has tended toward systematization
and occasionally toward creation of concepts of high abstraction. In
these respects American law has acquired a certain resemblance to
continental European legal systems.
The new professorial features have found significant expression in
those comprehensive treatises, such as Williston on Contracts, Wigmore
on Evidence, the works of Scott and Bogert on Trusts, and Davis on
Administrative Law, in which American scholars, much in the manner
of their continental European brethren, have presented major branches
of the law. The new trend culminated in the American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law which attempted to distill the "true" common
law out of the enormous mass of precedents and to present it in the
manner of a systematically arranged code. In this gigantic enterprise it
was natural that professors played the leading role. If the Restatement
had achieved the effect it was hoped it would achieve, American law
would have approached professorial law of European style. But the
success has been limited. The practitioners, accustomed to the traditions of case law, were unwilling fully to submit to the new style. But
the Restatement exists, and it has made an impact on the courts. More-
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over, the large number of participating scholars and practitioners were
strongly stimulated and influenced through the very process of its
creation.
American law professors thus have become influential leaders of
the law. In certain respects this influence has had consequences similar
to those which professorial influence has had in Europe. However, in
the United States the professorial influence has made itself felt in another direction, and this circumstance is due to the transformation
undergone by the American legal scholars.
III
The transformation of the attitudes of the legal scholars coincides
with the transformation of the intellectual and political climate of the
country. Conservative laissez faire is being replaced by a "liberal"
social policy of active governmental interference in favor of groups
which, under the system of laissez faire, had obtained but an unsatisfactory share of the affluence of the nation. The workers were the first
group to obtain such attention, then the ethnic minorities, especially
the Negroes, finally the "poor," whoever they may be.
The country was shaken profoundly by the Great Depression of
1929, which shattered the faith in the irresistible force of automatic
progress. In Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the government intervened in the economic life of the nation in order to reestablish the
shaken economy. Prior to this time, social scientists had propounded
the idea that social reforms were necessary and that they had to be carried out through active governmental intervention. With the advent
of the New Deal the implementation of this idea became politically
feasible.
The legislative bodies appeared, at first, to be the natural carriers
of the new policy. But two kinds of obstacles stood in the way. First,
legislators inclined to proceed with social reforms met with the resistance of conservative judges who frustrated essential parts of social
reform by declaring the pertinent laws unconstitutional. This judicial
resistance was eventually overcome. But the second obstacle remained;
in many cases legislatures were disinclined to initiate social reforms,
even when such reforms were politically inevitable. For example, although the legislatures in general were willing to assist labor, Southern
legislatures were unwilling to repeal racially discriminatory laws, even
if such repeal was made necessary by the impact upon the United States
of postwar world opinion.
Something had to be done and, since no one else was willing or able
to do what had become inevitable, the courts had to step in to fill the
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gap. The Supreme Court of the United States made the first strides,
which were followed by the lower federal courts and ultimately by the
state courts. The judicial tendency to give serious consideration to
political values reemerged, and its reemergence was facilitated by the
case law tradition. Judges working within the framework of case
law must constantly search for analogies between the case at bar and
the existing precedents. During the earlier part of the twentieth century the analogies were widely found in similarities of an abstract and
conceptual character. But quite easily, or one might even say naturally,
analogies may be discovered in the similarity of ideological value judgments. This method of legal reasoning had never been lost in American case law, even though it was temporarily pushed into the background. It became dominant again when it began to correspond to the
ideas of the new legal leaders, the professors.
The last forty years have seen a dramatic rise of the professorial influence in the United States. It was strengthened when law teachers like
Rutledge, Douglas, Frankfurter, Schaefer, O'Connell, and Traynor were
called or elected to high judicial positions. At the same time the new
leader group also became potent in legislation and administration. Professors began sitting on the committees charged with the preparation or
reform of legislation, and when a professor sits on a committee he is
likely to exercise a leading influence. In the administration as well as
in government agencies, professors were called to policy-making positions which they would occupy for a number of years until they returned to their universities or became business lawyers.
The new professorial influence took a direction different from that
which professors had exercised in the preceding phases of American
law. This change was caused by the transformation that occurred in
the ideology and the methods of legal learning, and that transformation
was, in turn, caused by the general change in the ideologies dominant
in the nation. In addition, two special factors of American legal education explain the emergence of professors as protagonists of reform
rather than defenders of the status quo. The first is the invention of
a new method of instruction. Under the case method, the law is not presented through academic lectures which would require systematic organization and conceptual fixation. Instead, the opinions of appellate
courts are discussed and subjected to trenchant critique. In this process
one is not satisfied with conceptual analysis. Inevitably, one begins to
search for the policy reasons by which the judges were moved, and one
seeks to discover the ways in which life is actually being affected by the
work of the courts. One learns to read between the lines, to look at the
case as an attempt to resolve a conflict between divergent interests of
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different groups. One tries to discover the reason why a judge has favored one group over another, or the manner in which he has sought to
work out a compromise between them. One tries to predict what influence the decision is likely to have on economic or social reality. One
learns that voluntaristic elements stand behind the alleged compulsion
of the conceptualistic formulae-in other words, that judges have
power. Thus comes the realization that judges, through their decisions,
can influence the course of social life, can restructure society, can be
social engineers.
The second factor of American legal education which explains the
active role of professors in social reform is the interaction between
American legal learning and the social sciences, which had been growing vigorously in the United States. This development first found expression in the sociological jurisprudence advocated by Roscoe Pound,
and then, in a more radical way, in the realist movement of the 1930's.
The interaction resulted from the admission practices of the leading
law schools, which all began to require attendance at a college as a
necessary preliminary to admission. In all colleges social studies became a necessary part of the curriculum. The familiarity with social
science consequently acquired was carried over in law school into the
critical discussion of cases. It was exercised in the classroom as well as
in the study of the scholar. Integration of the social sciences with
legal learning was vociferously demanded. Social scientists joined law
school faculties. Teamwork by representatives of the two branches of
learning was at times vigorously pursued. As social scientists worked
toward objective insight into social reality, they discovered that the
American Dream had not been as fully achieved as the public was
inclined to believe. Sizable groups of the population had not reached
full participation in the achievements of the Century of Progress. This
realization caused many social scientists to become political "liberals"
-advocates of social reform through government action. And for the
representatives of the social science of law, the courtroom became the
vortex of policy formulation.
As a result of the case method of legal education and the integration
of law and social science, in the present third phase of American legal
development the judges are more in need of professorial guidance than
ever before. The case method bestows a peculiar character upon the
work of the American legal scholar, namely an awareness that judging, especially appellate judging, involves creation of law. This awareness accounts for his primary interest in the possibilities of settling
social conflicts and in thus establishing the good society upon the demo.
cratic pattern. Accordingly, the legal scholar devotes himself to the
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monographic investigation of relationships between law and life. His
research is legal fact research in which social science methods are used
extensively. This kind of research cannot be performed by busy
judges, who in their daily work have to deal with a great variety of
problems. It requires the attention of specialists who have the time to
become experts-in other words, the professors. American law consequently tends to become a professorial law, but a professorial law that
differs widely from the European law that existed in the heyday of
European professorial influence.
CONCLUSION

One who tries to understand the American law of today must know
who its leaders are, by what ideas and ideals they are inspired, and in
what ways they exercise their influence. What applies to the American
law of the present also applies to the past phases of its development.
Each of these periods had its own kind of leaders and consequently its
own peculiar character. Understanding these facts and relationships
opens up awareness of essential features of legal history. It also opens
up awareness of essential characteristics of legal orders of different
countries.
Comparative law can no longer be carried on in the method of comparing conceptual elements. Its method can only be functional. The
comparatist must become familiar with the problems of social life and
then must investigate the tools by which the world's different legal
orders seek to solve these problems. He will also be interested in the
results achieved with the various tools. He has come to recognize that
law is not an autonomous phenomenon capable of being investigated in
isolation from other social phenomena. He knows that law, with all its
rules and institutions, is an aspect of social life, that it must be studied
in its relationship to all the other aspects of a society's cultural climate.
Particularly important is an understanding of the ideologies with which
it is imbued. The task of the comparatist is to develop his feel for these
relationships, to discover and to describe them, to disentangle the
strands of the seamless web of social relationships. This arduous task
is facilitated if, in the study of a particular culture, one interposes between the law and society the human beings who are the mediators
-between them. Of course, the leaders of the law are themselves determined by the structure of the society in question. Systematic observaion of leader groups can thus be the bridge from which one can discover the relationship between a society's cultural climate and its
legal order.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance
for Northern School Desegregation
Owen M. Fisst

Brown v. Board of Education1 stands for the proposition that the equal
protection clause prohibits the operation of a "dual school system"
and requires the conversion of that system into a "unitary nonracial
school system." Under a dual system, students are assigned to schools
on the basis of their race in order to segregate them. That is clearly
impermissible. But what is a permissible basis for assigning students
to schools under a "unitary nonracial school system"? This seems to
be the central riddle of the law of school desegregation.
There is one easy answer to this question: Under a "unitary nonracial school system" students may be assigned to schools on the basis
of any criterion other than race. But there is an understandable reluctance to accept this answer. This stems from the fact that even if some
seemingly innocent criterion is substituted for race as the basis for
assignment, virtually the same segregated patterns of student attendance that existed under the dual system might result-whites in one
set of schools and blacks in another. Moreover, there are reasons to be
concerned with this result, even assuming race is not the basis for assignment. The concern might be predicated on a fear of "evasion"-if the
school board is allowed to use any criterion other than race, it might be
able to accomplish the same thing as it did under the dual school system. The concern with the result might also be based on the view that
a segregated student attendance pattern alone-without regard to the
basis for assignment-gives rise to an inequality. The segregation
might stigmatize the blacks, deprive them of educationally significant
contacts with the socially and economically dominant group, and reduce the share of resources allocated to black schools simply because
they are attended only by members of the minority group.
But, of course, the picture is not all one-sided. There are several
countervailing factors that have the effect of diluting this concern
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This article is a modified version of a
statement delivered to the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity of the
United States Senate on June 15, 1971.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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with the mere result-the segregated pattern of student attendance. One
is the uncertainty surrounding the central empirical proposition that
a segregated pattern of student attendance itself leads to inferior education for blacks. Another is the price of a remedial order eliminating
the segregated school pattern. Such an order would probably divert
financial resources because of the expense of transportation and frustrate the intense associational desires of large parts of the community.
A court aware of these costs is likely to feel a need to justify its action
in terms that have the quality of a moral imperative. A justification
couched in terms of the wrongness of excluding individuals from a
school because of their race-the classic concept of racial discrimination-certainly has that flavor. But one cast primarily in terms of
the alleged inferiority of racially homogeneous schools does not.
These conflicting considerations account for the uncertain nature
of the law of school desegregation. The controversy has in large part
been over two approaches-one that forbids only the use of the racial
criterion as the basis of assignment (sometimes referred to as a de jure
approach), and the other that focuses on the result, the segregated
2
patterns themselves (sometimes referred to as a de facto approach).
It is the latter approach which presents the greatest challenge to the
school segregation of the North, for the assumption is that students in
the North are assigned to schools, not on the basis of race, but instead
on the basis of a seemingly innocent criterion-geographic proximity.
The controversy between these two approaches is far from resolved, but
there has been a historical trend. I would like to suggest that the
trend of school desegregation doctrine has been one in which the
courts have rejected an approach that forbids only the use of race and
have moved in the direction of the result-oriented approach.
I
The first significant development in Supreme Court doctrine occurred in 1968 in Green v. New Kent County School Board.3 There
the criterion for student assignment was individual choice. Under the
Board's plan, no student was assigned to a school on the basis of his
race. Instead, all students, black and white, were assigned on the basis
of their own choice. The result was that some blacks attended the
formerly all-white school, most blacks remained in the black school,
and no whites attended the black school. The Court declared that in
the school system before it, freedom-of-choice was an impermissible
2 These issues axe surveyed in more detail in an earlier article of mine, Racial Imbalance
in the Public Schools: the Constitutional Concepts, 78 HAIM. L. Rv. 564 (1965).
3 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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basis for assigning students to schools. The freedom-of-choice plan, the
Court concluded, had failed to "work." It had failed to produce a
"unitary nonracial school system"-a system, so the Court said, in
which there are not black schools and white schools, but just schools.
Despite the captivating quality of these phrases, they do not indicate
the basis for invalidating the choice plan. The Court said that it was
not ruling freedom-of-choice plans unacceptable in all circumstances,
but it failed to identify the particular circumstances that rendered the
New Kent County plan unacceptable. The Court carefully avoided
resting its decision on the view that the result was the product of
threats or that procedural irregularities of the plan interfered with
the exercise of choice. However, the Court did not say that a student
assignment plan would be deemed to "work" only when it produces
an integrated pattern of student attendance-when it eliminates, to
the extent possible, the all-black school. The message that emerges from
Green is a negative one-that a school board does not fulfill its
duty to convert to a unitary system by substituting for a racial criterion
one that is innocent on its face. In effect, the Court rejected the simple
formula that reduced the equal protection clause to a prohibition
against the use of race as a basis of assignment and thereby permitted
the use of any other criterion. In 1968 this was a considerable achievement.
Further movement in this direction occurred this past term when
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education4 the Supreme Court once again considered the adequacy of student assignment plans. The Court reaffirmed Green's rejection of the view that
only the use of race is forbidden but took four additional steps.
First, the seemingly innocent criterion held inadequate in CharlotteMecklenburg was not the freedom-of-choice criterion of Green but one
more common in the North-assigning students to the schools nearest
their homes. This holding was not premised on a finding that the
proposed geographic zones were "gerrymandered" in the Gomillion v.
Lightfoot5 sense. Instead, Charlotte-Mecklenburg holds that even if
geographic proximity, not race, were the basis for the zones and thus
for assignments, the Board's duty to convert to a "unitary nonracial
school system" would not be satisfied.
Why is the use of this seemingly innocent criterion-geographic
proximity-impermissible? The Court did not answer this question
merely by pointing to the resulting segregated pattern of student atten4

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

5 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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dance. The existence of this segregation was an important factor in
its analysis, but the Court added another ingredient. It sought to show
that the Board of Education was to some degree responsible for the
segregation, thereby making it "state-imposed segregation." For this
purpose, it focused attention on the Board's past wrongdoing. The
Court saw a causal connection between the Board's past discrimination
and present segregation, and on the basis of this connection attributed
responsibility to the Board for the segregation.
Two types of connections are suggested in the opinion: (1) The
past discriminatory conduct of a school board might have contributed
to the creation and maintenance of segregated residential patterns
which, when coupled with the present use of geographic proximity
as the basis for assignment, produce segregated schools. The assumption is that, under the dual system, schools are racially designated as
"white" or "black" and are located in different geographic areas, and
that in the past racial groups chose to live near "their" particular
schools. That choice might have been motivated by the desire of families to live close to the schools which their children attended, or it
might have reflected the belief that the racial designation of a school
also racially designated the residential area. (2) Prior decisions by a
school board regarding the location and size of schools might in part
explain why assigning students to the schools nearest their homes will
result in racially homogeneous schools. Under the dual school system,
school sites were selected and the student capacity of schools determined
with a view toward serving students of only one race. These past policies
are important because assignment on the basis of geographic proximity
will not result in a racially homogeneous school unless, in addition to
the existence of residential segregation, the school is so small that it
serves only a racially homogeneous area or so situated that it is the
closest school to students of only one race.
The second advance of Charlotte-Mecklenburg relates to the fact
that these causal connections between past discrimination and present
segregation are no more than theoretical possibilities and obviously
involve significant elements of conjecture. The Court's response was
to announce an evidentiary presumption that in effect resolves all the
uncertainties against the school board. The Court quite consciously
avoided holding that segregated student attendance patterns are, in
themselves, a denial of equal protection, and instead emphasized the
role that past discriminatory conduct might have played in causing
those patterns. But the Court also said that it was prepared to presume
an impermissible cause from the mere existence of segregation:
Where the school authority's proposed plan for conversion
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from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued
existence of some schools that are all or predominantly of
one race, they have the burden of showing that such school
assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory. The court
should scrutinize such schools, and the burden upon the
school authorities will be to satisfy the court that their racial
composition is not the result of present or past discriminatory
action on their part."
Concededly, the school board has the opportunity to show that the
consequence-segregated schools-is not caused by its discriminatory
action and that it is therefore not responsible for the segregation. In
that sense the distinction between cause and consequence is preserved.
But the distinction is likely to become blurred because the burden
cast on the board is a heavy one. The burden cannot be discharged
simply by showing that the school segregation is produced, given the
segregated residential patterns, by assigning students on the basis of
a criterion other than race, such as geographic proximity. The school
board will also have to show that its past discriminatory conductinvolving racial designation of schools, site selection, and determination of school size-is not a link in the causal chain producing the
segregation. This will be very difficult to do, and the difficulty of overcoming a presumption will tend to accentuate the fact that gives rise
to it, namely, the segregated patterns, and this will be reflected in the
board's assignment- policies. Greater attention will be paid to the
segregated patterns.
The third development relates to what the Court said must be done
to eliminate these patterns-everything possible. Prior to CharlotteMecklenburg it was generally assumed that even if attention were
focused on the result and a school board were obliged to eliminate the
segregated pattern, the extent of the obligation would be simply "to
take integration into consideration." Under this formulation of the
remedial obligation, integration would be one value, along with others
(such as minimizing the time and expense of transportation and
avoiding safety hazards), that must be considered in designing attendance plans. There would be a rough parity among these values. In
Charlotte-Mecklenburgthe Court constructed a hierarchy among these
values in which integration assumes a role of paramount importance.
The Court declared that "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation" must be achieved. The practicalities of the situation must,
of course, also be taken into account, but the Court made clear that
0

402 U.S. at 26.
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if there is a conflict between integration and other values, integration
will generally prevail.
Thus, the remedial plan in Charlotte-Mecklenburgrequires a massive, long-distance transportation program: Students living closest to
inner-city schools are to be assigned to suburban ones and students
living closest to suburban schools are to be assigned to inner-city ones.
True, this is the plan that had been formulated by the district court,
and there is considerable language in the Supreme Court's opinion
about the broad discretion that the district court has in fashioning a
remedy. But the discretion the Court vests in the district court goes
only to the question of how integration shall be achieved-the details
of the remedial plan (such as which particular schools shall be paired
for the transportation program). The lower court has no discretion to
alter or disregard the central remedial obligation-achieving the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation-and the plan it approves
will be measured by that stringent standard. That is why in a companion case involving Mobile, Alabama, the Supreme Court rejected
a desegregation plan that allowed some all-black schools to remain in
operation.7 The elimination of that residue of segregation required
assigning students across a major highway that divided the metropolitan
area. For the Fifth Circuit, this factor constituted a sufficient practical
barrier to relieve the school board of its obligation to remove all
remnants of segregation from the system.8 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court remanded because "inadequate consideration was given to the
possible use of bus transportation and split zoning."9
Fourth, Charlotte-Mecklenburgis significant because it validates the
use of race in student assignments when the goal is integration rather
than segregation. In this context there is little room for the pretense
of color blindness. In part this was anticipated in 1969 in United States
v. Montgomery County Board of Education,0 a case involving faculty
assignments. There the Court affirmed a desegregation order requiring
that teachers be assigned so that the proportion of white and black
teachers in the system as a whole would be mirrored in each school. The
achievement of that goal, in the face of preexisting segregated patterns,
required that in the process of deciding where to assign teachers some
weight be given to each faculty member's race. Similarly, in CharlotteMecklenburg the Court recognized that the achievement of student
integration requires that race play some role in the process of deciding
7 Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
8 Id. at 36.
9 Id. at 38.
10 895 U.S. 22 (1969).
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to which school a student will be assigned, and for that reason the
Court permitted the use of this criterion.
This aspect of Charlotte-Mecklenburg undermines the constitutional
basis for one objection that had frequently been voiced against remedial
programs-whether court-ordered or voluntarily adopted-that were
designed to eliminate segregation. More broadly, it indicates a conceptual departure from the approach to school desegregation that focuses exclusively on the racial criterion. In effect, it says that the
prohibition of the equal protection clause against the use of race as a
basis of assignment cannot be understood independently of the result.
The prohibition against the use of race is linked to the result. Race
is a forbidden criterion for assignment when it is used to produce
segregation, but not when it is used to produce integration.
II
These four doctrinal advances of Charlotte-Mecklenburg occurred
in response to a situation, not readily found in the North, in which a
school board had maintained a "dual school system" in the recent past.
The opinion appears to be further limited in its application by its
emphasis on recent, as opposed to ancient, history. It suggests that the
rules announced may be only transitional requirements." Moreover,
this concern with history has an analytical basis. It is used to attribute
responsibility. The Court's insistence that the school board be responsible for the segregation is satisfied in Charlotte-Mecklenburg by finding
a pattern of past discriminatory conduct. In time, however, the legacy
of past discrimination may become so attenuated that it will be unrealistic to presume the existence of any causal connection between it
and the present school segregation.
Nevertheless, it should be emphisized that this concern with recent
past discrimination does not confine Charlotte-Mecklenburg to the
11 The passage, which was obviously tacked onto the end of the opinion, indicating
that it may have been exacted at the last moment in exchange for someone's vote, reads:
At some point, these school authorities and others like them should have
achieved full compliance with this Court's decision in Brown 1.The systems will
then be "unitary" in the sense required by our decisions in Green and Alexander.
It does not follow that the communities served by such systems will remain
demographically stable, for in a growing, mobile society, few will do so. Neither
school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make yearby-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the
affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action is eliminated from the system. This does not mean that
federal courts are without power to deal with future problems; but in the
absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the
State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the
racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should
not be necessary.
402 US. at 32.
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South. Until a few years ago, Southern school districts openly maintained dual school systems, and therefore the existence of past discriminatory practices can be established by admission. In Northern systems,
there is no such admission. But that, of course, does not mean that the
past discriminatory practices of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg type did not
occur. It only means that they are more difficult, though not impossible,' 2 to prove. In my judgment, a very close, hard look at the
construction policies of Northern school systems would reveal numerous
instances in which school boards in the recent past have chosen sites
and determined capacity with an eye toward serving racially homogeneous areas-often called "neighborhoods." Instead of formally and
openly designating a newly constructed school as the Negro school,
a school board may have called it the Lincoln School or the Booker T.
Washington School and staffed it only with black teachers.' 3 The same
message is conveyed.
Thus, there are some situations where, because of their recent past
discrimination, Northern school systems can be assimilated to the
Southern systems, and where the rules of Charlotte-Mecklenburg are
therefore clearly applicable. But beyond that, one cannot simply say
that Charlotte-Mecklenburg "outlaws" the school segregation of the
North. Because of its focus on past discrimination, the case does not
lend itself to a blanket judgment about the North, as it does with
respect to the South. The net effect of Charlotte-Mecklenburg is to
move school desegregation doctrine further along the continuum
toward a result-oriented approach, but the progression is not complete.
Additional steps are required. It seems to me, however, that over time
this move will probably be made and that, in retrospect, CharlotteMecklenburg will then be viewed, like Green, as a way-station to the
adoption of a general approach to school segregation which, by focusing
12 See, e.g., United States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (NJD. Ill. 1968) (preliminary injunction), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), on remand, 301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. ill.
1969) (permanent injunction), aff'd with modification, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970). Following the Charlotte-Mecklenburgdecision, the Supreme Court denied the school board's
application for certiorari. 39 U.S.L.W. 3482 (U.S. May 3, 1971).
13 While Charlotte-Mecklenburg dealt primarily with student assignment, in my judgment the most difficult aspect of school desegregation, it also reaffirmed previous doctrine
requiring the desegregation plan to liquidate all aspects of the dual system, including
faculty segregation. This has considerable significance for the North. The Court wrote:
In Green, we pointed out that existing policy and practice with regard to faculty,
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities were among the most
important indicia of a segregated system. 391 U.S., at 435. Independent of
student assignment, where it is possible to identify a "white school" or a "Negro
school" simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the
quality of school buildings and equipment, or the organization of sports activities,
a prima facie case of violation of substantive constitutional rights under the Equal
Protection Clause is shown.
402 U.S. at 18.
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on the segregated patterns themselves, is more responsive to the school
segregation of the North.
This forecast is based in part on my view that the Court will want
to avoid the appearance of picking on the South. This appearance is
derived from the fact that segregated patterns of student attendance
are no less severe in Northern cities than in Southern ones. Under
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Southern school systems are obliged to eliminate those patterns and to achieve the greatest possible degree of
integration. But there is no similar blanket judgment about those
patterns in the North. A complicated analysis of causation might,
under the Charlotte-Mecklenburg theory, serve to justify the differential treatment afforded these otherwise identical patterns. But such
an analysis is not likely to be understood or even believed by most
people. And no national institution can afford to be unresponsive to
the popular pressures likely to be engendered by an appearance of
differential treatment of certain regions of the country. Even the
Supreme Court is not immune from such pressures, particularly when
they become identified with the ideal of equal treatment.
The forecast is based also on my view that the predominant concern
of the Court in Charlotte-Mecklenburg is in fact the segregated pattern
of student attendance, rather than the causal role played by past discriminatory practices. I realize that in Charlotte-Mecklenburg the
Court used past discrimination to attribute responsibility to the Board
for the school segregation, but this theory for attributing responsibility seems contrived. Although the existence of past discrimination
cannot be denied, the Court made no serious attempt either to determine or even to speculate on the degree to which it contributes to present segregation. Nor did the Court attempt to tailor the remedial
order to the correction of that portion of the segregation that might
reasonably be attributable to past discrimination. The Court moved
from (a) the undisputed existence of past discrimination to (b) the possibility or likelihood that the past discrimination played some causal
role in producing segregated patterns to (c) an order requiring the complete elimination of those patterns. The existence of past discrimination
was thus used as a "trigger"-and not for a pistol, but for a cannon.
Such a role cannot be defended unless the primary concern of the
Court is the segregated patterns themselves, rather than the causal
relation of past discrimination to them. The attention paid to past
discrimination can be viewed as an attempt by the Court to preserve
the continuity with Brown and to add a moral quality to its decision.
The Court is not likely to abandon its requirement that a school
board be responsible for the segregated patterns before it is ordered
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to eliminate them. This requirement, however, need not foreclose
any doctrinal advance. An alternative theory for attributing responsibility exists-one that is equally applicable to North and South
and well rooted in other areas of the law, such as torts. This theory
would hold the school board responsible for the foreseeable and
avoidable consequences of its own action. In this context, the pertinent action of the school board is its choice of a criterion for student
assignments. The board decides how students are to be assigned. The
result of using a criterion such as geographic proximity in a system
with residential segregation is foreseeable; and in most instances there
are reasonable measures that the board could adopt, if not to eliminate,
then at least to mitigate the result that flows from the use of that
criterion.
This theory for attributing responsibility is not without limitations.
For example, the causal chain linking the school board's decision to
assign on the basis of geographic proximity and the school segregation
might be broken if it could be presumed that present residential
segregation is truly voluntary. Moreover, the board might be relieved
of responsibility if there were no "reasonable" steps it could take to
avoid school segregation. For this reason, this theory might be viewed
as holding the school board to a lesser standard than that of CharlotteMecklenburg, which, through the triggering action of past discrimination, requires the board to take every possible step to eliminate
segregation. However, this difference in standards roughly parallels
tort rules which hold a person responsible for all the consequences
of an intentional wrongdoing but which limit liability to the proximate consequences when the wrongdoing is not intentional. In this
area a rule that requires the school board to take reasonable stepsas opposed to all possible steps-to eliminate segregation seems to
be the more sensible one and therefore the one that will predominate.
It does not rest on the unrealistic assumption that all present segregation is a consequence of past wrongdoing, and it gives a more
balanced appraisal to competing values that should be taken into
consideration in assigning students to schools. In any event, the general effect of the theory would be to focus attention on the segregated
patterns themselves and to bridge the doctrinal gap between CharlotteMecklenburg and an approach to school desegregation that emphasizes
primarily the result.
Admittedly, this theory for attributing responsibility does not require the construction of a causal chain that includes a racially discriminatory act in the past. But, analytically, that should be unnecessary. The equal protection clause requires that some government
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agency be responsible for the unequal treatment, but it does not
require that the responsibility be predicated on a causal chain involving an earlier discrimination. It does not require double discrimination. There is no need to search for a second discrimination if it is
determined that the segregated patterns themselves render the education afforded blacks inferior and thus are a form of unequal treatment.
Under this approach the central dispute would be over the factual
assertion that segregated education is inferior. Indeed, this is what the
dispute should be about.
The Court in Charlotte-Mecklenburgappears to have avoided this
dispute by relying on past discrimination. Arguably, the denial of equal
protection in Charlotte-Mecklenburg originated in past discriminatory
school construction practices and, although the Court was no longer
able to stop those practices, the injunction it issued could be viewed
as an attempt to undo the effects of the past wrong. Under this interpretation, the school segregation was a present effect of the past denial
of equal protection, and not itself a denial of equal protection. But
this interpretation of Charlotte-Mecklenburgdoes not seem persuasive.
It seems much more plausible that the segregated patterns themselves,
and not the past construction practices, are viewed as the denial of
equal protection. To regard all school segregation as simply an "effect"
of the past denial of equal protection requires the positing of an unproved and unlikely causal connection between the two. Furthermore,
there is no reason why the courts should use their remedial powers
to correct the effect of a past wrong unless that effect is itself harmful
or disadvantageous. Thus, at the very least, there is an implicit judgment in Charlotte-Mecklenburg that segregation itself is harmful or
disadvantageous. And if the segregation is viewed as particularly
harmful or disadvantageous to blacks, then it can be construed as a
form of unequal treatment. Under this interpretation, the only question remaining is whether the school board is responsible for it. In
Charlotte-Mecklenburg the Court attributed responsibility for segregation on the basis of past discrimination. My point is that there is
an alternative theory for attributing responsibility for the segregation
that is as intellectually satisfying as the Charlotte-Mecklenburg theory
requiring a search for past discrimination. 14
14 It should also be pointed out that the very use of geographic criteria may be as
responsible for residential segregation as past discriminatory construction policies. By rigidly adhering to geographic criteria over a long period of time, a school board assures
the white parent who does not want his children to go to school with blacks that this
desire can be fulfilled by moving into a white neighborhood. The use of geographic
criteria also assures the white parent that if he moves out of the neighborhood into which
blacks are moving, he will be leaving the blacks behind. They will not follow him to the
new school-unless they also change residence.
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III
Thus far the development in school desegregation doctrine has
been largely the work of the courts, and my forecast about future
direction is based on the view that the courts will-in the face of
popular pressure and logic-evolve an approach to school desegregation that is increasingly result-oriented. Within the weeks immediately
following Charlotte-Mecklenburgthat seems to be precisely what has
been happening in a few lower courts. 15 It is important to emphasize,
however, that other branches of government need not wait for these
projected doctrinal advances.
Local agencies are today free to institute the appropriate measures
to correct segregated patterns of student attendance. There is no suggestion in Charlotte-Mecklenburg that such voluntary remedial measures need be predicated on the discovery of past discrimination.
Indeed, this term the Supreme Court invalidated two statewide "anti7
busing" laws, one in New York16 and the other in North Carolina,
that would have impeded the efforts of local school boards to correct
racial imbalance. Moreover, Congress need not wait until the Supreme
Court declares a practice a violation of the equal protection clause
before requiring (or inducing) local authorities to correct it. Cases
such as Katzenbach v. Morgan s and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.19
indicate the lengths to which the Court will go to indulge and even
to encourage congressional activity on behalf of the cause of racial
equality. Under the Civil War amendments, Congress is free to enact
a rule of law that would require (or induce) school boards throughout
the country to take reasonable steps to eliminate segregated patterns
of student attendance-without regard to proof in each instance of
past discriminatory practices and their contemporary vestiges. Such
legislation can be predicated on a judgment about the inequality that
arises from a segregated pattern of student attendance itself. And if
the legislature insists, as does the Court in Charlotte-Mecklenburg,
that the segregation be "state-imposed," then such legislation can be
predicated on a conclusion that the South has no monopoly on past
15 See, e.g., Davis v. School Dist., No. 20477 (6th Cir. May 28, 1971); Johnson v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. C-70 1331 SAW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1971). But
see Spencer v. Kugler, Civil No. 1123-70 (D.N.J. May 13, 1971) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to state law that made boundaries of school districts conform to municipal
boundaries).
26 Chropowicki v. Lee, 402 U.S. 935 (1971) (summary affirmance of three-judge district
court ruling).
17 North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 US. 43 (1971).
18 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
19 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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discrimination, or that school boards are responsible for the foreseeable and avoidable consequences of their own actions. In any event,
there is no question about the authority to enact nationwide school
desegregation laws. For the last several years that has been clear. The
only question is about the will. Conceivably, Charlotte-Mecklenburg,
by imposing such a heavy burden on the South and by requiring the
greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, might be sufficient
inducement for such legislation. That might be the most significant
aspect of Charlotte-Mecklenburg for the North and for the law of
school desegregation.

...And Then There Were None: The Diminution
of the Federal Jury
Hans Zeiselt

Goneril: Hear me, my lord. What need you five-and-twenty?
ten? or five?
Regan: What need one?
King Lear, Act II, Scene IV
In a dramatic move sponsored by the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, seventeen of the federal district courts will
reduce the size of their civil juries from twelve members to six.1
Immediately following the Chief Justice's announcement, Representative William Lloyd Scott of Virginia introduced a bill in Congress
to provide for six-member juries in all federal trials, both civil and
criminal, except in cases involving capital offenses.2 On the state
level, the New Jersey Supreme Court called for an amendment to
the state constitution that would allow the legislature to reduce the
size of all juries and to end jury trials in civil cases. 3 Moreover, at least
one of the federal district courts has already been experimenting with
six-member juries in criminal trials, albeit by encouraged agreement
4
between prosecution and defense.
Juries with less than twelve members, of course, are not foreign to
our experience. Some state courts try small civil claims and minor
criminal cases before six-member juries; 5 four states even try nont Professor of Law and Sociology, The University of Chicago.
1 C.D. Cal., D. Colo., D.D.C., M.D. Fla., N.D. Ill., S.D. Ill., N.D. Ind., S.D. Ind., D.
Kan., E.D. La., D. Minn., D.N.M., D. Ore., W.D. Pa., W.D. Tex., and D. Wyo. Two
district courts have made a reduction in the size of the jury optional-E.D. Pa. and
E.D.N.Y. Information available from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
2 H.R. 7800, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
3 Information available from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
4 E.g., the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Id.
5 Minor cases include those civil and criminal cases before inferior courts, Ky. CONSr.
art. 248; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23; OKLA. CONsr. art. II, § 19; W. VA. CONsr. art. III,
§ 13, and those civil actions involving small claims, IDA. CONsr. art. I, § 7; N.J. CONST.
art. I, § 9; see UTAH CONsr. art. I, § 10, which specifies eight jurors in all noncapital cases
before courts of general jurisdiction. See also constitutional provisions authorizing state
legislatures to pass laws limiting jury size to less than twelve persons (I) in all civil cases
before inferior courts, ALAsKA CoNST. art. I, § 16; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 5; N.D. CONsT. art
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capital felony cases before juries that have fewer than twelve members.6
Despite this background, experimentation with the jury was previously
confined to the states. Until the present time, the federal jury appeared
to be immutable.
The reasons presently given for reduction of the size of federal civil
juries are to expedite jury trials and to lessen their cost. With respect
to the latter, the Chief Justice has estimated that contracting the size of
federal civil juries to six would result in an annual savings of four
million dollars.7 While this may seem to be a substantial sum, it is
only 2.4 per cent of the total federal judicial budget, and little more
than a thousandth part of one per cent of the total federal budget.8
With respect to minimizing delay, the smaller jury would merely
decrease the time required for impaneling. Although there are no
data available on the time consumed in impaneling juries, we do have
accurate data indicating that federal district court judges spend eight
per cent of their total working time in trying civil jury cases.9 Estimating that impaneling the jurors takes, on the average, about ten per
cent of the trial time, 10 one discovers that only eight-tenths of one
per cent of the federal district judges' total working time is presently
consumed by impaneling civil juries. On first impression, it might
seem that reducing the twelve jurors to six would save half of that
impaneling time. But in many federal courts the jurors are examined
primarily by the judge, who directs most of his questions to all jurors
at the same time. In this situation the savings would be minimal, since
it takes no more time to ask a question of twelve jurors than to ask
it of six. In any event, we are discussing an amount which is less than
half of the impaneling time-at best four-tenths, more likely threetenths, of one per cent of the judge's working time.
I, § 7; (2) in all cases before inferior courts, IowA CoNsr. art. I, § 9; (3) in all civil
cases, VA. CoNsr. art. I, § 11; (4) in all criminal cases before inferior courts and all civil
cases, COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23; Wyo. CoNsr. art. I, § 9; and (5) in all cases before all
state courts, FLA. CoNsr. art. V, § 22.
6 See FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 22; LA. CONS. art VII, § 41; TEx. CONsT. art. V, § 13 (where
juror dies or is incapacitated); UTAI CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
7 N.Y. Times, May 17, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
8 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET

FiSCAL YEAR 1972, at 523 (1971).
9 FEDEnR JUDICIAL CENTER, DssnrucT JuDGEs' TIME STUDY, Mar., 1971 (mimeographed
study). Table A-5 indicates that 16% of district court judges' time is consumed by jury
trials; a communication from the Center's research director relates that approximately
half of that time was consumed by civil jury trials.
10 This estimate is based on informal consultation with federal district judges and trial
lawyers. It would be misleading to infer higher figures for impaneling from the recent
widely publicized and extremely atypical voir dire proceedings in the Manson trial in
California or the Black Panther trial in New Haven. Both, in addition, were criminal
trials and neither was in the federal courts.
OF THE UNrrED STATES,
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Thus, neither the amount of money nor the amount of time that
would be saved can adequately explain and justify the reform recommended by the Chief Justice. However, when viewed in the broader
context of the other proposals to limit the functioning of the jury,
the decision of the federal district courts to adopt the six-member
jury appears as a significant step toward a drastic reduction of the
American jury system in general. Under these circumstances, this initial reform deserves careful scrutiny on its own merits.
I.

Williams v. Florida

The last pieces of the legal foundation for the six-member jury
11
were laid in the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Florida.
Williams, accused and subsequently, convicted of robbery, had made
a pre-trial motion to impanel a twelve-member jury instead of the sixmember jury prescribed by Florida law for non-capital cases. The
motion had been denied. In affirming the conviction, the Supreme
Court ruled that the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury does
not require that jury membership be fixed at twelve. In sweeping
language, the Court removed the constitutional obstacles to decreasing
the size of federal or state juries in both civil and criminal cases. First,
the Court summarized its historical discussion by stating that the
twelve-member jury appears to have been a "historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first
2
place."1
History, however, might have embodied more wisdom than the Court
would allow. It might be more than an accident that after centuries
of trial and error the size of the jury at common law came to be fixed
at twelve. A primary function of the jury was to represent the community as broadly as possible; yet at the same time, it had to remain
a group of manageable size. Twelve might have been, and might still
be, the upper limit beyond which the difficulty of self-management
becomes insuperable under the burdensome condition of a trial. On
this view, twelve would be the number that optimizes the jury's two
conflicting goals-to represent the community and to remain manageable.
Having disposed of the rationality of the number twelve, the Court
proceeded:
Nothing in this history suggests, then, that we do violence to
the letter of the Constitution by turning to other than purely
11 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In Duncan v. Louisiana, 891 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court had held
that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment.
12 Id. at 89-90.
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historical considerations to determine which features of the
jury system, as it existed at common law, were preserved in
the Constitution. The relevant inquiry, as we see it, must
performs and its
be the function that the particularfeature
13
relation to the purposes of the jury trial.
After a casual reference to empirical data, to which we will devote
our attention presently, the Court concluded that while the jury should
comprise a cross-section of the community, a six-member jury does not
perceptibly differ in this respect from a twelve-member jury:
[W]hile in theory the number of viewpoints represented on a
randomly selected jury ought to increase as the size of the
jury increases, in practice the difference between the 12-man
and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the community represented seems likely to be negligible. Even the
12-man jury cannot insure representation of every distinct
voice in the community, particularly given the use of the
peremptory challenge. As long as arbitrary exclusions of a
particular class from the jury rolls are forbidden . . . the

concern that the cross-section will be significantly diminished
if the jury is 4decreased in size from 12 to six seems an unrealistic one.'
Here, then, is the Court's reference to empirical data:
What few experiments have occurred-usually in the civil
area-indicate that there is no discernable difference between
the results reached by the two different-sized juries.' 5
The Court cites, impressively enough, six items: 16 (1) Judge Wiehl's
article on "The Six Man Jury" in the Gonzaga Law Review; 17 (2) Judge
Tamm's "The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional
Amendment" in the Georgetown Law Journal;8 (3) Cronin's piece on
"Six-Member Juries in District Courts" in the Boston Bar Journal;19
Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 102. Only at one point does the Court admit the possibility of a difference
between twelve-member and other juries. It notes that "[i]n capital cases . . . it appears
that no State provides for less than 12 jurors." Id. at 103. But instead of appreciating that
the twelve-member jury provides better community representation, the Court merely approves size qua size, the number twelve being a "recognition of the value of the larger body
as a means of legitimating society's decision to impose the death penalty," id., just as a
firing squad is superior to one executioner.
15 Id. at 101.
16 Id. at 101 nA8.
17 Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4 GONZAGA L. REv. 35, 40-41 (1968).
18 Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed ConstitutionalAmendment, 51 GEo.
13

L.J. 120, 134-36 (1962).
19 Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2 BoSroN B.J. No. 4, at 27 (1958).
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(4) "Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts District Court," in the
Journalof the American JudicatureSociety;O (5) "New Jersey Experiments with Six-Man Jury," in the Bulletin of the Section of Judicial
Administration of the American Bar Association;21 and (6) Judge
Phillips' article on "A Jury of Six in All Cases" in the Connecticut Bar
22
Journal.
It is worthwhile to disinter the substance buried in these citations:
(1) Judge Wiehl approvingly cites Charles Joiner's Civil Justice and
the Jury, in which Joiner somewhat disingenously states that "it could
easily be argued that a six-man jury would deliberate equally as well
as one of twelve."23 Since Joiner had no evidence for his conclusion,
Judge Wiehl also does not have any.
(2) Judge Tamm had presided over condemnation trials in the District of Columbia in which five-man juries are used and found them
24
satisfactory.
(3) Cronin relates that the Massachusetts legislature had authorized,
on an experimental basis, the use of six-member juries for civil cases
in the District Court of Worcester, a civil court of limited jurisdiction.
Forty-three such trials were conducted, and the highest verdict was for
a sum of $2,500. The clerk of the court is said to have reported that
"the six-member jury verdicts are about the same as those returned
by regular twelve-member juries." 25 Three lawyers also testified that
they could not detect any differences in verdicts, one because "the
26
panel is drawn from the regular Superior Court panel of jurors,"
another because "[t]here seems to be no particular reason why the
size of a finding would be affected by a six-man jury. '27 All those
trials, it seems, were given preferential scheduling to endear them
to counsel.
(4) The Court's fourth cited authority consists of an abbreviated
summary of the Massachusetts experiment and concludes that "the
lawyers who use the District Court, as well as the clerk, report that
the verdicts are no different than those returned by twelve-member
28
juries."
20 Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts District Court, 42 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 136
(1958).
21 New Jersey Experiments with Six-Man jury, BULL. OF THE SECTION OF Jut. ADMIN.
OF THE A B.A., May, 1966, at 6.
22 Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1956).
23 C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 83 (1962), cited in Wiehl, supra note 17, at 39
n.16.
24 Tamm, supra note 18, at 137.
25 Cronin, supra note 19, at 27.
26 Id. at 28.

27 Id. at 28-29.
28 Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts District Court, supra note 20, at 136.
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(5) The ABA Bulletin contains the statement that "the Monmouth
[New Jersey] County Court has experimented with the use of a six'29
man jury in a [sic] civil negligence case."
(6) Judge Phillips summarizes the economic advantages derived
from the Connecticut law that permits litigants to opt for a six-member
jury in civil cases. He advocates a mandatory reduction in jury size,
but never even mentions the problem of possible differences in verdicts in comparison to the twelve-member jury.30
This is scant evidence by any standards. The several thousand verdicts by criminal juries each year in Florida, Louisiana, and Utah
would have provided better evidence. Of course, no such evidence
was produced at the trial court, but the Court could conceivably have
asked sua sponte for such a study.31 Even without specific data, however, it is possible to demonstrate that the six-member jury must be
expected to perform quite differently than the twelve-member jury
32
in several important respects.
II.

SIX-MEMBER CIVIL JURIES IN A STRATIFIED COMMUNITY

The jury system is predicated on the insight that people see and
evaluate things differently. It is one function of the jury to bring these
divergent perceptions and evaluations to the trial process. 33 If all people weighed trial evidence in the same manner, a jury of one would
be as good as a jury of twelve because there would never be any disagreement among them. In fact, we know the opposite to be true, if
not from observation of our community then from the performance
of our juries. Two-thirds of all juries find their vote split in the first
ballot in a criminal case. 34 We have no comparable data on the li29 New Jersey Experiments with Six-Man Jury, supra note 21.
30 Phillips, supra note 22.
31 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the World War II treason case of
Cramer v. United States, it "invited reargument addressed to specific questions," Cramer
v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 7, 8 (1945), whereupon "[t]he Solicitor General engaged
scholars not otherwise involved in conduct of the case to collect and impartially to
summarize" the historical background of the issue in the major legal systems, id. at 8
n.9. For the compilation of American law, see Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58
H-Itv. L. Rlv. 226 (1944).
32 These proofs are derived from well established elementary statistical theory, from
simple models, and from some empirical data; it is the best evidence presently available.
To acquire more complete evidence would require additional research along two lines: (1)
controlled simulated experiments that would allow six- and twelve-member juries to view
and judge the same case and, more accessible if more tenuous, (2) retrospective performance
analysis of actual six-member juries in the states that employ them.
33 This is perhaps more true today than it was at the time the jury grew into a legal
institution. Originally, the emphasis was directed more toward the difference between the
jury and the judges as the representative of the King, and less toward the differences
among jurors.
34 H. KALvEN, JR. & H. ZEisEL, THE AMERiCAN JuRY 487 (1966).
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ability vote of the civil jury, but we do know that the evaluation
of damages usually covers a broad range.
There is, therefore, good reason to believe that the jury, to some
extent, brings into the courtroom the differences in perception which
exist in the community. To see how the six-member jury performs
this function in comparison with a twelve-member jury, it will be useful to begin with a simple model of a stratified society. We shall assume
that 90% of the community share identical viewpoints and that the
remaining 10% have a different viewpoint.3 5 Even a jury of twelve,
of course, is too small to represent all community views, but it can be
shown that the smaller the size of the jury, the less frequently it even
approaches community representation.
Juries, especially federal juries,36 are chosen by lottery from the
pool of available jurors. Suppose, now, we were to draw 100 twelvemember juries and 100 six-member juries from a population that had
a 10% minority. Of the 100 twelve-member juries, approximately 72
would have at least one representative of that minority; while of the
100 six-member juries, only 47 would have one. It is clear, then, that
however limited a twelve-member jury is in representing the full
spectrum of the community, the six-member jury is even more limited,
and not by a "negligible" margin.
Whether this difference in degree of community representation
results in a difference in civil verdicts is, of course, even more important. To explore this question we will slightly complicate our
stratification model of the community. We know from experience
and from many careful studies that the values different people place
on the harm done in a personal injury case are likely to diverge considerably. Table 1 assumes that with respect to the evaluation of a particular claim the community is divided into six groups of equal size.
We shall make a further assumption, very close to reality, that whatever the composition of the jury, the damages it awards will lie around
the average of the evaluations of all individual jurors. Again, we shall
simulate 100 random selections of the two types of juries-the twelvemember and the six-member jury. This time, however, we shall be
35 The "minority" need not be a demographic one; it may represent any minority
viewpoint, although the obvious concern is for representation of demographically defined
minorities. One may argue, and I would, that we should not confront each other as
majority and minority. But at this juncture of history, it is apparently not the accepted
view to disregard such differences. And to force on the jury a view that is not accepted by
the population in other spheres would seem to be a rash move.
36 See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-71 (Supp. IV, 1968), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-71
(1964). See also Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Case of the Vanishing Women Jurors, 37 U. Cr.

L. R.v. 1, 16-17 (1969).
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TABLE 1
COM.MUNITY EVALUATION OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM

Fraction of Community

Average

Dollar Evaluation

1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6
1/6

1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000

1/1

3,500

interested in the average of the individual evaluations of all members
of any given jury. Thus, we shall record a twelve-member jury consisting of 6 persons who would evaluate an injury at $1,000, and
6 who would evaluate the same injury at $2,000, as $1,500-the average
of 6 X $1,000 + 6 X $2,000. Table 2 indicates the relative spread of
these averages around the middle value for all juries of $3,500.
TABLE 2
PER CENT DISTRIBUTION

OF THE AVERAGE EVALUATION

BY 100 RANDOMLY SELEcrTED JURIES

Interval
$1,000-1,499
$1,500-1,999
$2,000-2,499
$2,500-2,999
$3,000-3,499
$3,500-3,999
$4,000-4,499
$4,500-4,999
$5,000-5,499
$5,500-6,000
Totals

Twelve-member
0.1
2.0
13.7
34.2
34.2
13.7
2.0
0.1
100.0

Six-member
0.1
1.4
6A
16.4
25.7
25.7
16.4
6A
1.4
0.1
100.0

It is easy to see that the six-member juries show a considerably
wider variation of "verdicts" than the twelve-member juries. For
instance, 68.4% of the twelve-member jury evaluations fall between
$3,000 and $4,000, while only 51.4% of the six-member jury evaluations fall in this range. Almost 16% of the six-member juries will
reach verdicts that will fall into the extreme levels of more than $4,500
or less than $2,500, as against only a little over 4% of the twelvemember juries. The appropriate statistical measure of this variation
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is the so-called standard deviation.3 7 The actual distribution pattern
will always depend on the kind of stratification that is relevant in a
particular case, but whatever the circumstances, the six-member jury
will always have a standard deviation that is greater by about 42%.
This is the result of a more general principle that is by now well
known to readers of such statistics as public opinion polls-namely,
that the size of any sample is inversely related to its margin of error. 38
Lest it be thought that standard deviation is merely part of a statistician's game that has no counterpart in reality, it will be useful to
provide the appropriate translation of the term into lawyer's language.
It is the measure of the gamble the lawyer takes when he goes to trial.
The "gambling" notion is seldom made explicit because normally
each case is tried only once, but lawyers are quite conscious of the
degree to which jury verdicts may vary. To obtain a measure of this
variability, trial lawyers were asked to think about their next civil
case and to estimate how they would expect ten different juries to
decide. 9 These estimates show, as a rule, a considerable amount of
variation, which should not come as a surprise since a case goes to the
jury on the very ground that reasonable men may differ in its resolution. Whatever the extent of the "gamble" incurred through the
twelve-member jury, we must expect that it will be significantly
greater with a six-member jury.40
This increase in the "gamble" might well have an interesting side
effect; it could increase the incidence of jury waiver and thereby
37 The standard deviation is the square root of all squared deviations from the group
average.
88 A reduction of the size of a sample by
increases the margin of error by the square
root of 2/1, or simply of 2-that is, by a factor of 1.42, or by 42%.
39 Data collected by the University of Chicago Jury Project, on file at the University of
Chicago Law School. The following is an excerpt from the questionnaire and a sample
answer:
Which, in your estimate, will be the most likely award in this case after trial?
$25,000
Of course, you cannot be certain that this will be the verdict. If you had to try
this case ten different times before ten different juries, you would expect some
variation in the verdicts. What do you think these verdicts would look like?
$ 0
$ 20,000
$ 25,000
$ 25,000
$ 35,000

$ 35,000

$100,000

$100,000

S 50,000

$100,000

Another way of providing an estimate of the variability of jury verdicts would be to
allow properly selected extra-juries-for instance by observation of closed-circuit television
screens-to try the same case after simulated deliberations.
40 The juries in our model have not undergone voir dire challenges which, when conducted by competent counsel, would tend to eliminate the extreme value positions. Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that such challenges would affect both types of juries equally
and consequently would not eliminate the differences between them.
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reduce the frequency of jury trials. The trial lawyer survey also
suggests that lawyers expect the variation of verdicts returned by
twelve-member juries to be of about the same magnitude as the variation expected if the same case were tried in bench trials before different judges.4 1 If the jury size is reduced from twelve to six, this
perception of the approximate balance between jury and bench trial
will be disturbed. Henceforth, the "gamble" with a jury will be significantly greater than the "gamble" with a judge and, as a result, more
lawyers might waive their right to a jury, perhaps a consequence not
unexpected by those who initiated the reform.
In addition to the tendency to be less representative and to produce
more varied damage verdicts, the six-member jury is likely to yield
fewer examples of that treasured, paradoxical phenomenon-the hung
jury.4 2 Hung juries almost always arise from situations in which there
were originally several dissenters. Even if only one holds out, his having once been the member of a group is essential in sustaining him
against the majority's efforts to make the verdict unanimous. Fewer
hung juries can be expected in six-member juries for two reasons: first,
as discussed earlier, there will be fewer holders of minority positions
on the jury; second, if a dissenter appears, he is more likely to be the
only one on the jury. Lacking any associate to support his position, he
is more likely to abandon it.
In Williams the Court cites the studies conducted in connection
with The American Jury to support its proposition that "jurors in
the minority on the first ballot are likely to be influenced by the proportional size of the majority aligned against them.

' 43

It is only fair

to point out that the findings were quite different:
Nevertheless, for one or two jurors to hold out to the end, it
would appear necessary that they had companionship at the beginning of the deliberations. The juror psychology recalls a famous series of experiments by the psychologist Asch and
others which showed that in an ambiguous situation a member of a group will doubt and finally disbelieve his own correct observation if all other members of the group claim that
he must have been mistaken. To maintain his original posi41

Data collected by the University of Chicago Jury Project, on file at the University of

Chicago Law School.
42 The hung jury is treasured because it represents the legal system's respect for the
minority viewpoint that is held strongly enough to thwart the will of the majority. The
paradox lies in the fact that the hung jury is only tolerable in moderation; too many
hung juries would impede the effective functioning of the courts.
43 Willams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 n.49 (1970), citing H. KaLVEN, JR. & H. ZFaS.L,
supranote 34,at 462-63, 488-89.
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tion, not only before others but even before himself, it is necessary for him to have at least one ally.44
The distinction is crucial in this respect: If it is only the proportion
that matters, then one versus five is the equivalent of two versus ten;
but if the original companionship of an ally is essential, then one
versus five is far less likely to produce a hung jury than two versus
ten. As stated previously, the probability of having at least one member of a minority (which comprises 10% of the population) on the
twelve-member jury is 72 out of every 100, as against 47 on six-member
juries. The discrepancy is aggravated by the fact that the expectation
of having more than one minority member on the twelve-member jury
is 34 out of every 100, as against only 11 on six-member juries.
This was one hypothesis, among those developed in this article, that
could be put to an immediate test. A survey was initiated to establish
the frequency of hung juries in criminal jury trials that had gone to
verdict since January 1, 1969 in the Miami Circuit Court, the largest
Florida court. The results were 7 hung juries in 290 trials before sixmember juries. The comparison with the national average provides
startling and gratifying confirmations of this prediction:
TABLE 3
HUNG JURIES IN CRIMINAL JuRY TRLAis
Twelve-member ............................................................
Six-m ember .................................................................

5.0% a
2.4% b

Sources:
a H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, supra note 34, at 56.

b Data collected by the University of Chicago Jury Project, on file at the University of
Chicago Law School.

On grounds of economy, one might welcome any reduction in the
number of hung juries. One should understand, however, that such
reduction is but the combined result of less representative, more homogeneous juries and of a reduced ability to resist the pressure for
unanimity.
From the foregoing discussion, it would appear that the Court's
holding in Williams rests on a poor foundation. In several important
respects, the six-member jury performs differently than the twelvemember jury. The Court probably suspected that some differences
in composition and performance would exist between the types of
juries but thought them negligibly small. It would seem that the
Court has underestimated their magnitude.
44

H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, supra note 34, at 463.
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III.

CRIMINAL SIX-MEMBER JURIES AND MAJORITY VERDICTS

Neither the reduction of the size of the criminal jury nor the adoption of majority verdicts are presently being considered by the federal
courts. Yet it is not premature to explore the consequences that would
accompany these two changes. Despite the Court's emphasis of the
importance of the unanimity requirement in Williams, there are indications, as Justice Harlan has recognized,4 5 that this requirement
could fall, and the reduction of the criminal jury may similarly be
within purview.46
The above analysis of the six-member civil jury applies with minor
variations to the criminal jury, where the stratification does not pertain to the dollar-evaluation of a claim, but to the perception of the
gravity of the charged crime and, more importantly, to the differing
standards of "reasonable doubt." To obtain a conviction under the
unanimity rule, the prosecutor must persuade the juror with the
highest standard. Considering the class of jurors who are most difficult to convince as a "minority" in terms of our model, it is evident
that fewer six-member juries will contain representatives of that minority.4 7 Consequently, a six-member jury provides a lesser safeguard
for the defendant than a twelve-member jury. Careful study of the
operation of juries with less than twelve members in such states as
Florida, Louisiana, and Utah should confirm this hypothesis by revealing that these juries yield fewer hung juries,4 8 more findings of
guilt, and among them relatively fewer convictions for the lesser included offense4 9 than are rendered in comparable cases by twelvemember juries.
4G Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 122 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
46 The Court will soon hear reargument on this issue in Johnson v. Louisiana, 230

So.2d 825 (La. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.M. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1970) (No. 5338),
and Apocado v. Oregon, 462 P.2d 137 (Ore. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 1970) (No. 5161), involving the two states that allow majority verdicts in felony

jury trials.
Rumblings on this theme came from the recent London meeting of the American Bar
Association:
From the remarks that have been made in speeches so far, it appears that five
features of the British system are prime candidates for tryouts in the United
States:

One is nonunanimous verdicts in jury trials. For several years British courts

have been permitting jury actions on votes of 10 to 2, and statistics show that there
have been more convictions, more acquittals and fewer hung juries than before.
The United States Supreme Court is expected to decide during its next term if it
would be constitutional for United States juries to rule by less-than-unanimous
votes.
N.Y. Times, July 19, 1971, at 14, col. 3.
47' See H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZmsmSL, supra note 34, at 182-90.
48 See text at note 42 supra.
49 See note 46 supra.
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With respect to the abandonment of the unanimity rule, there is
again considerable experience in the state courts. Many states allow
majority verdicts in civil trials before both twelve- and six-member
juries; 5° some states permit such verdicts in minor criminal trials, 5 '
and two states allow majority verdicts even in felony trials for noncapital offenses. 52 The important element to observe is that the abandonment of the unanimity rule is but another way of reducing the
size of the jury. But it is reduction with a vengeance, for a majority
verdict requirement is far more effective in nullifying the potency
of minority viewpoints than is the outright reduction of a jury to a
size equivalent to the majority that is allowed to agree on a verdict.
Minority viewpoints fare better on a jury of ten that must be unanimous than on a jury of twelve where ten members must agree on a
verdict.
An example will elucidate this proposition. Suppose we again assume a minority position held by 10% of the population, and that
two sets of juries are drawn: 100 twelve-member juries and 100 tenmember juries. In Table 4 are the frequencies with which the minority
view can be expected to be represented.
TABLE 4
EXPECTED NUMBER OF MINORITY JURORS*
ON 100 RANDOMLY SELECrED JURIES

Number

Twelve-member

Ten-member

None
One
Two
Three or more

28
38
23
11

35
39
19
7

Totals

100

100

* Representing 10% of the population.

50 See ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7, amend. 16; CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 7; IDA. CONST. art. I, § 7;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; MoNr. CONsr. art. III, § 23; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; NEV. CONSr.
art. I, § 3; N.J. CONsT. art. I, § 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; OHIo
CONST. art. II, § 5; 2 UTAH CONsr. art. I, § 10; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5.
51 See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(a); MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23; OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 19.
52 LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41; ORE. CONST. art I, § 11. In 1967, the British House of
Commons enacted a statute that allowed majority verdicts of ten in all criminal juries. The
Home Secretary- had requested the change to prevent a potentially bribed juror from
thwarting an otherwise certain conviction. See H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY: NOTES FOR AN ENGLISH CONmROVRSY, (University of Chicago Round Table No. 228,
April, 1967); The Times (London), Apr. 4, 1967, at 71. See also 745 HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFIciAL REPORTS (Hansard), No. 188 (April 27, 1967).
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Looking first at the 100 twelve-member juries, we expect to find
38 juries with one minority representative, 23 with two, and 11 with
three or more. If these twelve-member juries must be unanimous
to reach a verdict, the majority will have to reckon with at least one
minority member in 38 + 23 + 11 - 72 out of the 100 cases. If these
juries are permitted to reach a verdict by agreement of ten jurors,
then the majority will be able simply to disregard the minority position in 38 + 23 = 61 of the 72 cases. Only in the 11 cases in which
we must expect three or more minority jurors will they be able to
influence the verdict.
Let us now turn to the ten-member juries. Here only 39 + 19 + 7 65 of the 100 juries are expected to have at least one minority member.
But if we assume that the ten-member jury must be unanimous, then
the ten-member jury will give the 10% minority a chance to influence
the verdict almost six times as frequently (65:11) as in the case of the
twelve-member jury with majority rule.
No present proposals envisage combining size reduction and majority rule for federal juries. Yet the two jury-enfeebling measures do
exist jointly in some of our state civil courts of limited jurisdiction,
and there no longer appears to be any constitutional guarantee against
such an extension even to federal criminal juries. This powerful combination has been brought to dramatic public attention by the special
military court martial jury which tried Lieutenant Galley after the
My Lai affair in Vietnam.5 3 Galley was tried on a criminal charge-a
capital one at that-before a six-member jury authorized to reach a
verdict by the agreement of only four jurors, a form which allows the
majority to disregard a minority position as long as it does not have
at least three representatives on the jury.5 4 In our hypothetical community with a 10% minority, fewer than 2 out of every 100 Calley-type
juries will have more than two minority representatives if the juries
are randomly selected from the population. Even if we assume a minority position that is held by 30% of the eligible jurors, only about
every fourth Calley-type jury will effectively represent that minority.
One might wonder why the men who drafted the rules for this type
of court martial jury went to the extreme. Might one of their motives
have been that such a jury, more than any other, could be expected
to circumvent or conceal a disturbing minority position?
A significant characteristic of the Calley-type jury is its ability to
hide the fact that the jury's findings may not have been unanimous;
whether the verdict of the Calley jury was unanimous is still unknown.
53
54

N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
See 10 U.S.C. 852 (1964).
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The formula for announcing the verdict reads merely: "Upon secret
written ballot, two-thirds of the members present at the time the vote
was taken.. . ."55 Only one voting constellation out of seven possible
ones (from 6:0 to 0:6) results in a hung jury-the 3:3 constellation.
All the others result in a verdict. The reason for the extraordinary
length of the Calley jury's deliberation may have been its desire to
achieve unanimity in a trial for a capital offense, even if that aspect
of the verdict remained unpublished.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We have shown that the change in verdicts that might be expected
from the reduction of the twelve-member jury to six members is by
no means negligible. We have also considered another potential modification of the federal jury, the majority verdict, and the possible
combined application of both. However, the thrust of this article
must not be misread. Its purpose is not to advocate any of the possible forms of federal juries. It pleads neither for the twelve-member
jury nor for the smaller one, neither for the unanimity requirement
nor for the majority verdict. All these solutions are possible, as is
shown by the variety of rules adopted by our states. The legal systems
of most countries do not have any jury trials; to be sure, their mode of
selecting judges differs radically from ours.
The purpose of this article, rather, is simply to make clear that all
these modifications make for differences in adjudication that appear
to be negligible only to superficial scrutiny. Both in the short and
in the long run our judicial system has many options, but every solution has its own balance sheet of advantages and costs. What is necessary is that we, and with us the United States Supreme Court, see both

with equal clarity.
55 N.Y. Times, Mar. 80, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
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Voting Rights: A Case Study of
Madison Parish, Louisianat
During the past decade Congress recognized that the fifteenth amendment had not succeeded in securing the franchise for all citizens. In the
South, particularly, state-enforced registration laws prevented the majority of blacks from participating in the electoral process. To remedy
this situation, national legislation reaffirmed the right to vote and forged
methods of federal enforcement of that right. Although the initial Civil
Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 provided necessary predicates for relief
from discrimination, they did not terminate the need for county-bycounty litigation. Accordingly, Congress designed the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 to transfer enforcement from the courthouse to the registrar's office through utilization of administrative remedies. This shift
from a litigative to an administrative approach soon achieved impressive levels of black registration. However, the recalcitrance of registrars
and local officials persisted. Discriminatory practices reemerged in attempts to prevent free exercise of the franchise through manipulation
of electoral procedures. Consequently, the tedious litigation which preceded the Act did not abate; judicial intervention was still required to
force compliance with fifteenth amendment guarantees.
This comment will attempt to trace the development and effects of
voting rights litigation in Madison Parish, Louisiana, a black belt community which has experienced four major voting rights suits in the past
ten years. Following a brief description of the parish, the discussion will
focus on the emergence of private party and government suits, the implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the new discriminatory
practices in the exercise of the franchise, and the concomitant effects
on Madison Parish politics. It is hoped that this case study will, therefore, not only capture the flavor of voting rights litigation but also
t This study was performed under a research grant from the American Bar Foundation. The analyses, conclusions, and opinions expressed are those of the authors, however,
and not those of the Foundation, its officers and directors, or others associated with its
work.
During the course of research, extensive interviews were conducted with residents and
local officials in Madison Parish and with attorneys and other participants in voting
rights litigation. When requested, the identity of the person interviewed has been withheld to preserve anonymity.
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suggest the policy considerations which should underly future efforts
to secure the right to cast an effective ballot.
I.

THE SETrING

Madison Parish, whose eastern border meets the Mississippi River,
is situated in the Delta country of northeast Louisiana.' The tracks of
the Illinois Central and the Missouri Railroads divide the parish seat,
Tallulah, 2 both physically and racially-to the west the residences and
business are black-owned and -occupied, to the east they are white.
There is no municipal park, no municipal swimming pool, no indoor
movie theater, no bowling alley, no municipal transportation system,
no functioning hospital. An outdoor movie theater, the only public
recreational facility in Tallulah, is located in the white section of
town; the private Tallulah Country Club provides members with a
nine-hole golf course.
Traditionally, the parish has been a plantation society3 with a black
majority population. 4 Farming5 still provides the area's economic base,
I The parish, with a land area of 662 square miles, was organized by the Louisiana
legislature in 1838 and named after President Madison. For a written history of Madison
Parish, see the undocumented essay by a Tallulah attorney, Murphy, The History of Madison Parish,Louisiana, 11 LA. HIsT. Q. 39 (1928).
2 The original parish seat, Richmond, was destroyed during the Civil War. Tallulah,
founded in 1857, has a romantic origin much cherished by its residents. A railroad construction engineer fell captive to the charm of a rich widow who convinced him to build
the railroad across her land. Once the line was completed, the widow's romantic interest
waned. The disillusioned engineer named the station he established Tallulah, in commemoration of his lost love.
3 The Mississippi Delta area, in northeast Louisiana ...
remains a plantation sodety. There are plantation owners in Tensas and Madison parishes who take pride
in the resemblance between the plantations of 1856 and 1956, in terms of the physical appearance of the Negro and his cabin, and of the social and economic relationships between Negro and white.
The survival of this kind of power depends upon excluding the Negro from all
political and economic power.
Fenton & Vines, Negro Registration in Louisiana, 51 Am. POL. Sc. REv. 704, 708 (1957).
Compare the following 1899 description of the "peculiar conditions" in Madison Parish
which led to the lynching of six Italian immigrants in front of the courthouse:
It is the blackest district in the United States. In a population of 16,000 there are
only one hundred and sixty white families. There are twenty negroes to one
white, and in some sections they stand one hundred to one. Yet the entire power
is in the hands of the whites. They own all the land and other property. They
alone vote; they alone sit on juries. They elect all the officers and administer all
the affairs of the parish. Their administration is excellent ... But with so small
a white population in the midst of such an overwhelming majority of Negroes 'a
strong hand' has been deemed necessary to keep the latter in subjection ....
Walker, Tallulah's Shame, 43 HA .WE'sWVEEKLY 779 (1899).
4 Between 1880 and 1920, blacks comprised approximately 90.0% of the total population. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NEGRO POPULATION 1790-1915, at

782 (1918). In 1930 the figure dropped to 64.5%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COmMERCE, NEGROES IN THE UNrIED STATES 1920-32, at 742 (1935). The black-white popula-

tion ratio remained at 65:35 until 1970, when it dropped to 60:40.
5 Of 423,860 acres only 185,069 are under crop production. Figures available from Madi-
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primarily through extensive government subsidies. 6 Mechanization of

agriculture has resulted in consolidation, however, 7 and the majority of
residents now live in Tallulah."
A changing racial profile has accompanied this demographic shift.
Since 1940, white population has risen in city and parish alike, while
nonwhite population has increased in Tallulah but decreased in the
parish as a whole.9 In other words, a few rural blacks have migrated to
the city while a greater proportion have left the parish altogether.
Lack of industrial development helps explain this exodus.10 The only
source of large-scale employment in Tallulah itself is a lumber mill. 1
son Parish Assessor. The remaining acreage is forest land, 70% of which is owned by the
Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., which operates a plant in Tallulah.
6 In 1969, 112 farms received $1.7 million in grants and subsidies. Eighteen farms and
corporations received over $120,000 apiece in cotton surplus. The overall average subsidy
was $13,900, with one farm garnering $79,000. Interview with Carl Smith, Director, Delta
Community Action Association (funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity), in Tallulah, La., Oct. 30, 1970. Compare the fact that the Chicago Mill and Lumber Co. pays
no taxes to the city of Tallulah.
7 Between 1950 and 1959 the number of farms decreased from 1669 to 735 and the average size increased from 142.4 to 281.5 acres. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL, A STATISTICAL PROFILE oF MADISON PAISH 13 (June, 1965) (out of print; copy on file at The
University of Chicago Law Review [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL PROFILE].
8 In 1940, 69% of the parish's residents were settled in rural areas. 2 BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, PoPuLATION pt. 3, at 363 (1943). By 1960, city dwellers were in the majority, with 57.2% of the
population. Additionally, of the 42.8% representing rural population, 17.2% are classified
as nonfarm. I BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EIGHTEENTH DECENNIAL
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960 pt. 20, at 10, 230 (1963).
9

1940

Madison
Total
White
Nonwhite
Tallulah
Total
White
Nonwhite

1950

1960

1970

Population

Per
Cent

Population

Per
Cent

Population

Per
Cent

Population

Per
Cent

18,443
5,655
12,788

80.7
69.3

17,451
5,891
11,560

33.8
66.2

16,444
5,812
10,632

35.3
64.7

15,065
5,895
9,151

39.1
60.9

5,712
1,955
3,757

34.2
65.8

7,758
2,145
5,613

27.6
72.4

9,413
2,874
6,539

30.5
69.5

9,446
*
*

*

* 1970 figures not yet available.
Sources: 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

U.S. DEP'T OF COmmERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE

UNITED STATES: 1940, POPULATION pt. 3, at 363, 419 (1943); 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE SEVENTEENTH DECENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950 pt. 18, at 24, 72 (1952); 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EIGHTEENTH DECENNIAL

CENSUS OF THE UNITED

STATES,

CENSUS OF

POPULATION: 1960 pt. 20, at 57, 82 (1963). The 1970 census figures are available from the
Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce.
10 Between 1950 and 1964, the number of farms operated by blacks decreased from
1,058 to 152 while the number of white-owned farms increased from 611 to 368. STATISTICAL
PROFILE, supra note 7, at 13 (1950 figures); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF CommiaERCE,
CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: 1964, LOUISIANA 326-27 (1965) (1964 figures).
11 Although Madison Parish does not meet the 6% unemployed criterion for classifica-
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Welfare payments, therefore, support a substantial segment of the pop12
ulation, both black and white.
Madison Parish has always been a black majority community under
white control. 13 In 1884 the ratio of black to white voters was ten to
one, the highest of any parish in Louisiana.14 Blacks did not, however,
govern themselves, and following the post-Reconstruction era they were
disenfranchised. 15 For the next half century, the apparatus of state-suption as an area of substantial unemployment, the average estimate of those out of work
was 5.8% in 1967, 5.7% in 1968, and 4.7% in 1969. The hiring of additional workers at
boat plants in Delhi, Louisiana and Natchez, Mississippi caused the reported decrease in
1969 unemployment. LA. DEs'T or EMPLOYMENT, CIVILIAN WORK FORCE STUDY, AREA
MANPOWER REvmw 1967-1969. On August 7, 1967, on the basis of criteria other than
unemployment, Madison Parish was designated a redevelopment area under Title 4 of the
Public Works and Economic Development Act. Letter from William L. Gifford, Special
Assistant for Legislative Affairs, United States Department of Labor, to Senator Russell
Long, Aug. 7, 1967.
12 In 1959, of 3,619 families, 63.2% earned under $3,000 and 4.6% earned over $10,000.
The median annual income was $2,190. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DF'T OF COMMERCE,
COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 1967, at 153 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 DATA BOOK].

Comparative Louisiana state figures: 35.6% of the population earn less than $3,000 per
year, 9.9% earn more than $10,000; the median income for Louisiana is $4,272. Id. In
December, 1970, 1,092 families received food stamps for 5,271 individuals, amounting to
S120,885 in coupons. Madison Journal (La.), Jan. 28, 1971, at 3A. Aid to Dependent
Children funds reached 427 families, representing 1,695 children and amounting to payments of $38,829. LA. PuBuc WELFARE STATISTICS, REPORT ON APRIL, MAY AND JUNE
1970, at 10 (figures as of June 1970). Contributing to the dominance of welfare in the
Madison Parish economy are the age level and educational background of residents. The
percentage of citizens over 65 rose from 4.8% in 1940 to 7.7% in 1950 to 10.2% in 1960,
while the percentage of those 21 and over decreased from 59.5% in 1940 to 55.5% in 1950
to 51.7% in 1960. 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, POPULATION pt. 3, at 372 (1943); 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE SEVENTEENTH DECENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950 pt. 18, at 72 (1952); 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EIGITEENTH DECENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, CENSUS OF

1960 pt. 20, at 82 (1963). Only 19.6% of the residents have completed high
school, and 36.8% have finished less than five years of school; 10.9% of the adults have
no schooling. 1967 DATA BOOK, supra, at 153. With a median school year completion level
of 6.7 grades for those 25 and over, id., Madison Parish ranks 54th of the 64 parishes.
STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 7, at 5.
Is Detloff & Jones, Race Relations in Louisiana 1877-98, 9 LA. HiST. 301, 309 (1968).
14 1886 LA. SEC'Y OF STATE ANN. REP.; 1884 LA. SEC'Y OF STATE STATEMENT, at 51-52
(1886).
15 See Walker, supra note 3. Carpetbag government existed in Louisiana until April,
1877. During the following twenty years, the Democratic Party secured its position by
buying black votes while running on a white supremacy ticket. The 1898 state constitution
established three alternative qualifications for electors: an educational requirement
which included demonstrating ability to read and write by filling out an application
form containing "traps for the unwary," a property requirement of $300 assessed value
and paid-up taxes, and a grandfather clause. LA. CONsT. art. 197, §§ 3-5 (1898). The grandfather clause was a substitute for the understanding clause, which had been condemned
as a fraud. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 372 nA6 (E.D. La. 1963), af'd, 380
U.S. 145 (1965). Judge Wisdom's scholarly opinion provides a concise historical overview
POPULATION:
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ported segregation insured that black citizens would be denied the right
to vote.16 The white primary served to prevent blacks from influencing
the nominating process and, following its invalidation' 7 the Louisiana
Constitution itself provided the means by which local officials deprived
all blacks of the franchise'8-under the "voucher requirement," all
prospective registrants were required to establish their identity to the
registrar's satisfaction."9 In Madison Parish, the registrar invariably demanded that black applicants obtain personal verification from two
registered voters. 20 Since all registered voters were white and no white
would "vouch" for a black, total disfranchisement on racial grounds
resulted.
World War II appears to have been an important catalyst in changing this system. Although segregation existed in the army, black men
trained with whites and were expected to perform similar jobs. Readjustment to Southern expectations of servility and self-deprecation was
difficult. 21 Moreover, an election for President had been held in 1944.
White soldiers could cast absentee ballots, but many black men could
not.
[I]t was a time when President Franklin D. Roosevelt was runin addition to a detailed study of statutory and discretionary discriminatory devices. See
also W.E.B. DuBois, BLAcK RECONSTRUCrION (1935); E. LONN, RECONSTRUCTION IN LOUISIANA
AFrra 1868 (1918); Fenton & Vines, supra note S.
16 When the Supreme Court invalidated the grandfather clause, Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347 (1915), Louisiana's 1921 constitutional convention replaced it with an equally
odious practice. The interpretation test required voter applicants to be able to read and
write and to interpret the state and federal constitutions. LA. CONsT. art. 8, § 1(c) (1921). A
provision permitting registration if the applicant could "understand and give a reasonable
interpretation of any section of either Constitution when read to him by the registrar"
protected illiterate white voters against disenfranchisement. Id. at § l(d), repealed in
1960 by constitutional amendment, LA. CONsT. art. 8, § 1(c).
17 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see V.0. KEY, SoUTHERN PoLrmcs IN STATE
AND NATION 555, 576 (1949). For a discussion of alternative methods of disenfranchisement,
see M. PRICE, THE NEGRO AND THE BALLOT IN THE SOUTH (1959); Note, Use of Literacy Tests
to Restrict the Right to Vote, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 251 (1956).
Is Until 1962 no Madison Parish black was registered; as of 1956 only three other
parishes could report zero black registration. U.S. CoMa''N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT 567-69
(1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 CIvIL RIGHTs REPORT].
19 LA. CONST. art. 8, § l(c) (1921); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:37 (1969).
20 See United States v. Ward, 222 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349 F.2d 795,
modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1965). The voucher requirement was even more pernicious
than either the interpretation test or the selective purge. Although federal law did not
require officials to preserve records, cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (Supp. V, 1965-69), some registrars
kept files of rejected applications, which enabled investigators to document technicalities
employed to disfranchise blacks. By contrast, when the voucher requirement was used
no black ever even filled out an application form and no documents existed to contradict
a registrar's avowal of nondiscriminatory practices.
21 See U.S. Comm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT 42 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 CIvl.
RIGHTS REPORT].
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ning for reelection. All of us black soldiers stood there and
felt like fools as we watched white soldiers going to cast their
absentee ballots for Roosevelt. You know all of us liked Roosevelt and, man, I wanted to vote so bad that it just hurt. But
they told me I couldn't vote because I wasn't a registered voter
in my hometown. Now here I was an American soldier way over
in Europe fighting for some white people's freedom and I
couldn't even vote for the president of my own country. That
hurt me bad. I said to myself right then that when I get back
to Tallulah [and Madison Parish] I was gonna start laying
the
22
groundwork for black people to get the right to vote.
This resolution gained strength from evidence that blacks throughout
the South were resisting discriminatory social patterns23 and from the
increased black registration in some areas following invalidation of the
24
white primary
In Madison Parish, returning veterans began their first attempts to
register during 1947. These individuals still reside in the parish and
provide the continuity of leadership which has been a major factor
in securing the black community's strong political position.2 5 Zelma C.
Wyche, the acknowledged leader of the parish's blacks, described the
nature of prelitigation history:
[In 1947] we drew up a petition with the names of the taxpayers in the town and presented it to the Mayor and the
Sheriff after an appointment had been made with them.
[T]hey said they would take it under consideration and notify us at a later date and this date was never given. We were
22 The statement is that of Village Marshal Zelma C. Wyche, quoted in Sanders, Black
Lawman in KKK Territory, EBONY, Jan., 1970, at 57, 60.
23 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating restrictive housing
covenants); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (invalidating local laws requiring
segregated seating in passenger carriers engaged in interstate travel).
24 It is estimated that in 1940 only 5% of voting-age blacks were registered to vote in
eleven Southern states. By 1947 the number increased to 12% and by 1952 to 20%.
M. PRicE, THE NEGRO VOTER IN THE SOUTH 1 (1957). In Louisiana, black registration in 1948
was only 3% but by 1952 it had reached 10.2% of the eligible adult blacks. Hearings
Before the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights 424 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Civil Rights
Hearings].
25 My primary reason for coming back to Madison Parish after World War II
was to do something about the situation that we were in in Madison Parish as
black people . . . . We were really under a bondage . . . . [Bllack people were
primarily slaves, I might say, because there was nothing constructive that black
people could do in Madison Parish that would help them. The only thing
that the white man wanted out of us was work for nothing or a little pay. After
that they were through with you. I knew I was going to stay in Madison Parish
the rest of my days and that was why I thought it was necessary to band ourselves
together to do something to help eradicate these conditions that we were in.
Interview with Zelma C. Wyche, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 29, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Wyche
Interview].
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asking for the privilege of registering and voting in Madison
Parish.
[After the meeting with the Mayor and the Sheriff] we went
to the Register office on the first occasion, we asked the Registrar if we could be registered at that time and she said, "Yes,
but you will have to have two electors who are on my books to
identify you."
And we asked if any Negroes were on the books and we were
told no. We said, are there any whites registered? And she said,
"Yes." We said, "who are some of them?" And she said, "practically all the white people in Madison Parish are registered."
"Would you give us some of the names?" We asked,-this
is on the first occasion-and she said, "quite a few are registered." Or, "All are registered." And we asked if we could
get some of the names and she said: "You might bump into
some of them on the streets any place." And we left the office.
[In 1951] we had a committee to go and try to register 26
[The Registrar] said, "You will have to have certain
identification." And I told her I had my driver's license
and also I had my tax receipts in my pocket, which I thought
were identification enough, and at that time I had my honorable discharge from the Army in a small pocketbook size and
I offered to show these but she said, "you still will have to
have someone who is on our books to identify you." She told
us we should see the Sheriff about registering, and we left the
office and went across the hall to the Sheriff's office. He wasn't
27
in on that particular date and we didn't see him.

Repeated frustration led black residents to retain the only black attorney in that part of the state, James Sharp, Jr.,28 as counsel. Con26 The committee was composed of barbers Wyche, Harrison Brown, and Ike Oliver,
and dry cleaning store owner Martin Williams.
27 Record at 5-11, United States v. Ward, 222 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349
F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1965) (testimony of Zelma C. Wyche) [this portion of the Record hereinafter cited as Wyche Testimony]. (The questions put to the
witness are omitted from this quoted portion to permit a continuous narrative statement.
The testimony has been edited to avoid repetitions, and bracketed words and phrases
have been inserted for clarification.)
28 Sharp was at that time the only black attorney in northeast Louisiana. For a documentation of the difficulties he encountered before Southern judges, see Sharp v. Lucky,
148 F. Supp. 8 (W.D. La. 1957), rev'd, 252 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1958), on remand, 165 F. Supp.
405 (W.D. La. 1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 842 (1959), in which Sharp sued for money damages
alleging injury to him as a black attorney. For a discussion of Sharp's difficulties as counsel for black plaintiffs, see M. Psuca, supra note 17, at 43. Sharp's client, Dr. Reddix,
technically won his suit, R'eddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1958), but class relief
was denied and Reddix dismissed Sharp.
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tinuing the negotiation approach preferred by parish representatives, 29
Sharp contacted the Registrar of Voters, the town's Mayor, and the
Judge of Louisiana's Sixth Judicial Court to seek their cooperation in
correcting the registration procedures. Having received no response to
his inquiry,30 Sharp visited the Registrar's office. Registrar Mary K.
Ward 31 informed him that there was an agreement between the parishes of East Carrol, Madison, and Tensas to the effect that Negroes
would not be permitted to register. 32 She stated that she was operating
under instructions from several public officials, including Sheriff C. E.
33
Hester, and that Sharp should discuss the matter with them.
At Sheriff Hester's office two armed officers were present during the
interview.
I was somewhat surprised at the intimidating fashion in which
he went about it ....Sheriff Hester began at that moment to
denounce the administration of Mr. Truman, and he did seem
to express just a little more regard for the administration of
Mr. Eisenhower, and he told me that I was sitting on a powder
keg; that in effect he said that if I pursued what appeared to
be my purpose any further, that he would take me for a ride.
He further stated that any efforts that I would make in that
direction I could assure myself that I would not have any
34
protection whatsoever from his office.
In a letter to Wyche recounting this experience, Sharp concluded that
"legal proceedings are indicated and in my opinion ... in order."3 5 An
additional unsuccessful attempt to register confirmed the necessity for
litigation and provided the incident on which to base a complaint.36
29 "I wish to confirm our decision at a recent conference to use all peaceful means to
solve this problem before legal action is taken; to withhold legal proceedings in any event
until the books are closed for registration in the coming election." Letter from James

Sharp, Jr. to Zelma C. Wyche, Mar. 1, 1954.
30 Letter from James Sharp, Jr. to Judge Frank Voelker, Sr., of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, Mar. 1, 1954 (copies were sent to Mayor Sevier and Registrar
Ward) (copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review).
31 Mrs. Ward had held the appointive position of Registrar of Voters since 1931;
she retired in 1955.
32 Letter from James Sharp, Jr. to Zelma C. Wyche, Mar. 26, 1954 (copy on file at The
University of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Sharp Letter].
33 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 24, at 35 (testimony of James Sharp, Jr.).
34

Id. at 36. Compare the sworn statement submitted by Sheriff Hester to the Com-

mission on April 26, 1961. Id. at 755.
35 Sharp Letter, supra note 32.
36 This experience was a duplicate of previous attempts to register. However, Sheriff
Hester erased any doubts concerning the feasibility of future applications by stating that

there "wasn't any niggers registered on the books, and . . . 'as long as I am Sheriff
there won't be any registered on the books, and I am tired of you coming up here."'

Wyche Testimony, supra note 27.
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PRE-VOTING RIGHTS ACT LITIGATION

The Private Suit: A Lesson in Futility

In 1954, blacks faced substantial barriers when instituting litigation. 7
While the Department of Justice could file criminal charges,38 it was
assumed that only the aggrieved private parties, and not the federal
government, had standing to bring civil actions for damages or equitable relief.3 9 Moreover, fear of intimidation, lack of finances, difficulty
in adducing evidence, and expectations of unfavorable verdicts from
Southern jurors deterred individuals from initiating proceedings. 40
In weighing these factors, Madison Parish blacks deemphasized possible intimidation. Although harassment could be anticipated, black
leaders believed that citizens in northeast Louisiana rarely resorted to
violence when dealing with civil rights problems. 41 Additionally, individuals who attempted to register were self-employed and served the
black community; the impact of unofficial economic sanctions by local
37 Although Congress had passed three comprehensive Civil Rights Acts following the
Civil War, only five enforcement provisions remained in force by 1954. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 14 Star. 27 (1866), evolved into 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 and 18 U.S.C. § 242
(Supp. V, 1965-69). Three sections of the major Reconstruction legislation, the Enforcement Acts of 1870, 16 Stat. 40 (1870), survived judicial emasculation and Congressional
repeal in 28 Star. 36 (1894): 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964) (criminal sanctions) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1964) (restating the fifteenth amendment but providing no sanctions). The 1871
Act provided for civil damages and equitable relief and was usually joined to § 1971, 17
Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (Supp. V, 1965-69). For a discussion of these Acts
with respect to voting and the general development of civil rights litigation, see Kommers,
The Right to Vote and Its Implementation, 39 NoTaE DAME LAW. 365 (1964); Note, Federal Civil Rights Legislation, 54 Nw. L. REv. 332 (1959); Note, Federal Legislation to
Safeguard Voting Rights: The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 46 VA. L. REV. 945, 949-54 (1960);
cf. Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CORNELL L. REV. 108 (1960).
38 For general criticism of government initiative in the field of criminal civil rights
litigation, see Comment, Discretion to ProsecuteFederal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YAE L.J.
1297 (1965); cf. 1961 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 21, at 75 n.18 ("the criminal statutes
were unwieldy and difficult to apply'). See also 1957 LA. ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 109 (1957)
(Louisiana federal grand jury refused to issue indictments in connection with voter
registration discrimination). But see R. CARa, FEDERAL PROTECON OF CIvIL RIGHTs 198
(1947) (arguing that criminal sanctions here operate to order society without resort to punitive actions).
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1983, 1985 (Supp. V, 1965-69). But see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1894).
Few private suits in the area of voting were filed between 1870 and 1957. See 1961 CiviL
RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 21, at 134; Kommers, supra note 37, at 372. For analysis
of
recent private suits, see Niles, Civil Actions for Damages under the Federal Civil Rights
Statutes, 45 TEX. L. REv. 1015 (1967).
40 Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3
(1965). The Government had similar problems once it undertook civil actions. See text at
notes 69-73 infra.
41 Interview with Zelma C. Wyche, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 28, 1970 [hereinafter cited as
Wyche Interview.
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whites would, therefore, be minor. Since the complainants were willing
to testify about discussions held with Mrs. Ward and Sheriff C. E.
Hester during recent unsuccessful attempts to register, the only anticipated difficulty was proving that the Registrar did not require "unknown" white applicants to meet the standards imposed on black
citizens. In this regard, the plaintiffs hoped that a 1952 injunctive
order against discriminatory use of the voucher in Bossier Parish
would provide the basis for asking the district judge to find discrimination through statistical evidence. Noting that more than nine thousand
whites and no blacks were registered to vote, Judge Porterie of the
Western District of Louisiana had concluded in the Bossier Parish case:
"This is enough taken arithmetically to give plaintiffs the injunction
42
they seek.
Since "the time to act had arrived,"4 3 Sharp filed a class action
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana on June 16, 1954.44 The complaint alleged, first, that the
identification requirement of the Louisiana registration laws was unconstitutional on its face and, second, that even if constitutional the
regulation was being discriminatorily applied by Mrs. Ward. The plaintiffs sought damages of $5,000 apiece. 45 Judge Benjamin C. Dawkins,
Jr. set the hearing for November 23, 1954.46
Because of a flat tire, the complainants arrived late at the courthouse, which is located in Monroe, 75 miles from Tallulah. Judge
Dawkins called their case first and, the plaintiffs not being present,
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 47 Participants contend that
Sharp did not file another suit for financial reasons. However, a sec42 Byrd v. Brice, 104 F. Supp. 442, 443 (W.D. La 1952), aff'd, 201 F.2d 664 (5th Cir.
1953). The population of Bossier Parish was composed of 22,227 whites and 13,912 blacks.
43 Wyche Interview, supra note 41. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), had
been handed down on May 17, 1954.
It would be impossible for a white person to understand what happened within
black breasts on that Monday. An ardent segregationist has called it "Black Monday." He was right, but for reasons other than the ones he advances; that was the
day we won; the day we took the white man's laws and won our case before an
all white Supreme Court with a Negro lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, as our chief
counsel. And we were proud.
L. LoMAx, THE NEGRo R VOLT 84 (1963).
44 Wyche v. Ward, Civil No. 4628, (W.D. La., filed June 16, 1954).
45 The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1983 (1964).
46 Judge Dawkins, a Democrat, was appointed by President Eisenhower in 1953 to
succeed his father, Benjamin C. Dawkins, Sr., who had sat on the bench since 1924. Judge
Dawkins has sat as trial judge in every voting case concerning Madison Parish.
47 The litigants contend that they were only five minutes late. "The Judge, knowing
that this was an opportune moment to get rid of us once and for all, called us up first.
We were not there and he threw the case out. We lost that round." Wyche Interview,
supra note 41. On September 14, 1959, a formal order of dismissal was made by the
court in the absence of counsel's submission of a formal decree.
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ond filing fee of $25 would not have drained the plaintiffs' financial
resources. Rather, it appears that counsel saw no hope of receiving
favorable rulings from Judge Dawkins, and the plaintiffs became dis48
couraged as they envisioned a succession of futile suits.

Wyche v. Ward represents only one of the cumulatively expensive 49
and unsuccessful50 private attempts undertaken at this time to secure
the franchise. Locally, these suits forced community leaders to create
strong grass-roots organizations which could function as pressure groups
in the face of insufficient legal remedies and the exercise of unbridled
discretion by local officials and the federal judiciary. Nationally, these
cases 5 provided the evidence for early arguments that the inequities
in the dual school system described in Brown v. Board of Education 2
represented only one discrediting aspect of race relations in the South.
This contention gained support as state legislatures acted to insure
48 Even if Judge Dawkins had found for the plaintiffs, he might not have withdrawn
the Registrar's discretion. In Byrd, Judge Porterie did not order registration of the complainants, stating that (1) they had not been tested as required by state law, and (2) even
if they had been, "a direct mandate from us would be usurpation by us of the discretionary
function of the registrar." Instead, the judge instructed that "the registrar must become
convinced that the Negroes are entitled to the benefit of the same time and trouble she
gives to the white applicants in her seeking to identify them. This, we think, will be an
immediate solution of the situation." 104 F. Supp. at 443-44.
49 Plaintiffs challenging disfranchisement in the courts are estimated to have spent over
$500,000. W. Wnrrm, How FAR THE PROMIsED LAND 65-66 (1955). Additionally, only a handful of blacks have been registered after years of delay, appeals, and remands. A representative case is Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ala. 1945), a class action voter
registration suit for injunctive relief and damages in which the complaint was dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and because the black plaintiff could not
maintain a class action. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that
exhaustion was not required. 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1946). The hearing on the merits
resulted in a decision for the defendants. 69 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ala. 1947). While the
case was again being appealed to the Fifth Circuit, the defendant registrar produced a
photocopy of Mitchell's registration certificate, dated January 20, 1943-two years prior to
filing of the suit-showing Mitchell to be a certified voter. Mitchell had never been
notified that his application had been "accepted," nor had the defendant registrar produced
the certificate during the two and one-half years of litigation. Accord, Davis v. Schell, 81 F.
Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (condemning discriminatory
application of registration tests and resulting in the registration of ten blacks).
50 In East Carrol Parish, a suit was filed against the registrar of voters in 1951. It
dragged on "from 1951 until 1957 [when] Jurist Ben Dawkins put us out of his court, said
he had no jurisdiction, it belonged to the three-judge court, and after that our attorney
went off to California." 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 24, at 22 (testimony of Rev.
John H. Scott); cf. Sellers v. Wilson, 123 F. Supp. 917 (M.D. Ala. 1954) (allegations of discriminatory treatment upheld but injunctive relief denied on the ground that the defendant members of the board had resigned).
51 For descriptions of the accumulated instances of refusal to grant injunctive relief
and their effect, see 1959 CrvL RIGrs REPo T, supra note 18; 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,
supra note 24.
52 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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adherence to the philosophy 3 and practice 54 of white supremacy. Moreover, state agencies and local organizations cooperated 5 in a program
of retrenchment 6 designed to maintain white control of state and local
politics. 57
B.

The Government Suit: A Lesson in Frustration

Congress eventually gave formal recognition to the inadequacy of
private party litigation by passing the Civil Rights Acts of 1957is and
1960.59 The 1957 Act authorized preventive relief to be sought by the
Attorney General on behalf of one or more individuals threatened with
deprivation of the right to vote, 0 prohibited any person from purpose53 The Louisiana Legislature established a Joint Legislative Committee "to provide the
ways and means whereby [the] existing social order shall be preserved," La. H.R. Con.
Res. No. 27, July, 1954, and further emphasized its intention by mandating that the Committee "maintain segregation of the races in all phases of [Louisiana] life in accordance
with the customs, traditions and laws of [the] state," La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 9, May, 1956.
For a discussion of Southern state government activity, see Note, Federal Protection of
Negro Voting Rights, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1051, 1068-79 (Louisiana), 1081-91 (Mississippi), 10931100 (Alabama) (1965).
54 To insure administrative compliance, the Louisiana Legislature enacted a series
of laws regulating the activity of registrars, see Kommers, supra note 37, at 397-98, and
amended the Louisiana Constitution to provide for registrant disqualification on grounds
of "bad character," which included conviction of a misdemeanor carrying a six-month
prison sentence, participation in a comon law marriage, and parentage of illegitimate
children. These designations were not exclusive and other evidence of bad character could
be used by the registrar to disqualify. LA. CONsr. art. VII1, § 1(c); see 1961 Civit. RIrrs
REPORT, supra note 21, at 68-70; Kommers, supra note 37, at 397-98.
55 The Association of Citizens Councils of Louisiana arranged to purge black registrants,
suggested means to discipline or remove uncooperative registrars, and published an inflammatory "manual of procedure for registrars of voters"; the pamphlet, entitled "Voter
Qualification Laws in Louisiana: The Key to Victory in the Segregation Struggle," provided the basis for discussion at conferences sponsored by the Joint Legislative Committee
and the State Board of Registrars. See 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 24, at 526-29,
532-46. See also United States v. Association of Citizens Councils, 187 F. Supp. 846 (W.D.
La. 1960).
56 1961 Civio RIGHTs REPORT, supra note 21, at 43. Id. at 39-72 documents this concerted
action and discusses various aspects of discriminatory conduct in Louisiana between 1954
and 1961. See also LmRARY oF CONGRESS, Civu. RIGHTS PRoJECT: REPORT LOUISIANA No. 1
218-19 (Oct. 23, 1958) (statement of Louisiana Attorney General Jack GremiUion).
57 While black participation in elections may have rankled less than the anticipated desegration of schools, see the "rank order of discrimination" analysis in G. MYRDAL, AN
AM ERICAN DiI.zE.-wA 60-61 (1944), fear of the effect of black voting is reflected in the sudden reversal of the trend in Louisiana of increased black registration. The percentage of
blacks registered in Louisiana, having jumped from 3.0% in 1948 to 10.2% in 1952, reflected steady growth until July, 1954, when 13.3% of eligible blacks were on the rolls.
The figure stabilized near the 13.7% level (except for a sporadic jump to 15.3% in May,
1956) until July, 1960. 1961 Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 24, at 424.
58 71 Stat. 634 (1957); see Lane, The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 4 How. L.J. 36 (1958);
Note, Federal Civil Rights Legislation, supra note 37.
59 74 Stat. 86 (1960).
00 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1964).
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fully interfering with that right, 61 and established the United States
Commission on Civil Rights. 62 While ambitious, the 1957 Act did not
materially aid disfranchised blacks. Between 1957 and 1960 the Department of Justice initiated only four actions, 6 3 not one of which resulted in placing blacks on the voting rolls for the first time. 64 The
Commission, which had been authorized to investigate complaints of
voting rights deprivation, met with a series of legal challenges which
delayed its effective functioning. 65 In 1959 the Commission finally concluded: "Against the prejudice of registrars and jurors, the U.S. Government appears under present laws to be helpless to make good the
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution."6 6
Congress, therefore, strengthened the means for securing registration of qualified applicants in the 1960 Civil Rights Act. 67 Whenever
a government-initiated suit established denial of the franchise because
of race, color, or creed, the Attorney General could request that a
federal district court enter a finding of deprivation of rights pursuant
to a pattern or practice of discrimination. Such determination would
permit any resident within the defendant's jurisdiction to apply to
the court for an order declaring him qualified to vote in any election,
providing the applicant was qualified to vote under state law and had,
subsequent to the court's "pattern or practice" finding, been denied
Id. at § 1971(b).
Id. at § 1975. The Act also restated the Enforcement Acts' right-to-vote policy, id.
at § 1971(a)(1); eliminated the exhaustion of remedies requirement for federal jurisdiction,
id. at § 1971(d); empowered district court judges to hear criminal contempt cases without
a jury if the sentence did not exceed a $300 fine and 45 days' imprisonment, id. at § 1995;
provided for an additional assistant attorney general, 5 U.S.C. § 295-1 (1964); and eliminated the requirement that federal jurors must qualify under state law, 28 U.S.C. § 1861
(1958).
63 Christopher, supra note 40, at 4.
64 For an explanation of the year's delay in filing this small number of suits on
grounds that the first cases had to be "factually strong" to provide support against assertions of the Act's unconstitutionality, see Hearings on S. 2684, S. 2719, S. 2783, S. 2814,
S. 2722., S. 2785 and S. 2535 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1960) (testimony of Attorney General William P. Rogers), criticized
and evaluated in 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 128-33; Note, The Civil
Rights Act of 1960, supra note 37 at 957-61.
65 Even Congress' research tool, the United States Commission on Civil Rights, proved
a slow starter by initially lacking material to investigate, 1959 CIVIL RIGHTS RE-PORT,
supra note 18, at xiii, 98-99, and finding its hearings delayed by legal challenges, see
Larche v. Hannah, 176 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. La. 1959), aff'd., 177 F. Supp. 816 (1959) (threejudge panel), rev'd, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). For an early history of the Commission's activities,
see generally 1959 CIvIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 55-97.
66 Id. at 3.
67 The Act, 74 Stat. 86 (1960), was signed on May 6, 1960, by President Eisenhower. For
a general history and preliminary analysis, see Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1960, supra
note 37.For a detailed account of the legislative history, see D. BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A
LAw: THE CIvIL RIGHTS OF 1960 (1962).
61
62

1971]

Voting Rights

the opportunity to register or to vote by persons acting under color
of state law. Additionally, the legislation permitted discretionary court
appointment of federal referees to receive applications, hear evidence
ex parte, and present findings to the court on the applicant's eligibility
68
for relief.
However, even after passage of the 1960 Act, severe hurdles to government action remained. These deficiencies are highlighted in United
States v. Ward,0 9 a 1961 suit in which the Government sought to force
abandonment of the voucher requirement as applied in Madison Parish,
and to enjoin local officials from subjecting black applicants for registration to different and more stringent standards than were applied to
white persons.
The first problem the Government encountered was convincing black
residents to make the necessary attempt to register which would enable
the Department of Justice to bring suit. While preparing a voting discrimination case in neighboring East Carroll Parish, 70 government
attorneys periodically visited Tallulah and discussed the Madison Parish situation, giving informal assurances that failure of a new attempt
to register would initiate an investigation likely to result in the filing
of a federal suit.71 However, black residents took no action until

August 28, 1961; once again failure to fulfill the voucher requirement
defeated the registration attempt.72 The Government filed suit on
October 21, 1961.
While black residents do not remember why they hesitated to act
despite the obvious desire of government attorneys to begin proceed08 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. V, 1965-69), held constitutional in US. v. Manning, 215 F.
Supp. 272 (W.D. La. 1963). Additionally, the Act provides for presentation, production,
and inspection of voting records at the request of the Attorney General, 42 U.S.C. § 1974
(a)-(e).
69 222 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349 F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th
Cir. 1965).
70 United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962).
71 Interviews with attorneys in the Civil Rights Division, United States Department of
Justice, in Washington, D.C., Nov. 23-24, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Department of Justice
Interviews].
72 The registration attempt produced a unique dialogue indicating the tragicomic absurdity of Miss Ward's application of the voucher requirement. Wyche testified at the
Ward trial:
[The Registrar told us] "you will have to have two electors, as I have previously
said, because I don't know any of you."
And I said, "I am Zelma C. Wyche."
And the Registrar said, "You are the one who filed the lawsuit against my
mother [the former Registrar]."
I said, "I am."
She said, "I still don't know you. You will have to get someone to identify you."

Wyche Testimony, supra note 27.
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ings,73 it appears that increasing harassment influenced their decisions7 4
A black minister was arrested twice and beaten75 after testifying before
the Civil Rights Commission in September, 1960. 76 Wyche was subjected to unusual harassment in his Army Reserve unit, which eventually forced his resignation after sixteen years' service.7 7 Harrison
Brown, another leader of the black community, declined to testify before the Commission because he feared subsequent financial retaliation
8
by whites and the possible loss of his wife's teaching position.
The second problem attached to government suits filed under authority of section 1971(a) was the necessity for county-by-county litigation. Although an action attacking the voucher requirement had been
brought in neighboring East Carroll Parish, 79 a favorable decision from
Judge Dawkins in that case could not aid Madison Parish blacks. No
assumption was permitted that lopsided registration figures and a "pattern or practice" finding against one registrar were conclusive of discriminatory activities in another parish, despite identity of legal theory
and striking similarity of evidence.8 0 Nor could the Government rely
solely on statistical evidence of voting patterns within Madison Parish
itself to prove its case. Although the Fifth Circuit had suggested, s and
Judge Dawkins eventually held, 2 that disparate registration and popu73 Elliot C. Nolley, a store owner registered in Ouachita Parish until he was purged in
1956, had written to the Department of Justice and had been visited by Federal Bureau
of Investigation agents requesting him to register; he declined. Fieldworker's Report, Aug.
8, 1960, on file at the United States Commission on Civil Rights.
74 Madison Parish blacks continually denied, however, that harassment or intimidation
affected their activities. Interviews with local residents, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 26, 1970.
75 Fieldworker's Report, Nov. 15, 1960, on file at the United States Commission on Civil
Rights. Compare United States v. Deal, 6 RAcE REL. L. REP. 474 (1961), in which East
Carroll residents retaliated against fanner Joe Atlas, who had testified before the Commission, by refusing to gin his cotton and conduct ordinary business with him. Following
intervention by the Department of Justice, the court issued a consent decree by which
boycotting merchants agreed to desist.
76 1961 Civil Rights Hearings,supra note 24, at 29 (describing in detail another attempt
to register). Compare the account given by Sheriff Hester in a sworn statement submitted
to the Commission on April 26, 1961, following the Commission's invitation to respond
to Rev. Neal's testimony. Id. at 754.
77 Fieldworker's Report, Apr. 4, 1960, on file at the United States Commission on Civil
Rights (report of interview with Wyche). Wyche specifically stated that his Army trouble
stemmed from the fact that white citizens had learned he was to appear at a Commission
hearing in Shreveport, Louisiana. Id.
78 Fieldworker's Report, Aug. 8, 1960, on file at the United States Commission on Civil
Rights.
79 United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. La. 1962).
80 No blacks had been registered in Madison Parish during this century, United States
v. Ward, 222 F. Supp. 617, 618 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349 F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329
(5th Cir. 1965), nor in East Carroll since 1922, United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172
(W.D. La. 1962).
83 Alabama v. United States, 804 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
82 Where it is shown, as in this case, that, prior to the trial, none of the more than
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lation figures could constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination,
establishing the fact of segregated patterns was not enough. To obtain
effective relief the Government needed to identify specific acts of discrimination. In Ward, 21 blacks testified that they had been denied
applications for failure to meet the personal identification requirement.8 3 Additionally, the Government called Katherine Ward, the new
Registrar, to describe the registration system she used;8 4 presented testimony that a general understanding existed among white people that
they would not identify blacks; 85 and demonstrated that Miss Ward
knowingly utilized the voucher requirement to prevent registration of

blacks.8 6
Amassing the evidence necessary to supplement registration statistics
5,000 Negroes of voting age in the Parish had been registered since 1900, and a
majority of the white persons of voting age were allowed to register to vote, and
a number of Negroes attempted to register to vote, this evidence alone establishes a claim for relief under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and
under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, as amended. It must be concluded that
Negroes were systematically excluded from registration for voting.
United States v. Ward, 222 F. Supp. 617, 620 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd, 349 F.2d 795, modified,
352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1965); accord, United States v. Wilder, 222 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. La.
1963); United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172, 174 (W.D. La. 1962). Since the Government did not rest upon presenting the statistical evidence in these cases, it is impossible
to know whether Judge Dawkins would have made his conclusion of law absent the additional evidence of attempts by blacks to register. But see the refusals of other district
courts to grant statistics even probative value. United States v. Logue, 9 RACE REL. L. REP.
770 (S.D. Ala. 1964), rev'd, 344 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1965) (Thomas, J.); United States v.
Ramsey, 8 RACE REL. L. Rm. 156 (S.D. Miss. 1963), rev'd, 331 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964),
modified, 353 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1965) (Cox, J.); United States v. Duke, 9 RAE REL. L. REP.
788 (M.D. Ala. 1963), rev'd, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964) (Clayton, J.). Compare the Fifth
Circuit's refusal to find discrimination based on voting statistics showing that 92% of
white applicants were accepted while 62% of Negroes were not. United States v. Atkins,
323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963), af'g 210 F. Supp. 441 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
88 Brief for Plaintiff at 17.
84 Miss Ward did not use the literacy test, which was optional, 47 LA. REv. STAT.
§§ 18:35-:36 (1969), but "qualified her voters" by determining age, residency, citizenship, and absence of conviction of a crime, id. at § 18:31, before permitting an applicant to fill out a form. If she knew an applicant or if the applicant had previously
registered, no additional identification was required for issuance of a new certificate.
Miss Ward stated that she knew many white people in the parish because she had been
born and raised there but that she knew very few Negroes, "only those who work for me
or help me." Record at 122, 104-105, 107-108.
85 Tax Assessor Speigner, who had vouched for two white persons, stated that he did
not want to identify blacks because "he didn't care to have anything to do with it."
Record at 26. The Government demonstrated that 37 whites had been identified by public
officials (including two by Sheriff Hester, four by Clerk of Court Post, and 23 by six of
the sheriff's deputies), and four blacks testified that white men they approached refused
to identify them. Brief for Plaintiff, App. B, Table 2.
86 Miss Ward testified she knew that no blacks had been registered in the past while
most whites had, and that no black had ever been identified by a white person. Moreover,
when Wyche's group appeared at her office on August 28, Miss Ward testified, "[I]t was the
first time any colored persons had been in my office and it struck me as being a little
peculiar or strange." Record at 103.
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required exhaustive preparation. Each government case demanded the
presence of five lawyers for a minimum of one month to analyze all
registration forms. Thus, for each county in which it brought suit,
the Government spent at least 1,200 attorney-hours just to acquire complete command of registration material;8 7 it is impossible to estimate

the time spent interviewing residents, preparing for trial, litigating the case, filing memorandums, and, inevitably, briefing and arguing
appeals.88
While the inherent delays in county-by-county litigation compounded
the Government's difficulties, the discretionary nature of relief under
the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts eventually proved to be the major
obstacle. Despite a finding that the voucher requirement unconstitutionally deprived Madison Parish blacks of the right to vote,8 9 Judge
Dawkins did not grant adequate relief. His final decree merely (1)
enjoined use of the voucher to establish identity, (2) provided that the
Registrar's records be available to government agents, and (3) required
submission of periodic reports to the court detailing progress in processing registration applications. 90
These orders did not seriously affect the defendants' activities. Registrar Ward had already abandoned the voucher requirement in September, 1962, substituting more stringent registration procedures.9 1
Therefore, the injunction merely proscribed the application of a standard no longer in use, and Judge Dawkins' condemnation of the strict
identification practice amounted to no more than judicial affirmance.
that the "voluntary abandonment" must continue. Similarly, since the
Civil Rights Act of 1960 required registrars to make records available
to government agents, the order's provision for inspection and photographing at all reasonable times merely insured future access without resort to court order. Moreover, the Government itself had indicated a willingness to accept less coercive sanctions by suggesting
that Judge Dawkins adopt the monthly reports requirement as an alternative to appointing a voter referee. 92 Thus, the plaintiff's victory
87 Compare this Department of Justice estimate with Attorney General Katzenbach's
statement that it has become routine to spend as many as six thousand man-hours only
in analyzing the voting records of a single county. H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1965).
88 Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
89 222 F. Supp. at 620.
90 Id. at 620-21.
91 See text at notes 94-96 infra.
92 Judge Dawkins had previously assumed this overseer role at the Government's suggestion. United States v. Manning, 205 F. Supp. 172, 175 (W.D. La. 1961). The Manning
decision included a finding of discrimination pursuant to a "pattern or practice." It has
been conjectured that Dawkins did not realize the implications of using the statutory
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amounted to a decree ordering the defendants to do that which they
were already doing or could be required to do through pro forma
application for a court order. The real significance of this decision lies,
therefore, in Judge Dawkins' power to deny, subject to appeal, certain
relief requested by the Government: (1) a finding of discrimination
pursuant to a "pattern or practice;" (2) an order that standards applied
to future applicants for registration be those which had been used between January 1, 1961 and August 31, 1962 (freezing relief); 93 and
(3) an assessment of costs against the State of Louisiana as well as
Registrar Ward.
The failure to make a "pattern or practice" finding precluded either
judicial registration of voters or the appointment of referees pursuant
to section 1971(e) of the 1960 Civil Rights Act. The defendants, therefore, remained in control of the Madison Parish voter registration machinery. Moreover, the defendants had freedom to operate that
machinery in a discriminatory manner as a result of Judge Dawkins'
failure to order use of the former registration requirements in judging
future voter applicants. Even at the time of trial it had been quite
clear that the defendants were shifting to other discriminatory tactics
in lieu of the voucher requirement.
First, in September, 1962, Registrar Ward had put into practice the
"citizenship test" approved by the Louisiana legislature the previous
month. 94 Using this standard, an applicant could not qualify for
registration unless he answered correctly four out of six multiple choice
questions on citizenship, government, and history. Additionally, applicants were required to read and write from dictation a portion of the
preamble to the United States Constitution.9 5 Since a system of permanent registration had been instituted in February, 1963, the stricter
requirements were inapplicable to those persons who had registered
prior to September, 1962 on the basis of age, residence, and no criminal
conviction, all of whom were white.
A second pre-trial innovation concerned the application form which
language and that he never intended to provide the means for triggering the 1971(e)
machinery. C. Hamilton, Southern Federal Courts and the Negro Vote 207, 1957 (unpublished dissertation in Regenstein Library, The University of Chicago).
93 Prior to trial no blacks had been registered and registration was periodic; a complete registration was held every four years. See LA. REv. STAT. §§ 18:231, 18:249 (Supp.
1969). On February 14, 1963, the police jury changed to a system of permanent registration.
Therefore, the Government argued, past inequities would be perpetuated for many years
if the lenient pre-September, 1962 requirements were not applied-at least until the
effects of discrimination were eradicated. For extensive discussions of freezing relief, see
Fiss, Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 Sup. CT. Rkv.
379; Note, supra note 53, at 1137-52.
94 LA. Rrv. STAT. § 18:191 (Supp. 1969).
95 Record at 131-32.
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had been used formerly as a means to obtain and record essential
information about substantive qualifications of applicants; with abandonment of the voucher it had been transformed into a device to test
literacy. The applicant was required to fill in the card himself without
any assistance or supervision. To avoid "passing" through memorization, five different forms were used to elicit the same information.90
Having anticipated that the Registrar might attempt to use literacy
as a means of disqualifying blacks should the voucher procedure be
prohibited, the Government had sought to establish at trial the standard of acceptability for application forms previously set by Miss Ward.
Each card was examined for mistakes; in court the Government presented successive cards with identical but unique mistakes, raising the
inference that many applicants copied one form.9 7 Searches were made
for the "lowest standard" registered voter who had filled out his own
card. Arguably, his form would become the basis of comparison for all
future applications 98 since the Louisiana Constitution had been
amended in 1960 to refuse illiterates the right to vote. 99 Moreover, a
handwriting expert attested to the Registrar's practice of completing
cards for applicants. Through testimony the Government established
that 1760 out of 1762 applicants or 99.9 per cent were registered, that
Miss Ward accepted all applications unless they looked "ridiculous,"
and that she pointed out errors to applicants and permitted them to
fill out new cards. 100
Abrogation of these lenient standards would inevitably place a
heavy burden on all future registrants, but, more importantly, the
results of past, flagrant discrimination would be frozen in and perpetuated. 101 However, the attempt to set a literacy standard which
9G Id.

97 This thorough preparation revealed facts unknown to the defense. Counsel, caught
unawares, merely continued to argue Miss Ward's adherence to the law. Moreover, counsel
for Miss Ward never submitted a post-trial brief.
98 This technique was first adopted in Mississippi. Investigators would tour the community looking for the most deplorable living accommodations and then would determine
whether the occupants were registered. Madison Parish's most "illiterate literate white
voter" was found living under a railroad bridge siding. He was so far removed from the
white power structure and so poorly informed about the parish's struggle to prevent black
voting that on being subpoenaed to appear at trial, rather than ask a white citizen for a
lift, he requested Wyche to help him get to the federal courthouse in Monroe. Since it
was a civil rights matter, he assumed that Wyche was behind it and that no white citizens
would be involved. Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
99 LA. CONST. art. 8, § l(d), as amended on November 8, 1960. However, it should be
noted that illiterates already on the rolls would remain registered.
10o Record at 98, 122.
101 In presenting this evidence, the Government raised the possibility of future discrimination through registrar discretion by questioning the timing behind altered
registration procedures. If prior to September, 1962, whites registered at will without
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would, in effect, reflect past standards failed. Despite a century of
segregation and evidence of current discrimination, Judge Dawkins
refused either to take the voter registration machinery out of the
defendants' hands or to control significantly the way in which the
defendants operated that machinery.
The Government did not challenge Judge Dawkins' omission of the
"pattern or practice" finding, which would trigger the assignment of
voter referees, or the judicial registration of voters under section
1971(e). Department of Justice analysts felt that the court's decision
included statements sufficient to set the 1971(e) machinery in force
"even though the judge clearly does not intend for it to."' 0 2 Referees
were never requested, however; until proven insufficient the Government was willing to accept Judge Dawkins' adoption of the limited
overseer role.
The Department of Justice, did, however, appeal Judge Dawkins'
refusal to grant freezing relief. In August, 1965, the Fifth Circuit reversed the Ward decision and ordered suspension of nondiscriminatory
voting qualifications not previously applied to white citizens. 10 3 The
court, additionally, used this opportunity to indicate the contours of
the freezing remedy. 10 4 Of primary importance, however, was the Fifth
Circuit's recognition that the 1960 Act erred in permitting significant
being subject to any test while blacks were not permitted to register at all because
of their race, the Department of Justice suggested, it was far from coincidental that
strict standards and difficult tests were adopted following initiation of federal court
action-that is, only after the Registrar recognized that she would be forced to permit
blacks to apply.
102 Memorandum from Frank Dunbaugh, attorney in the Civil Rights Division, United
States Department of Justice, to Assistant Attorney General John Doar, Nov. 12, 1963.
This assumption was borne out by the Fifth Circuit when Ward was appealed. 349 F.2d at
800. Judge Brown stated: "The decree entered by the District Court . . . although not
using the exact phraseology of 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) . . . found a discriminatory pattern and
practice." The court, additionally, took this opportunity to instruct that the "pattern or
practice" finding was not discretionary and should be made in the terminology of the
statute to expedite post-finding voter applications. Cf. United States v. Ramsey, 353 F.2d
650 (5th Cir. 1965), rev'g 331 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964) (Rives, J., dissenting strongly) (holding that the finding was discretionary).
103 United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1965).
104 First, the court characterized the freeze order as "an effective equitable tool to
eradicate the consequences of past discrimination" rather than as an additional sanction
to the 1971(e) "pattern or practice" machinery. 349 F.2d at 803. Second, Judge Brown repudiated past decisions denying the remedy, id. at 801; explained the necessity for a twoyear conditional period of suspension, id. at 803 (but see United States v. Louisiana, 380
U.S. 145, 155 (1965); Note, supra note 53, at 1148); and extended coverage of related
registration standards to all applicants, whether or not they were of eligible age and
residence during the discriminatory period, noting that restricting eligibility created an
"incongruous conflict" between requirements placed on the Registrar, who could reject
applicants on the more rigid current standards, and those lax requirements used by the
court once rejection had been established, id. at 803-04.
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relief to depend on the discretion of Southern district judges.10 5 Accordingly, the Court instructed:
Voter registrars should come to learn that when the cases are
tried on the application for permanent injunction and the
facts establish a pattern or practice, the District Court must so
find. Next, the Judge must make the finding to set in operation the §1971(e) machinery. Next, he must enter a decree,
which, through suitable freeze provisions, effective for an adequate period of time, will assure that the evils of past discrimination be eradicated before new and more stringent state
provisions may be exacted of Negro applicants. The handwriting is indeed on the wall-in Mississippi Ward, in Lynd and
now Louisiana Ward. 0 6
The court also withdrew the district judge's discretion in apportioning costs.' 0 7 Although Judge Dawkins had taxed litigation expenses of

$1,468.77 against Miss Ward in her capacity as Registrar of Voters, he
had entered no assessment against the State of Louisiana. Characterizing the suit as a battle "between two sovereigns," the Fifth Circuit
summarily instructed the State to assume these costs. 08
105 Not only did district judges avoid the "pattern or practice" finding, but even
those who made the determination might decline to utilize 1971(e) machinery. See, e.g.,
United States v. Parker, 236 F. Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala. 1964); cf. United States v. Cartwright,
230 F. Supp. 878 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (not specifically rejecting a voter referee assignment but
decreeing only that certain named individuals be placed on the rolls).
After four years of litigation, Congress also recognized its error. The omnibus 1964
Civil Rights Act authorized three-judge district courts to decide suits at the request of
the Attorney General or the defendant when the Government requested a finding of
discriminatory pattern or practice. Hearing would be immediate and the decision would
be directly appealable to the Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(g) (Supp. V, 1965-69). The
provision did aid in removing some delays. Prior to 1964 the time lapse between the filing of
the complaint and the beginning of trial was 16.33 months, more than six months of which
was spent awaiting an answer. Between July, 1964 and February, 1965, of the seven
1971(a) suits fied the average time lapse between complaint and answer was less than
one month. One case went to trial during that time, and in two suits offers of consent
judgments were made by the defendants. 1 Hearings Before the U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights 259-60 (1965) (statement of Burke Marshall). The Act also established a rebuttable
presumption of literacy, id. at § 1971(c), and prohibited, in elections held solely or
in part for federal offices, registration procedures different from those used in the past,
rejection of applicants for immaterial errors or omissions, and use of literacy tests as a
voting qualifications unless administered and conducted wholly in writing, id at
§ 1971(a)(2).
106 349 F.2d at 805. Additionally, the court framed a proposed uniform decree which
would serve as a model for district judges and would be entered on remand, thereby
cutting down the time lag between formal grant of judicial relief and implementation of
that relief. Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. The court further characterized the state as having given Mrs. Ward aid and
comfort, financial as well as moral. Cf. United States v. Duke, 382 F.2d 759, 770 (5th Cir.
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C.

The Effects of Litigation

It has been argued that once the Fifth Circuit established freezing
relief and voter referee assignments to be mandatory, an effective
barrier to discriminatory registrar procedures had been erected and no
further federal legislation was necessary.1 0 9 Judge Tuttle, for example,
stated that
the courts of our circuit .

by the midsummer of 1965 had

disposed of substantially all of the legal questions that had
arisen from the continued reluctance of local officials in some
counties to accept the century-old command of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 110
It is admittedly idle to speculate whether the federal bench responded to the need for a radical remedy or to the pressure of impending federal legislation in developing the criteria for ordering and
fashioning "complete" substantial relief."' However, a reconsideration
of the delays, costs, and consequences incident to county-by-county
litigation vividly demonstrates the easily anticipated inadequacy of
continuing dependance on the judiciary to effectuate voter registration
2

policies."1

First, it could not be assumed that the Fifth Circuit's pronounce-

ments would be followed. In the past, frequent and explicit instructions
1964) (holding the state a necessary party for granting complete relief); accord, United
States v. Ward, 345 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679 (5th
Cir. 1964).
109 It seems certain that if Congress had not invalidated discriminatory state voting
provisions and provided means to correct the effect of prior disfranchisement,
the judicial doctrines formulated by 1965 would have accomplished a similar
result.
Note, supra note 53, at 1189. But compare the statement of a knowledgeable northeast
Louisiana attorney:
After Brown, the derision heaped on the Supreme Court filtered down to the
lower federal courts. No Southerner expected honest compliance with district
court orders. While state officials expressed sympathy for the plight of Negroes,
and had no interest in resisting Negro registration once the [federal] examiners
were sent in, nothing at all would have happened if Congress hadn't forced it.
A court order could be ignored. An act of Congress commanded respect.
Interview with northeast Louisiana attorney, Oct. 27, 1970. See also the Louisiana
"interposition resolution" of May 29, 1956, La. H.R. Res. 10, 1956 Sess., repudiating
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and another case, reported in 1 RAcE REL. L.
R)E'. 753, 754-55 (1956).
110 Tuttle, Equality and the Vote, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 245 (1966).
111 The phrase is taken from Judge Johnson's original formulation of the concept underlying freezing relief. United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 682 (M.D. Ala. 1961),
aff'd, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
112 United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145 (1963) (attacking use of the interpretation
and citizenship tests in 21 parishes) and United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965)
(challenging a variety of state voting procedures) represent attempts to avoid repeated
suits, but alternative discriminatory methods were still available. See Note, supra note 53,
at 1175-89.
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to the inferior courts had not halted evasive tactics. 115 There is little
reason to conclude that further explication of controlling legal doctrines and specific articulation of the court's expectations would automatically produce compliance.
Second, eight years of litigation provided the most persuasive argument that adjudication and court-developed enforcement tools could
not ensure extensive registration. 1 4 In Madison Parish, for example,
between the Ward trial and August 5, 1965, only 327 black citizens
succeeded in passing the citizenship and literacy tests.115 While whites
argued that this low registration demonstrated lack of interest in
political matters, other factors seem to provide a more plausible explanation. Initially, apprehension of "incorrectly answering" the citizenship questions restrained many from applying to register. School
teachers, among others, refused to permit white persons to gossip that
"they didn't even have enough sense to pass that simple test." 116 Once
the district court ordered termination of the Registrar's unofficial discretion, threats of job loss replaced fear of failure. 117 Additionally,
some black residents alleged that discriminatory delaying tactics were
used-admitting only one black applicant into the Registrar's office
while permitting four and five whites to fill in the forms at the same
time, using hypertechnical errors and omissions to invalidate application cards, and refusing such identification as electric bills to establish
residency because the company-issued receipts did not include dates."-,
As the culmination of a concentrated effort to provide both the
opportunity and the means for eradicating racially motivated disfranchisement, United States v. Ward and the seventy other Department of
113 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClellan, 341 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam);
Kennedy v. Lynd, 806 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952 (1963).
114 Progress has been painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of state
and local officials and repeated delays in the judicial process. Judicial relief has
had to be gaged not in terms of months-but in terms of years.. . . The judicial
process affords those who are determined to resist plentiful opportunity to resist.
Indeed, even after apparent defeat resisters seek new ways and means of discriminating. Barring one contrivance too often has caused no change in result,
only in methods.
H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1965).
115 By February 23, 1962, ten weeks after trial and eight months prior to Judge
Dawkins' decree, 174 blacks had been registered. 349 F.2d at 799.
116 Wyche Interview, supra note 41.
117 Sheriff Hester's fiat that "as long as I am Sheriff, there won't be any [niggers]
registered on the books," Record at 16, strongly negated the argument that the absence
of black voters resulted from voluntary disinterest. Judicial recognition of the Sheriff's
superordinate role and of the Registrar's complicity therein was established by the district
court. 222 F. Supp. at 619.
118 Interview with Harrison Brown, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 27, 1970 [hereinafter cited
as Brown Interview]. At no time did the Government investigate with the intent of
bringing a motion for contempt or prosecuting a suit under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (Supp.
V, 1965-69).
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Justice suits filed between 1957 and 1964119 present a dismal recommendation for redressing grievances through legal action. After eight
years of litigation, only 37,146 of 548,358 voting-age blacks had been
registered in the 46 counties which had been subjects of government
suits. 120 Moreover, intensive litigation in Alabama, Louisiana, and

Mississippi' 21 did not generate accelerated enrollment of black voters.
Between 1956 and 1965, black registration rose by only 3.0 per cent in
these three states as compared to an 18.3 per cent average increase for
122
the eleven Southern states.
While these figures highlight certain inadequacies of judicial enforcement, secondary gains should not be overlooked when evaluating
the effect of litigation. In addition to opening registration rolls, through
voting rights suits the Government sought to influence behavior patterns of the white leadership. Department of Justice attorneys indicate
that they succeeded, for example, in forcing some district judges to
confront the blatant misconduct of local officials. 123 They believe,
moreover, that Judge Dawkins became so indignant over the refusal of
officials to register blacks that he threatened in private to appoint a
24
voter referee if intransigence persisted.
119 Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
120 Note, supra note 53, at 1196, based on figures in Hearings on S. 1564 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1175 et seq. (1965).
121 Between 1960 and 1964, the Department of Justice filed twelve voting discrimination suits in Alabama, 22 in Mississippi, and fourteen in Louisiana, all of which resulted
in findings of discrimination by either the district court or the court of appeals. H.R.
REP. No. 489, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965).
122

1956 Black
Registration
Number
Alabama
Louisiana
Mississippi
Eleven
Southern
States

Per Cent

1965 Black
Registration
Number

1965 White
Registration

Per Cent

Per Cent
69.2g
80.5g
69.9g

73,272
152,587
19,$47

14.Oa
31.7b
3.9c

92,737
164,601
28,500

19.3e
31.6e
6.7e

1,200,000

25.0d

2,174,200

43.3f

Sources:
a 1959 CIvIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18, at 578 (unofficial 1958 figures).
b Id. at 569 (official 1956 figures).
o Id. at 580 (official 1956 figures).
d Id. at 40.
e US. COMW'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 222 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as POLrcA.L PARTICIPATION].
f US. COMM'N ON CvrL RIGHTs, Tin VOTING RIG-Ts ACT: THE FIasr MONTHS 8 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as THE FIRsT MONTHs].
g POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra, at 227-46.
123 White attorneys in northeast Louisiana discount the influence of informal discussions
with federal judges. Interviews with northeast Louisiana attorneys, Oct. 26 & 28, 1970.
124 Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71. Charles Hamilton recounts a
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As a second objective, Government attorneys hoped to provide the
black community with vital information. Referring to the Ward trial,
one attorney stated:
I got the registrar on the stand and the galleries were packed
with Negro leaders in the county. So I asked her questions for
the benefit of the Negroes. Questions like: Now what are
your office hours? What days are you in your office? Now just
what do you require of persons who come to make application
to register? And the Negroes are sitting right there and they
leave the courtroom armed with all that information. Plus,
you see, I purposely ask the registrar if she intends to register
all persons who come in and who are qualified.
Now we just recently tried that case before Judge Dawkins
and he is nowhere near a decision, but the next week seventy
Negroes were registered. I expect they'll get 1000 Negroes
registered in that Parish and it won't make
much difference
125
what sort of ruling we get from Dawkins.
While black registration did not approach this optimistic prediction,
the actions of community leaders acknowledge the efficacy of such trial
technique. As soon as the trial was completed, and before the Registrar's
books had arrived from the federal courthouse in Monroe, black residents appeared at Miss Ward's office to apply for certification. 126
Additionally, a not wholly unintended benefit developed from this
trial process:
When the suit was called up Wyche and four or five others
were on the stand. Everyone listening to our story and writing
it down. Miss Ward was called, also. And she found she was
the only one involved. All the lawyers in town were there to
watch but they couldn't help her. She just sat there, looking
around, with no one to answer the questions but her.12 7
A civil rights attorney who had handled Madison Parish voting suits
observed that when black leaders reminisce about the early stages of
their struggle,
[o]ne of the things they repeat over and over again is how great
it felt to see the registrar without anyone to protect her. Also,
I think the psychological lift of showing the sheriff to dissimilar observation by Department of Justice attorneys interviewed in early 1963. Hamilton, Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rights: The Judicial Approach to the Solution of
ControversialSocial Problems, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 79, 91.
125 Hamilton, supra note 124, at 97.
126 When permitted to apply, black resident Joe Neal registered first, followed by Wyche
and Brown. Interview with Moses Williams, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 27, 1970.
127 Brown Interview, supra note 118.
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advantage gave many of the less activist Negroes the courage
to register once the trial ended. After all that time and after
all the misery those [white] people dished out, having their
vulnerability revealed probably bothered them more than the
128
knowledge that Negroes would register and vote.
However, these subsidiary benefits neither outweighed the futility of
judicially policing the voting process nor blurred recognition that federally sanctioned litigation produced the same frustrations as those arising
from out-of-court negotiation and private suits. To thwart state-supported disfranchisement required additional legislation which would
not only withdraw all discretion from white registrars but also provide
efficient enforcement mechanisms against post-registration discrimina129
tion by local officials.
III. POST-VOTING

RIGHTS

ACT

LITIGATION

The Voting Rights Act of 1965130 provided three enforcement mechanisms against continuing deprivation of the franchise. First, Congress
provided an alternative to enforcement through litigation by developing a plan under which the Department of Justice could automatically
suspend literacy tests and similar discriminatory devices.' 31 These provisions, which are the only mandatory, administrative remedies under
128 Interviews with attorneys from the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee, in
New Orleans, La., Oct. 23, 1970 [hereinafter cited as LCDC Interviews].
129 Compare the statement of Justice Holmes in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488

(1903):
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to keep the
blacks from voting. To meet such an intent something more than ordering the
plaintiff's name to be inscribed on the [registration] lists ...will be needed. If
the conspiracy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not defeat
them. Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of
the court, it seems to us that all the plaintiff could get from equity would be an
empty form.
130 79 Stat. 437 (1965) 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (Supp. V, 1965-69). Several authors have
noted the historical precedents to the Voting Rights Act in previous civil rights legislation,
Christopher, supra note 40, at 2 nn.6-11, and have detailed its provisions, see id. at 9-15;
Note, supra note 53, at 1195-1204; Statute Note, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1411 (1966).
131 In any state or political subdivision in which fewer than 50% of the eligible voters
had been registered or had voted in the 1964 presidential election, suspension was automatic. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (Supp. V, 1965-69). The legislation provided an opportunity
for the state to rebut the presumption of discrimination through a declaratory judgment
proceeding, id. at § 1973b(a), but a judicial finding of voting rights denial through racially
discriminatory tests concluded the issue until five years after final judgment, id., whether
entered prior or subsequent to statutory enactment. See United States v. Ward, 352 F.2d
329 (5th Cir. 1965). Additionally, following suspension no new tests or devices could be
adopted unless approved by the Attorney General or by the District Court for the
District of Columbia in a declaratory judgment proceeding. Id. at § 1973c; see Allen v.
Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), holding inter alia that private parties have standing
to seek a declaratory judgment that a new state statute is subject to the § 1973c procedure
and that such coverage questions may be brought in local district courts since they do
not determine the substantive discriminatory effects of new state enactments.

The University of Chitago Law Review

[Vol. 38:726

the Act, withdrew from the district courts discretion to enforce federal
law and to impose available sanctions. Additionally, the coverage
formula eliminated the need for county-by-county litigation, the concomitant search for aggrieved parties, and the exhaustive preparation
required under earlier voting rights legislation.

Although automatic suspension removed locally enforced barriers to
registration, Congress did not trust county officials to comply voluntarily and to register blacks without delay. The legislation's second
enforcement mechanism prevented dilatory tactics by providing the
Attorney General with discretionary power to appoint federal examiners to any political subdivision designated under the automatic suspension sections. 132 To insure that individuals once registered would
be permitted to cast their ballots, Congress authorized the Attorney
General to assign federal observers to oversee elections within any political subdivision designated an "examiner county."'133 This provision,
like that mandating examiner appointments, differed in kind from the
voting referee approach of the 1960 Act in that authority to exercise
discretion was vested in the Attorney General rather than in the vari134
ous district judges.
Finally, Congress proscribed voting-oriented intimidation, threats,
and coercion by both private individuals and those acting under color
of law. 1 5 To enforce these provisions, the Act authorized both criminal
sanctions' 36 and preventive, civil actions, which included specific power
to request a court order directing state or local election officials to
137
permit listed persons to vote and to count their ballots.
132 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a(a), 1973g (challenging listings), 1973k (termination of listing
process) (Supp. V, 1965-69). The examiner could not register individuals but could certify
voter eligibility. On the duty of state officers to accept federal "listing," see Reynolds v.
Katzenbach, 248 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Ala. 1965).
33 42 U.S.C. § 1973f (Supp. V, 1965-69). See also United States v. Executive Comm.,
254 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ala. 1966).
134 Initially, the Department of Justice designated several counties as requiring an
examiner merely to trigger the right to appoint observers. POUTICAL PARTICipAToN, supra
note 122, at 159. This was the case, for example, in Madison Parish, where incidents of
harassment reported by blacks prompted the Department to appoint observers on August
12, 1966, one day prior to a Democratic primary. For the United States Commission on
Civil Rights' discussion of the observer program, see id. at 157-62 & nn. 23-26.
135 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b) (Supp. V, 1965-69).
136 Id. at § 1973j. Note that the definitions of these crimes do not require purpose to
render these acts criminal. Criminal contempt is provided for in id. at § 19731(a).
137 Id. at § 1973j(d). To expedite judicial determinations, Congress eliminated the
exhaustion requirement for federal district court jurisdiction, id. at § 1973j(f), and
authorized examiners to receive and substantiate complaints from listed and eligible
persons who alleged within 48 hours after the polls dosed that they had not been
permitted to vote. If the Attorney General agrees that the complaint is well founded, he
can apply to the federal district court for an order requiring the individual's ballot to
be cast and counted before final certification of election results. The district court must
hear and determine such applications immediately. Id. at § 1973j(e).
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Measured as a means to register blacks, the shift from litigation to
administrative procedures has achieved commendable results. In Madison Parish, for example, 1,819 voting-age blacks registered between
August 7 and September 29, 1965,138 and by October, 1967, black

registration reached 3,862 voters or 74.5 per cent of eligible black citizens.139 Concomitantly, local registrars in the nonexaminer counties of
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina placed
more than 110 000 blacks on the books during the first few weeks after
passage of the Act. 140 Throughout the South, registrars and federal
examiners together brought black registration to 2,810,763 or 57.2 per
cent.141
138 Additionally, during this period 49 whites were accepted and three blacks rejected.
THE FIRST MONTHS, supra note 122, at 62; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 240-

41.
139

Madison Parish was not designated an examiner county at this time.

140 THE

FnSr

MONTHS,

supra note 122, at 2. The first black to receive a certificate

under the Voting Rights Act resided in Selma, Alabama. Mrs. Ardies Maulden was
described as "typical of thousands of black people across the Deep South." Neither

a civil rights leader, militant, nor activist, she was "simply an Alabama woman who feels
she is entitled to the right to vote the same as anyone else." Hearings on H.R. 4249, H.R.
5538 and Similar ProposalsBefore Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 3, at 192 (1969) (statement of Vernon E. Jordan, Director, Voter
Education Project).
141 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 222. The comparable figure for whites
is 14,750,811 or 76.5%. During congressional hearings to amend the Voting Rights Act (the
automatic suspension provisions, among others, would have terminated on August 6, 1970,
absent renewal), it was estimated that 800,000 blacks had been given the opportunity to
register as a result of the Act. See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 661-2 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings]. Despite this marked increase in registration, critics have contended that the Government refused to utilize fully the examiner provision. PoLrrcAL
PARTICIPATioN, supra note 122, at 153. See also P. WAT'rRs & R. CLEGHORN, CLIMBING
JAcoB's LADDER 245-47, 259-65 (1967). But see R. CLAUDE, Tim SUPRE E COURT AND THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS 13543 (1970). Arguing that, as a minimum, examiners were required
in every county in which a judicial determination of discrimination had been made,
observers rejected the Government theory that voter registration drives would have more
impact locally than would the presence of examiners.
It is impossible to determine why local registrars in some areas performed their
duties voluntarily, albeit grudgingly, while other officials refused to comply. However, a
comparison of Madison and East Carroll Parishes indicates that failure by the Attorney
General to exercise discretion through blanket appointments of examiners did not
necessarily impede registration progress. The Attorney General designated examiners for
East Carroll on August 9 (nonwhite voting-age population 4,183). Tim FIRST MONTHS,
supra note 122, at 50. By September 29, only 33 blacks had been registered there, id. at
61, while in Madison Parish the local registrar had enrolled 1,819 blacks (nonwhite voting-age population 5,181), id. at 62. This initial imbalance abated, however, and on

November 25, 2,647 blacks were on the rolls in East Carroll, compared with 2,036 in
Madison Parish. Letter from Attorney General Katzenbach to Stephen Currier, Nov.
21, 1965. Since the Fifth Circuit's modification of Ward did not issue until October 21,

1965, voluntary compliance cannot have been caused by the court's decree, which included
changes suggested by the Government "to eliminate any possible doubt as to the
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However, Congress designed the Voting Rights Act not only to secure
registration 142 but also to facilitate enforcement of the constitutional
right to vote in its entirety. 143 Although the coverage formula protects
against threshhold discrimination through denial of registration, the
Act fails to extend automatic, administrative protection to every stage
in the electoral process. Moreover, the success of administrative sanctions depends upon strong executive pressure. Absent persistent enforcement, local officials will create increasingly subtle barriers to
formal political participation, thereby increasing the situations which
require judicial intervention. Accordingly, emphasis has shifted from
denial of the vote to dilution of its effectiveness through discriminatory
manipulation of election procedures, and the need for litigation has
not diminished. 144
In comparing recent litigation to that undertaken prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, two familiar problems appear. First,
judicial reluctance to invoke available sanctions substantially undercuts
the value of adjudicated relief. Second, delayed compliance with congressional mandates burdens the court with continuous, repetitious
litigation. However, post-1965 legal actions also present interesting
contrasts to the registration suits. Reluctance to utilize available sanctions is no longer limited to the judiciary. Government policy repudiates the mandatory provisions of section 5145 and eschews the initiaRegistrar's duty to process each applicant as expeditiously on the day he appears as
possible." 352 F.2d 329 at 331.
142 Southern reaction to unilateral displacement of state voting requirements is well
presented in Brief for Louisiana as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966):
Instead of carefully weeding out the remnants of resistance to the Fifteenth
Amendment, Congress has been shooting from the hip with all sorts of trigger
clauses which leave gaping holes in State statutes, however fairly they are administered. . . . There is no good reason for Congress to start a whole prairie
fire and burn up State statutes wholesale to kill the few remaining weeds of
discrimination still surviving in the South.
143 Many legislators recognized that the Act might prove inadequate to the task. See
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2483 (1965) (statement of Congressman
Lindsay); accord,Senate Hearings,supranote 141, at 9-11 (statement of Senator Mathias); cf.
18 U.S.C. § 245 (Supp. V. 1965-69). However, the dominant trend of thought supported the
predictions that the Act would make the fifteenth amendment "a real part of the United
States Constitution" and that "much of the turmoil over the rights of citizens to participate in this basic governmental function will now be eliminated." Tuttle, Equality and
the Vote, supra note 110, at 263. But see Judge Wisdom's pre-enactment prediction in
United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 108 (5th Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion):
If Congress should adopt the proposed Voting Rights Act of 1965, that law too
will change many local customs and further exacerbate state federal functions....
I cannot see into the unknown. But the dark realities of the past militate against
the Court's taking a rosy, relaxed view of the future.
144 See PorITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 162-67.
145 During the Congressional hearings to extend those provisions of the Voting Rights
Act due to expire, Attorney General Mitchell submitted the Nixon Administration's
proposal to eliminate the prior approval procedure (in favor of a plan which would
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tion of legal proceedings. 146 Abdication of executive responsibility for
preventing discrimination in voting has therefore forced private attorneys to institute most litigation. Additionally, the delay inherent in
using the courts for enforcement has disillusioned black leaders who
expected simplified access to sanctions and has undermined belief in
the electoral process. The following subsections document the limited
efficacy of the Voting Rights Act by examining the new resistance'47
and by analyzing the Madison Parish litigation necessary to redress
continued voting rights infringement.
A.

Brown v. Post' 48 (Post I)

One year after the Voting Rights Act suspended registration requirements,'149 Harrison Brown successfully sustained a Democratic primary
challenge against the white incumbent' 50 for a seat on the school
board.' 8 ' Although the black community had assumed that the Norender new voting provisions ineffective only after a successful action brought in a local
federal court). Although the House accepted the proposal, the Senate did not, and a
simple five-year extension of all expiring provisions was finally adopted. 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3277 (1970). However, the Department of Justice
has revoked through executive policy what the administration did not succeed in
eliminating through legislation. See Letter from Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, to Howard Glickstein, Staff
Director, United States Commission on Civil Rights, Nov. 12, 1970 (copy on file at The
University of Chicago Law Review). In addition, of thirteen suits challenging new voting
provisions, under § 5 or in other contexts, only six were initiated by the Department of
Justice and of the six only two were instituted in 1970.
146 In 1966, twelve suits were decided pursuant to the Voting Rights Act in which
the United States had either initiated action or had been a party plaintiff. In 1970 the
Department of Justice reported activity in only three suits, one of which is Toney v.
White, Civil No. 15,641 (W.D. La., filed May 4, 1970), discussed in text and notes at
notes 256-92 infra. An indication of the declining importance of voting rights can also
be gleaned from the manpower distribution in the Civil Rights Division: education has
thirty attorneys, employment 27, but voting and public accommodations only thirteen.
Letter from Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, to The University of Chicago
Law Review, Mar. 17, 1971.
147 POLTrncA PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 21-131 (systematically documenting the
various techniques utilized throughout the South).
148 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968).
149 The decision in United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1965) issued on
August 11, 1965. However, its terms were superceded by the Voting Rights Act, which
had been signed by President Johnson on August 5. See United States v. Ward, 352 F.2d
329 (5th Cir. 1965).
180 Brown defeated Dorothy Provine in the August 13, 1966 Democratic primary by
1,682 to 1,592 votes. The Attorney General had designated Madison Parish an examiner
county the preceding day and had designated federal observers to oversee the primary
contest, which proceeded without incident. 279 F. Supp. at 61-62 (W.D. La. 1968). Every
subsequent Madison Parish election has been observed.

151 Madison Parish is divided into political subdivisions called wards from which the

single-district school system recruits its board members. Ward 4 includes but is not
coterminous with Tallulah.
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vember 8 general election would be a mere formality, 152 Brown was
defeated by J.T. Fulton, a white write-in candidate who had not campaigned openly 53 and whose 1,891- to 1,622-vote victory included 510
of the 512 absentee ballots counted, all of which had been cast by white
voters. 154
The gravamen of the complaint 55 in Brown v. Post was that Clerk
of Court Jerome C. Post and his deputies intentionally discriminated

against black voters by illegally making absentee ballots available to
ineligible white voters in the general election. 156 Fifteen months after
the contest, Judge Dawkins found that the defendant's administration
of the absentee process, while undertaken in good faith, did discrimi57
nate in fact against blacks, rendering the election invalid.
Post I, the first of three suits challenging the conduct of parish elections, 158 highlights the changing nature of discriminatory practices
152 Since the Republicans had not selected a school board nominee in a primary,
state law forbade designating a Republican candidate on the ballot. LA. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:281 (1969). Proposed constitutional amendments were the only other contested items
in the election.
153 Fulton, who qualified as a write-in candidate on October 4, conducted an intensive
but discreet campaign. Until November 8, the day of the election, no radio announcement appeared and not a single poster or newspaper advertisement apprised voters of
Fulton's candidacy. Brief for Plaintiff at 14. Nor did the Madison Journal inform voters
that the school board seat was in contention. Although the paper had printed news
stories about previous elections, including the August 13 primary, and carried an editorial
commenting on the Ward 4 contest after the general election, Editor William Roundtree
ordered a brief blackout on election news prior to November 8, later explaining: "It is
a policy that I adopted." Brief for Plaintiff at 14 (deposition of William Roundtree).
However, the campaign of white citizens between August 13 and October 8 increased
Ward 4 white registration from 2,101 to 2,329. Figures available from Madison Parish
Registrar of Voters.
'54 279 F. Supp. at 62.
155 Id.
156 On November 16, 1966, the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee had filed a
class action on behalf of Brown and two other qualified electors, requesting that the
Governor be enjoined from certifying the election returns and that Brown be declared
the Ward 4 school board member. Brown v. Post, Civil No. 12471 (W.D. La., filed Nov.
16, 1966). Although on November 9, Brown had protested the election in a letter to
the Department of Justice, the Government took no action until January 9, 1967, when
it brought a similar suit. United States v. Post, Civil No. 12583 (W.D. La., filed Jan.
9, 1967). The delay was attributed to the "more thorough investigation" required before the Government brings suit. Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71. The defendant's answer, filed January 26, 1967, denied the relevant allegations of discrimination and denied the district court's jurisdiction. Additionally, the answer claimed that
defendant Post acted according to state law and did not subject any Madison Parish citizen
to unusual treatment. Brief for Defendant at 4-11.
357 279 F. Supp. at 63. The Brown trial had been held on March 20-22, 1967, and the
opinion was delivered on January 24, 1968. A preliminary injunction issued by Judge
Dawkins on December 5 had prevented the issuance of a commission to any candidate
for school board member.
158 This was also the first parishwide election in which a black candidate ran for
public office or in which a significant number of black voted. See, however, allegations

1971]

Voting Rights

following passage of the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, local officials
shifted their tactics from denial of the vote to reduction of its effectiveness. 5 9 The court was therefore required to determine, first, if
dilution, absent a finding of intentionality, constituted a remedial
grievance and, second, what form of relief would most capably protect
the fifteenth amendment's guarantee by insuring full weight to each
ballot.
1. The Discrimination in Effect Standard. In the legislative context, Baker v. Carr60o has established that constitutional protection
extended beyond absolute deprivation of the franchise. While judicial
recognition of violations in electoral integrity had been limited to acts
of fraud""' and circumstances in which racial motivations denied access
to the polling place, 62 in April, 1967 the Fifth Circuit recognized that
acts which on their face are innocent but which in fact promote voting
discrimination violate the fifteenth amendment. 6 3 Post I established
that a conclusion of unconstitutional dilution of the vote does not
depend on a finding of discriminatory purpose.
In adopting the "discrimination in effect" standard, the court rejected strong evidence of intentional misconduct. The defendants had
provided white residents with opportunities to vote absentee without
extending the privilege to similarly situated blacks. Louisiana law
provides that the clerk of court may establish substations to aid absentee voting.' 4 The procedure contemplates public notification and
a permanent site, authorized by the police jury, at which regular hours
are kept.6 5 Nevertheless, substations created by Clerk of Court Post
of discrimination regarding the first local election to be held after the passage of the
Voting Rights Act. POLrncAL PAMCIPATION, supra note 122, at 38-39.
359 See text at notes 186-88 infra.
160 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
161 See, e.g., Wells v. Wallace, 337 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1959); In re Dorgan, 44 N.J. 440, 210
A.2d 67 (1965); Ingram v. Burnette, 204 Tenn. 149, 316 S.W.2d 31 (1958).
162 Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966).
163 Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967).
164 LA. Rv.STAT. ANN. § 33:1461 (Supp. 1971).
165 In defining the procedure to be followed with regard to substations, the Louisiana
Attorney General had advised, quoting a February 22, 1958 opinion, that

should you decide, in the exercise of your sound judgment, that a sub-office or
sub-offices should be opened for the purpose of facilitating absentee voting, then
you should direct your request for suitable offices, furniture and equipment, to

the [police jury], and obtain the necessary authority of that governing body to
either purchase or rent a building or buildings, and to obtain the required furniture and equipment.
Brief for Plaintiff at 46. The Attorney General had also advised:

Although the statute is silent as to the days and hours these sub-offices are to
be kept open, we would advise against keeping them open other than during the
regular days and hours for absentee voting. Also, in the interest of fairness in
elections, we advise that you give public notice of your intention to open a
sub-office.
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did not meet these standards. Without notice, a temporary, one-day
office was established at the Scott Plantation, which is located one and
one-half miles from Tallulah and which employed only white field66
hands.1
Nor did fieldworkers' absentee ballots accepted by Post conform to
Louisiana law. The procedure requires a qualified registered voter
who expects to be absent from the parish on the day of a general election to apply between two to ten days before that election to the parish's district court clerk for an official ballot. In applying for his absentee
ballot the voter must swear that he is duly registered and will be
absent from the parish on election day. The applicant then executes
his ballot in secret, seals it, and swears to its authenticity and secrecy.1 67 However, those voting absentee at the plantation uniformly
testified that they had no genuine expectation of being absent from
the parish on election day, that they were not asked if they would
be outside the area, that their affidavits consisted of signing their names,
and that they completed their ballots by marking an X next to the
name of J.T. Fulton, which had already been written in for them.'6
Post repeated this procedure at the all-white Delta Haven Nursing
Home because "[i]n a prior election Senator Brown, who was either a
major stockholder or owner of the rest home called me up and asked
me if these people would be allowed to vote and that they expressed
a desire to vote."'16 9 At this special substation, Deputy Clerk Jewell
Willhite not only helped fill in the ballots, but also informed voters
170
of Fulton's race and status as a write-in candidate.
Inpatients at the all-black Baptist Nursing Home received neither the
opportunity to vote nor the assistance afforded whites in similar circumstances. Rev. Frank Wilson, unsuccessful candidate for Ward 2
school board member, testified:
I asked Mr. Post about bringing in some of the elderly people
to let them sign an absentee ballot before the day of the election. Mr. Post said that I would have to bring them and they
166 Post established the station at the request of Scott Plantation managers.
This was an unusual circumstance and during this period of time the place had
been sold. The employees that worked there were trying very hard to finish the
Scott plantation crop. During the time of absentee balloting they were busy in
the field, as it were. There were a number of them that were anticipating leaving
town. At the same time the majority of them, if the crop was harvested before
the voting date, were to be transferred to another place to work. I felt like it
would expedite matters if he set up a station there rather than have these people
go to town to vote absentee because it would save him and them time, too.
Brief for Plaintiff at 40 (testimony of Mrs. Warren Patrick, wife of part-owner).
167 LA. RP-v. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:1071-:1076 (1969) describe absentee voting procedures.
Brief for Plaintiff at 40-43.
169 Record at 379 (emphasis added).
170 Record at 80 (testimony uncontradicted).
168
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would have to swear an affidavit they would be out of town on
the day of the election. But I said I had no intention of them
being out of town and I thought maybe they could sign an
absentee [ballot] since they were old and couldn't get about,
no, they couldn't do that unless they would be out
but he said,
171
of town.
In addition to providing opportunities for voting absentee at substations, 72 the defendants aided those white citizens who came to the
clerk's office thinking they might like to avoid the polls on November
8 for reasons of personal convenience. Witnesses referred to being
encouraged to vote absentee. While these encouragements were not
attributable to the defendants, their conduct supported an inference
of soliciting absentee ballots. Mrs. M. N. Ingram, who did not expect
to be absent from the parish on election day, voted absentee because
she might not have transportation to the polls on November 8. Mrs.
J. J. Smith, who had never before voted absentee, did so in this election
because she wanted to stay in her store all day. Mr. Roy Erwin was
neither asked if he expected to be absent from the parish nor required
to fill out his own affidavit-one of the clerk's employees did that for
him. Other residents received absentee ballots in the mail without
having requested them. 73 However, when Moses Williams, Brown's
campaign manager, inquired about absentee voting procedures, Post
told him that "one must swear he is to be out of town or have reason
to believe he will be out of town on election day," that "absentee should
be cast in the Clerk's office," and that "it couldn't be cast nowhere but
74
in the Clerk's office."'
Intentional discrimination may also be inferred from the internal
administration of the absentee voting process. Louisiana law provides
that printed instructions for voting absentee be furnished to each
absentee voter.175 These materials include detailed information on
procedures to be followed in executing the ballot in person or by mail,
and a simple statement of the method used to vote for a candidate
whose name does not appear on the ballot. Each absentee voter received
this material from the Clerk of Court's office. However, Deputy Clerk
171 Brief for Plaintiff at 49.
172 In addition to the offices described in the text, Post set up six substations in private
homes in the white Willow Bayou section of Tallulah "without a corresponding opportunity being given to Negroes similarly situated." 279 F. Supp. at 63. The plaintiffs offered

fifteen witnesses to explain the circumstances of their voting absentee at places outside
the Clerk of Court's office. Brief for Plaintiff at 19,46.
173 The plaintiffs offered thirteen witnesses to describe the circumstances surrounding
their use of absentee ballots. Brief for Plaintiff at 19-46.
174 Brief for Plaintiff at 49.

175 LA. R v.STAT. § 18:1074 (Supp. 1964).
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Grace Grimes also enclosed (1) a photocopy of an official ballot on
which she wrote "J.T. Fulton" in the space provided for entering a
candidate's name and (2) instructions telling the voter to "use a lead
pencil containing black lead to mark your ballot, mark it as shown on
the sample ballot enclosed. Mark the white square opposite the name
in the blank column on your ballot."'176 No comparable instruction
guided voters desiring to mark their ballot in favor of Brown or the
constitutional amendments 177
Most incriminating of all, the defendants were unable to offer convincing reasons for having requested one thousand absentee ballots for
the November election. 78s Since fewer than 150 voters had cast absentee
ballots in the August primary, 179 lack of a substantial basis for expecting
such a dramatic increase in absentee voting leads to the conclusion that
the defendants intended to strengthen J. T. Fulton's write-in candidacy
by promoting absentee balloting. 80
Ignoring the issue of intentionality for a moment, the tally of absentee ballots further supports an inference that the conduct of local
officials aided Fulton's write-in campaign. While absentee ballots comprised thirteen per cent of the total votes cast in the election, nearly
27 per cent of the white voters cast absentee ballots. Moreover, Fulton's 169-vote margin of victory contained 26.9 per cent questionable
absentee ballots while Brown's official tally included only two votes
not cast at the polls.' 8 ' Thus Brown, whose supporters took the trouble
to appear in person, trailed by 508 votes before the polls even opened.
176 Brief for Plaintiff at 20.
177 The plaintiffs offered six witnesses to explain the circumstances and procedure for
voting absentee by mail. Brief for Plaintiff at 19-46.
178 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1072 (1969) requires the Secretary of State to provide
absentee ballots equal to 10% of the registration thirty days prior to election.
179 In the past three Madison Parish elections, fewer than 4% of the voters had cast

absentee ballots. April 9, 1966 Democratic primary: of 3,145 votes cast, 114 absentee.
August 13, 1966 Democratic primary: of 3,509 votes cast, 149 absentee. September 24, 1966
runoff primary: of 2,469 votes cast, 48 absentee. Pre-Trial Stipulation.
180 The justifications offered include Mrs. Grimes' assertion that increased "colored"
registration between April and August necessitated increased ballots, Brief for Plaintiff
at 19 (this rationale appears questionable since only eight blacks had voted absentee in
the August primary), and Clerk of Court Post's testimony that he knew the Ward 4 election to be causing unusual interest which would result in a heavier vote, Record at 17
(this reasoning is similarly suspect since by his own admission Post appears to have requested the additional ballots prior to learning of Fulton's candidacy, id. at 18).
181

Fulton
Brown

Total
Votes Cast

Votes Cast at
Polling Places

Absentee
Votes

Per Cent
Absentee

1,891
1,622

1,881
1,620

510
2

26.94%
0.01%

Source: 279 F. Supp. at 62.
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Despite all this evidence, Judge Dawkins refused to find that the
defendants intentionally granted whites illegal advantage in order to
discriminate against blacks. 1 82 Under this view, the defendants merely
18 3
discriminated in fact by omitting to grant blacks similar privileges.
Hence, no absentee ballots were found to be illegal; 8 4 rather, those
accepted at the substations resulted in a discriminatory effect. Since
giving preferential treatment to one class of voters promotes impermissible racial distinctions, the defendants' motivation became irrelevant. 8 5
With Post I, Judge Dawkins extended the ambit of activities consti8 6 In Bell v. Southwell, 87
tuting effective dilution of the franchise.
where the defendants' "flagrant" and "completely indefensible" conduct included overt discriminatory acts on election day, the court held
that an election tainted by such constitutional violations will be voided
182 Judge Dawkins found, "[c]ontrary to the allegations of the complaint," that:
(a) There is no evidence whatsoever that defendant Post or his deputies obtained
absentee ballots from the Secretary of State for white persons alone, or that the
ballots were obtained to facilitate any particular class of voters. The unusual
amount of interest in this election was known to defendants and therefore they
obtained extra ballots commensurate with this unusual interest.
(b) The name of all persons voting absentee in the subject election were posted
in a conspicuous place in the Clerk's office as provided by law.
(c) No conspiracy by defendants to deprive Negroes of their right to vote has
been shown even in the slightest respect.
(d) There is no affirmative proof that it was the color of any candidate or any
prospective voter which caused defendants to accept any allegedly illegal absentee
votes. There is no basis or justification for the allegation that defendants accepted
irregular absentee ballots from white voters merely because they were white
and would therefore vote for J. T. Fulton because he was the white candidate.
(e) None of the defendants actively campaigned for J. T. Fulton.
Id. at 63.
183 Id. However, the defendants, as clerks of court acting under state law,
had a duty under the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 not to engage in any acts or practices
in the absentee voting process which have the effect of discrimination among
qualified voters in elections of any kind. This duty included refraining from any
conduct which results in allowing white voters opportunities to vote without
affording the same opportunities to Negro voters.
Id. at 64.
184 "The result of the election would not have been different had the final tabulation
not included absentee ballots cast outside the office of the Clerk in violation of Louisiana
law." Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
185 "Reiterating for emphasis, we do not find defendants engaged in any intentional
plan to deprive Negroes of their constitutional right to vote. However, the manner in
which they administered the absentee process was discriminatory in fact." Id. (emphasis
in original).
186 Judge Dawkins did not state that in recognition of a "discriminatory in fact [effect]"
standard he was adding to the theoretical texture of franchise deprivation. His opinion,
composed of sixteen findings of fact and nine conclusions of law, contains no jurisprudential discussion at all.
187 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967). The plaintiffs had alleged two sets of irregularities,
but the court's decision, which technically reversed a grant of summary judgment, treated
only the maintenance of segregated voting lists and polling booths, which the defendants'
answer had admitted. Id. at 664, 665 n.l3.
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even if the plaintiff cannot show they affected the final results. In Post I,
however, Judge Dawkins predicated relief on discriminatory practices
which neither influenced blacks not to appear at the polls nor personally
intimidated individuals by deterring them from voting for black candidates. Therefore, a remedial grievance had been established even if
election day activity was untainted and black voters lacked direct
knowledge of racially motivated unequal conduct on the part of state
officials, provided that the defendants' practices added a new, intervening factor which directly prejudiced the integrity of the entire electoral
process. The plaintiffs could satisfy their burden of proof by demonstrating "discrimination in effect." Concededly, Judge Dawkins' approach may have been motivated by his desire not to characterize the
defendants' acts as intentional. However, plaintiffs' attorneys, who had
strongly argued for a finding of intentionality, recognized that in the
future the "discrimination in effect" standard would be a far simpler
88
one to satisfy1
2. The Voiding Remedy. Having determined that the defendants'
actions constituted a violation of electoral integrity, Judge Dawkins
faced two alternative forms of relief-he could either declare the loser
victorious 8 9 or void the election. 190 Awarding the office to Brown
required vote counting either by determining if Brown would have
188 This point is discussed briefly in McCarty & Stevenson, The Voting Rights Act of
1965: An Evaluation, 3 HA~v. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 357, 402-03 (1968).

189 Assuming that Judge Dawkins would find all absentee votes invalid, the plaintiffs
contended that on the facts as they appeared subsequent to the election, had the
illegally obtained and executed ballots been excluded, Brown would have beaten Fulton
1,620 to 1,381. There is an obvious danger to this line of reasoning-it denies the franchise
to possibly innocent victims of official misconduct, including the victorious candidate.
First, an undetermined number of absentee ballots were legally obtained and executed.
Should these not have been counted, some white voters would have been denied their
right to vote because of action to which they did not contribute and of which they had
no knowledge. Second, of those who cast absentee ballots, a percentage did not intend
to act illegally and relied on the defendant's statements and procedures by virtue of his
office. Had they not believed themselves to be eligible to cast absentee ballots, they might
have personally voted at the polls on November 8.
190 While courts have traditionally refrained from interfering with the electoral
process by voiding or enjoining elections, following the Voting Rights Act district courts
have set elections aside under extraordinary circumstances in which plaintiffs have diligently pressed their claims so as to avoid unnecessary disruption of governmental processes.
Hiamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966). But see McGill v. Ryals, 253 F. Supp.
874 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge panel) (denying declaratory relief to plaintiffs who
sought to have Lowndes County offices declared vacant on the ground that an array of
past constitutional violations had collectively denied blacks the right to vote and enabled
a white minority to seize political power); accord, Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
v. Democratic Party, 362 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1966) (denying a request to enjoin state primary
elections for four months to permit additional registration which would compensate for
one hundred years of racial discrimination); cf. Hamer'v. Ely, 410 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969)
(involving the election ordered in Hamer); Gray v. Main, 309 F. Supp. 207 (MD. Ala. 1968).
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beaten Fulton had a certain number of "white votes" been rejected, or
by adding to Brown's tally the hypothetical number of votes he could
have secured at the Baptist Nursing Home and substations set up on
plantations employing black fieldhands. Having refused to recognize
the illegality of any absentee ballot, Judge Dawkins precluded any
attempt at a vote count. Therefore, the question that ultimately con11
fronted him was whether to void the election. '
Judge Dawkins followed Bell v. Southwel1 92 and recognized the
defendants' offense to be against the election itself as a constitutionally
guaranteed process. The plaintiffs, having shown a discriminatory
effect and having seasonably filed their complaint one week following
the contest, were entitled to relief. The decree ordered a special election between Brown and Fulton to be held within ninety days. Additionally, Judge Dawkins ordered the defendants not to engage in the
practices which had caused invalidation of the first election or in any
other practices discriminatory in fact. 19 3
Although plaintiffs' attorneys had anticipated a more stringent decree condemning the defendants' conduct, at this point they were willing to exchange restraint in applying judicial sanctions for the more
flexible "discriminatory in effect" standard which would support future
applications to void elections. Additionally, the general portion of
Judge Dawkins' order enjoining any acts discriminatory in effect appeared a sufficient basis for invoking the court's contempt power should
Post or the other defendants again disturb the election process.
The subsequent history of Brown indicates, however, that the voiding
remedy does not erase all barriers to effective relief and further suggests
191 The two factors which underlie the courts' granting of voiding relief are timing
and the intervening event test. Even if plaintiffs have filed timely objections, courts
appear to have determined as a matter of policy not to interfere as long as the spirit of
current legal standards is being met. The reward for acquiesence is thus judicial restraint should blacks request additional sanctions. See cases cited note 190 supra. For
example, in Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and McGill, the plaintiffs desired
to catch up in the political process although no new official action impeded their progress.
They argued that accumulated past wrongs depriving them of the right to vote entitled their
class to preferential treatment, including the opportunity to time an election. In Hamer,
on the other hand, an additional causative factor intruded to affirmatively retard the

effects of judicially granted freezing relief. Using state residency and poll tax payment
laws, local officials sought to continue the condemned policy of disfranchising blacks. Cf.
United States v. Democratic Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 943 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Smith
v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala 1966), modified, 886 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967).
192 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967). Although Hamer v. Campbell, 385 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.
1966), had implicitly rejected the "affecting outcome" approach (only 1.1% of eligible
blacks were registered compared with 80% of eligible whites), Bell, handed down April
14, 1967, was the first case to so hold when pre-election relief had not been requested.
193 279 F. Supp. at 64.
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that the plaintiffs misconstrued the reach of Judge Dawkins' order.'"
A purge of registered voters marred the conduct of the special election
held on April 9, 1968.15 Judge Dawkins had issued specific orders respecting voter eligibility: 196
[T]he voters eligible to vote in the special election between
J. T. Fulton, as a write-in candidate, and Harrison H. Brown,
as Democratic nominee, shall be the same as those eligible to
vote in the general election held on November 8, 1966, as
19 7
determined by the eligible voters list used in that election.
However, Registrar Myrtis Bishop' 9s issued instructions to the voting
commissioners that 271 black voters and 208 white voters who were
eligible to vote in the general election would not be permitted to
vote in the reelection. The commissioners followed these instructions,
which were based on a purge of voters undertaken subsequent to the
November 8 election, and did not permit the named individuals to
vote on April 9 whether or not they had reregistered. 199 With the
purge in effect, Fulton again defeated Brown, by 1,579 to 1,510 votes.
The Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee (LCDC) filed a civil
contempt motion against Mrs. Bishop,200 alleging that violation of the
court order may have altered the April 9 election results201 and request194 Compare the plaintiffs' experience while awaiting Judge Dawkins' determination in
Post L On October 11, 1967, plaintiffs' counsel requested a further preliminary injunction
amending the December 5, 1966 order. The plaintiffs filed in advance of the Democratic primary scheduled for November 4, 1967, in which seven black candidates were running for office, to avoid the litigation and uncertainty that resulted from the 1966 school board election. However, Judge Dawkins denied relief because the issue was not decided, thus rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the facts in Post I were undisputed and that the
only determination for the court was the application of federal law.
'95 The defendants filed a motion to stay on February 15, which was denied, and a

notice of appeal on February 20, but Judge Dawkins ordered the reenactment of the
general election held as scheduled on April 9, 1968.
190 The order followed by one day a request for clarification of the January 4 decree.
Letter from Louisiana Attorney General Jack Gremillion to Judge Dawkins, Feb. 13,
1968. On February 8, 1968, a general election had been held under questionable circumstances. See text and notes at notes 208-54 infra. The Attorney General apparently desired
to avoid a challenge to the special election.
197 In addition, Judge Dawkins instructed his clerk to advise all counsel "that the
Board of Election Commissioners shall conduct this election, as to the write in candidate
in full accordance with Louisiana Law as applicable on 11/8/66." Information on file at
the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee.
198 Katherine Ward had resigned as of January 1, 1966.
199 Complaint at 2.
200 This motion, filed on April 24, was predicated on the January

4 decree
enjoining the defendants from engaging in "practices and procedures which may be discriminatory" and on the February 14 eligibility order.
201 Complaint at 2. The Registrar found 2,389 blacks and 2,121 whites eligible to vote
on April 9. Figures available from Madison Parish Registrar of Voters. This special election is the only contest before 1970 in which black registration fell below that of whites.
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ing that the 479 purged persons be permitted to cast their ballots
within thirty days of entering the order.20 2 Three affidavits supported
the complaint.
No hearing on the contempt proceeding was held.20 3 On August 21,

the defendants filed a motion to vacate past injunctive relief and to
require the governor to give Fulton his commission. Citing the civil
contempt motion, the plaintiffs rejected the contention that "no proceedings have been filed herein contesting the result" of the special
election. However, they decided to abandon the contempt proceeding
because of insufficiency of proof.2

4

Accordingly, the plaintiffs did not

contest that part of the defendant's motion to vacate that injunctive
relief which prevented certification of the election of Fulton, but they
did oppose the vacation of any permanent injunctive relief previously
entered by the court.
The rationale offered by plaintiffs' attorneys for deciding to abandon
the civil contempt proceeding is difficult to accept in light of the affidavits submitted with the complaint. Rather, it seems that the attorneys
decided not to antagonize Judge Dawkins by requesting him to find a
Madison Parish white official in civil contempt.2 0 5 By this time, the
February 6 special election in which Republican Clayton Cox defeated
Zelma C. Wyche for village marshal was being contested. 20 6 When balanced against the remote possibility that counting purged persons' votes
would reverse the April 9 results, the psychological importance of
electing a chief of police and the greater influence of the office in the
power hierarchy argued against continuing the contempt proceedings.
Given the Judge's reluctance to find intentionality and his manipulation of the "discriminatory in effect" concept, such pressure could
202 Following this voting, the Board of Supervisors would add the additional ballots to
the recorded tally and send the recompiled returns to the Secretary of State so that he
could proclaim the winner and rescind any prior proclamation on the subject. Complaint
at 2-3. For a discussion of the various bases of the purges, all of which were utilized by
Registrar Bishop, see text and notes at notes 261-77 infra.
203 A May 8 hearing on the contempt motion was cancelled (attorneys involved do not
remember why). Subsequently, counsel informed the court that defendants wished to
abandon their as yet undocketed appeal of the decision and order in Post 1. Information
on file at the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee.
204 Letter from Richard Sobol, plaintiff's attorney, to The University of Chicago Law
Review, Jan. 6, 1971. Although deterred from continuing the contempt proceeding, plaintiff's attorneys pressed Judge Dawkins to approve the bill of costs submitted following the
January 4 opinion. After a year's delay, Judge Dawkins ordered Post to pay costs of
$1,623.33 to the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee. This reimbursement has
not yet been received. Information on file at the Lawyers Constitutional Defense
Committee.
205 Similar difficulties with contempt actions have occurred in other district courts.
See the history detailed in United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1965).

208 See text and notes at notes 209-55 infra.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 38:726

severely prejudice the second voiding case. This apprehension no doubt
influenced plaintiffs' attorneys not to request Judge Dawkins to void
the special election and contributed to the Department of Justice's decision not to invoke section 1973j of the Voting Rights Act, which would
20 7
have permitted collection and tallying of illegally excluded votes
and, additionally, would have provided a speedy resolution of the
election challenge while still permitting the civil contempt proceeding
to continue.
On September 8, Judge Dawkins granted the motion to vacate all
injunctive relief, indicating that his general order not to engage in
practices "discriminatory in fact" had been designed to cover only
activities incident to the special election and not, as the plaintiffs had
assumed, all future electoral conduct of defendants. Thus, after two
years of litigation and a judicial determination that fifteenth amendment rights had been violated, no local official remained bound by
court order not to discriminate and Fulton assumed Mrs. Provine's
Ward 4 school board seat on the strength of a questioned 69-vote
majority.
B.

United States v. Post2s (Post II)
The conduct of local officials during the February 6, 1968 special
election, 20 9 in which Cox defeated Wyche for village marshal, 210 demonstrates the complete failure of Post I to deter future acts of discrim211
ination. Only three weeks after an injunction was issued against him,
Clerk of Court Post helped institute last-minute changes in election
procedures which again discriminated against black voters. In United
States v. Post, moreover, the evidence of the defendants' 212 intent to
207 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(e) (Supp. V, 1965-69). It is arguable that when examiners are
not present in the county, federal observers or Department of Justice attorneys could perform the function of receiving and substantiating complaints.
208

297 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1969).

209 The death of the incumbent before his term expired necessitated special elections,

which were joined with the Democratic primary of November 4, 1967 and the general
election of February 6, 1968.
210 Wyche had defeated two white candidates in the special Democratic primary while
Cox received the Republican nomination, after being appointed to fill the marshal's
seat on a temporary basis. Cox won the election in question by a margin of 1,954 votes
to Wyche's 1,659. Brief for Plaintiff Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee at 14
[hereinafter cited as LCDC Briefj.
211 See text at note 249 infra. Judge Dawkins issued his opinion in Brown v. Post on
January 4, 1968. Post's involvement in the present case dates from January 24, 1968, when
he urged officials to adopt the lockout in Ward 4. See text at note 231 infra.
212 Although Post was the principal defendant, suit was also brought against F.M.
Magee, a voting machine mechanic; Douglas Fowler, State Custodian of Voting Machines;
Wade Martin, Secretary of State; and Jack H. Folk, J.W. -Huckabay, and Myrtis Bishop,
members of the Board of Supervisors. On February 23 and 26, 1968, respectively, the
Government and LCDC filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973a, 1971(a), 1971(c),
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discriminate appears even stronger than in Post L The fundamental
significance of Post II, therefore, lies in the response of both the plaintiffs' attorneys and the trial judge to repeated infringement of voting
rights. Despite convincing evidence that the defendants sought to defeat Wyche, the Department of Justice and LODO chose not to press
for a finding of intentional discrimination or to seek punitive measures
that would deter future misconduct. Rather, the attorneys acknowledged Judge Dawkins' tendency to impose minimal sanctions and limited their requested relief to an order setting aside the election. Judge
Dawkins, in turn, fashioned a politically adroit compromise, giving the
plaintiffs the new election they clearly deserved while expressly exonerating the defendants.
1. Discrimination Through Adjustment of Voting Machines. The
central issue in Post II is the decision to disconnect the master party
lever from the marshal's race, thereby requiring Tallulah residents to
pull the individual lever above the candidate's name in order to vote
for town marshal.
Post convinced his superiors to adopt this procedure 213 after the
Secretary of State's office mistakenly listed the marshal's race on all
Ward 4 ballots. The officials involved did not realize that Ward 4 is
comprised of areas inside and outside Tallulah boundaries. 214 As
printed, the ballot would permit ineligible voters-those residing outside the village boundaries-to vote in the special election for village
marshal.21 5 To remedy this situation, state officials considered several
options(l but decided to disconnect the marshal's election from the
master level in all Ward 4 voting machines. Election supervisors
could prevent out-of-town voters from casting ballots in the marshal's
race by using a "lockout" switch to freeze the individual levers in
place.2 1 7 Accordingly, Tallulah voters could vote for marshal only by

pulling the individual lever above the candidate's name.
and § 12(d) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These actions were subsequently consolidated for trial.
213 As Clerk of Court for the Sixth Judicial District of Louisiana, Post was ex officio
custodian of parish voting machines.
214 Ward 4 contains seven precincts. Three precincts contain only Tallulah voters, while
the remaining four contain voters living within and without the village limits.
215 The ballot indicated, moreover, that pulling the master lever would register a vote
for all 24 offices, including village marshal, the last one listed.
216 See text at notes 228-29 infra.
217 Because of the mechanical limitations of the voting machines, however, the lockout
switch could be used only on individual levers that were disconnected from the master
party lever. 297 F Supp. at 48. In the special primary of November 4, the marshal's
race appeared on all ballots in Ward 4. A primary, however, does not involve straight
party voting or the use of the master party lever. It is always necessary to pull the individual candidate's lever in order to vote in a particular race. Hence, no problem arose
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Post, however, did not announce the change in procedure, either to
the general public or to the candidates involved. 21 8 On election day,
precinct officials under his supervision failed to inform several hundred
black voters of the need to pull the individual lever in the marshal's
race.21 9 Moreover, printed instructions inside the voting machines also
indicated that the master party lever would cast votes for all party
candidates. 220 The election therefore proceeded in a state of confusion,
with an indeterminate number of voters mistakenly pulling the master
lever to vote for marshal.
While the decision to adjust the machines does not by itself seem
racially motivated, a discriminatory purpose nevertheless appears from
the selection of a highly prejudicial procedure and from the unaccountable failure to inform either the public or the candidates of the
major change. First, the requirement of separate voting in the marshal's
contest discriminated solely against Wyche, since he alone based his
entire campaign on urging voters to pull the Democratic master lever. 22 '
when election officials froze the marshal's levers as voters living outside Tallulah entered
the booth.
218 The only form of public notice was the posting of a revised sample ballot outside
the Clerk of Court's office indicating the need to pull the individual lever in the marshal's
race. The revised ballot replaced the first sample ballot, which did not indicate the need
to pull the individual lever. 297 F. Supp. at 49.
219 As the polls opened, commissioners in Precincts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 did not mention
the necessity of pulling the individual lever, according to the testimony of federal observers. Record at 114-15, 121, 132, 152-54, 162. No information in the record concerned
the remaining precincts 1 and 7, which were all-white. LCDC Brief at 13. At approximately
6:45 a.m., Wyche discovered that the master lever would not cast a vote in the marshal's
race. When Robert Moore, a Department of Justice attorney supervising federal observers, learned of this situation, he protested the failure of election commissioners to offer
the necessary information. Id. at 12. Thereafter, Jack Folk and Post went to all voting
precincts and instructed the commissioners to advise each voter to pull the individual lever
to vote for marshal. Accordingly, the correct information was generally offered, except in
Precinct 4 where four white commissioners still did not volunteer the instructions. Record
at 137-38. The plaintiffs estimated that more than three hundred black voters failed to
receive the proper information, and therefore did not cast a vote for marshal that actually
registered, although intending to do so. LCDC Brief at 13-14.
220 "To Vote STRAIGHT TICKET Turn Large Handle by Emblem to Right. This
Marks X's for all Party Candidates but NOT for AMENDMENTS. To Vote AMENDMENTS Turn Each Pointer SEPARATELY." LCDC Brief at 12.
221 Wyche distributed three thousand campaign cards with the slogan "PULL THE
LEVER WITH THE ROOSTER. Vote the Straight Democratic Ticket." (The Rooster is
the emblem of the Democratic Party in Louisiana and is pictured next to the master party
lever on the ballot.) On local radio, he made ninety announcements to promote the straight
ticket, while the Voters League distributed a standard Democratic Party campaign leaflet
which told people to "Vote [for] the straight MCKIETHEN-AYCOCK-PARKER TICKET
and for all other Democratic Nominees" by pulling the party lever next to the rooster.
Wyche's supporters also displayed 275 bumper stickers with his name printed beside a
prominent picture of the rooster. Other campaign materials included handbills and
leaflets, both of which emphasized the straight party ticket. Record at 15-25; LCDC Brief
at 4-5.
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The comparatively large number of illiterate voters in Tallulah, the
majority of whom are black, made such a strategy advisable. These
individuals invariably have difficulty in operating a voting machine
correctly. 222 Hence Wyche's campaign slogan, "Pull the lever with the
Rooster," gave his supporters a tangible symbol to associate with his
name and reduced the possibility of pulling the wrong lever. The use
of voting machines, moreover, constituted a relatively new experience
for the black community as a whole. Turning the master lever would
simplify the procedure of voting for Wyche, who was listed on the ballot
beside 23 other Democrats.
Cox, in contrast, could not have been affected by the lockout. His
campaign consisted simply of asking his supporters to pull the individual lever above his name.2 23 Since he was one of only two Republican candidates, he did not expect the traditionally Democratic voters
224
of Madison Parish to pull the Republican master lever.
In addition to being discriminatory, the procedure used by the defendants was unnecessarily misleading. Electors accustomed to voting
a straight party ticket had no reason to assume that the master lever
would record votes for only 23 of the 24 candidates listed on the ticket.225 Louisiana law in fact requires that the voters be able to cast
a straight party ticket in all general elections. 226 Arguably, these provisions also apply to special elections that are joined to general elec7
tions.22
222 Although illiterates are entitled to seek assistance in operating voting machines,
many decline to do so, either out of pride, embarrassment, or unwillingness to let third
persons witness their vote. See United States v. Louisiana, 265 F. Supp. 708, 715 (E.D. La.
1966), aff'd, 886 U.S. 270 (1967) (interpreting a Louisiana statute to require assistance to
illiterate voters on request).
223 Brief for Plaintiff United States Department of Justice at 11. [hereinafter cited as
Government Brief].
224 White Madison Parish residents ordinarily vote Democratic in state and local
elections-as long as a black candidate has not won the primary. See, e.g., STATE OF
LoUISIANA, GENM.AL ELErION RrtruRs, NovLNrasm 5, 1968, at 56 (1968).

225 See text at notes 286-41 infra.
226 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1168 (1969) provides:

Any voting machine may be leased, borrowed, or purchased and used which is
so constructed as to fulfill the following requirements ....
(8) It shall permit the voter to vote for the candidates of one party as a unit at
general elections.
LA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 15, provides:
All elections by the people, except primary elections, ... shall be by official
ballot . . . [which shall have] a specific and separate device adopted by [a] political party ....
By stamping such device at the head of the list of the candi-

dates of each political party, or nominating party, the voter may indicate that his
vote is for the entire or straight ticket of the particular party. ....
This provision has been incorporated into statute in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:671 (1969).
227 The voting machine mechanic, however, believed that the special election did
not require connection with the master lever. 297 F. Supp. at 48-49.
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Significantly, the defendants rejected three administratively feasible
alternatives which were nondiscriminatory and straightforward. New
ballots could have been printed, listing the marshal's race separately
from the 23 other offices.228 This procedure would have clarified the
special nature of the election and apprised voters that the party lever
would not operate in the marshal's race. Additionally, separate machines could have been set up for the different classes of residents since
the marshal's race would be locked out on nonresidents' machines.
Finally, new ballots could have been used in which the marshal's race
229
would be listed for Tallulah voters only.
Although the defendants denied any discriminatory purpose, they
could not convincingly explain their choice of the most confusing procedure. An administrative assistant to the Secretary of State made the
final decision on the basis of a January 24 telephone discussion with
Post, who claimed to have already instructed election commissioners
in the use of the lockout.230 Post urged retention of that procedure
because it would be difficult to get the commissioners to attend another
meeting.231 However, the strength of this justification is undercut by
the testimony that Post never informed commissioners of the need to
pull the separate lever 23 2 and by the subsequent failure of commissioners to instruct voters as to the proper means to cast a ballot for
marshal.23 Furthermore, it appears that a voting machine mechanic
disconnected the marshal's lever on his own decision = 4 prior to the
meeting of commissioners. His superiors were not informed of this
228 This
and D of
candidates
Brief at 8.

229

alternative, considered by officials, would have listed Wyche and Cox on rows C
the ballot, below the other candidates. On the final ballot, 24 Democratic
were listed horizontally on row A and two Republicans on row B. LCDC
Notice would still have been required for the candidates and the public.

LCDC Brief at 7. Robert Hughes, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of

State, preferred this procedure before speaking with Post. LCDC Brief at 8.
procedure considered would have disconnected the marshal's lever only in
precincts that contained both Tallulah and outside voters. Id. In this way, at
voters in the other three precincts could all use the straight party lever to

Another
the four
least the
vote for

marshal. See note 214 supra.
230 LCDC Brief at 8.
231 Id.
232 Two election commissioners, Mary Veal and Emma Weston, claimed Post had
not informed them that each voter had to pull the individual lever to vote for marshal.
Government Brief at 28-34. Post and James Trichel, the voting machine supervisor,
claimed, however, that the proper instructions were given. Government Brief at 27.
Compare the court's opinion:
At the school [for commissioners] it was at least mentioned that the pulling of
the master party levers would not affect the election of the Marshal for the Village of Tallulah, Louisiana. This condition of the machines, however, was not
made clear to the persons in attendance.
297 F. Supp. at 49.
233 See note 219 supra.
234 Government Brief at 17-20.
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fact until after the meeting was held, when Post could argue that a
235
change in procedure would confuse the commissioners.
Even if one assumes the decision to use the lockout resulted from
poor judgment, the defendants' failure to notify the candidates and
voters remains highly suspect. Post in particular realized that Wyche
was basing his campaign on straight ticket voting, but made no effort
to inform him of the basic change in procedure. 236 Nor did the Secretary of State send Wyche a copy of the corrected sample ballot indi2 37
cating the necessity of pulling the individual lever for marshal. Most
curious of all, no local official publicly announced that the marshal's
race would be disconnected.2 38 While commissioners should have explained this fact on election day, public notice would have minimized
confusion. The defendants also failed to place the required demonstration voting machine in Ward 4 prior to the election, 23 9 failed to inform
Wyche of the sealing of the actual machines, 240 and failed to replace
the incorrect written instructions which had been inserted in the machines.241
2. The Role of Compromise in Litigation. Despite the strong evidence of wrongdoing, the Department of Justice 2 2 and LCDC 243 made
a conscious decision not to press the question of intentionality. First,
the attorneys declined to initiate contempt proceedings against Post,
even though he was under an injunction at the time of the election
not to engage in any "practices and procedures which may be discriminatory in fact." 244 Since Judge Dawkins had avoided a finding of
intentionality in Post I, it was assumed that he would not respond
favorably to a request for sanctions directed at specific white officials.
235

Id.

236 Government Brief at 46-47. Post also knew that Wyche had inspected the incorrect
sample ballot on January 19. LCDC Brief at 4.
237 297 F. Supp. at 49-50. Wyche had written to the Secretary of State requesting
copies of the sample ballot for Ward 4. He received them on January 23, but never
received any corrected samples. Id. at 48, 49.
238 Government Brief at 6, 14, 47.
239 LCDC Brief at 17. LA. PEv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1180 (1969) states in part that "at
least one machine for demonstration purposes shall be placed in each ward not more
than twenty five days and up to but not including the day of election." When the
machines were set up on election day, however, they contained erroneous instructions.
240 Mrs. Grimes testified that she mailed notice of the time and place of sealing of
the machines to Wyche in accordance with LA. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1176 (1969). Record
at 239-40. Wyche tesified that he did not receive notice. Id. at 25. Cox, moreover, was
subpoened to produce all documents received from the Clerk's office relating to the
election, and did not produce any such notice. Id. at 147.
241 297 F. Supp. at 49-50.
242 Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.

243 LCDC Interviews, supra note 128.

244 Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60, 64 (W.). La., 1968).
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Second, plaintiffs' attorneys recognized the lower standard of proof
established in Post I and repeatedly emphasized the discriminatory effect of the defendants' action without impugning their motives. 245 The
briefs meticulously documented the various failures of each official,
while carefully withholding any conclusions of intent. Although the

plaintiffs argued the discrimination was harmful precisely because it
was subtle, the analysis did not characterize the subtlety itself as pur-

poseful. 246 The Department of Justice and LCDC thus honored Judge
Dawkins' gradualist approach 24 7 by asking for a new election, their
primary goal, at the expense of seeking sanctions for official misconduct.
The court's decision embodies this compromise approach by finding
discrimination in fact and ordering a new election, while characteriz-

ing the defendants' actions as undertaken in "good faith." 248 Although
the decision provided a remedy for the immediate wrong, failure to
find intentionality cost the plaintiffs additional relief. Officials were
not only spared considerable embarrassment and political repercussions249 but were also protected against possible prosecutions for voting

fraud.

250

245 It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs' briefs mention neither Post's role in
Brown nor the injunction issued against him. In contrast, the injunction was raised by
the State in Post's defense:
Mr. Post was under a restraining order as a result of a previous suit, Brown v.
Post, 279 F. Supp. 60. Now the plaintiffs attack Mr. Post's alleged inactivity
whereas in the above suit his activity was attacked. Plaintiff would apparently
condemn Mr. Post for either his activities or his inactivity.
Brief for Defendant at 13.
246 Repeated efforts to enforce the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment have
made us aware of one indisputable fact; that as the prohibitions [on discrimination in voting] become more effective, the obstacles to Negro political participation become more ingenious. The instant case presents a classic example
in subtle discrimination.
Government Brief at 51.
247 The phrase is that of Charles Hamilton, who has categorized Southern federal
judges as "recalcitrant," "gradualist," and "aggressive." Hamilton, supra note 124.
248 This action by defendant Post [failing to instruct the election commissioners
properly] was not in bad faith. He and all other defendants at all times acted
in good faith, never intending to deprive Negroes of their constitutional or
statutory right to vote. . . . Where, as was done here, public officials, engaged
in performing the duties of their offices, cause to be disseminated instructions
to voters as to the manner of casting votes in a general election and, then, even
though in good faith, without adequate notice to the voters, institute a new
voting procedure contrary to the instructions previously disseminated, and a
substantial number of Negro voters are induced to vote according to such
erroneous instructions and are thereby prevented from casting effective votes,
we conclude that Negroes have been discriminated against in the administration
of the voting process ....
297 F. Supp. at 50, 51.
249 White parish residents have expressed increased dissatisfaction with the necessity of
voting again for the same offices. Interviews with local residents, in Tallulah, La., Oct. 28,
1970.
250 Admittedly, it is not likely that state prosecutions under LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18:369, 18:1194, or 18:221 (1969) would have followed a finding of intentional discrimination since one of Post's attorneys was Thompson Clarke, District Attorney for the
Sixth Judicial District of Louisiana.
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More important, however, the finding of good faith undercut any
deterrent effect the litigation might have on future conduct. First, the
decree did no more than order the defendants to obey the law: "The
defendants... shall administer the voting process in compliance with
the applicable Louisiana and Federal law in such a manner that will
afford equal opportunities to vote to all qualified voters regardless of
race or color." 251 Second, the Judge warned the officials not to repeat
the same mistakes: "Defendants are specifically enjoined from engaging in the practices which were found to be discriminatory in the February 6, 1968, election and any other practices and procedures which
25 2
may be discriminatory in fact."
Finally, the defendants' exculpation reduced the plaintiffs' ability
to improve their position in future lawsuits. Recent voting rights cases
have established that a documented history of purposeful discrimination casts a strong presumption of illegality over continuing attempts
to manipulate the electoral process. 25 By specifically emphasizing Post's
"good faith" efforts on two separate occasions, Judge Dawkins implicitly
declined to recognize that a conscious pattern of discrimination existed
in Madison Parish. In fact, the Judge's decision makes no mention of
Ward or Post I, as though Post 11 were sui generis rather than one instance of a historical continuum.
In sum, Judge Dawkins imposed almost the same injunction in
Post II as in Post 1. In the second case, it is true, the injunction remained in effect, placing some element of deterrence on the principal
defendant. But on the whole, Judge Dawkins did not increase the
threat of sanctions on election officials. On the contrary, he showed
a willingness to give the defendants every benefit of the doubt in their
administration of the electoral process. The chance of punishment for
discrimination-whether by the criminal law, the civil law, or the
contempt power-remained remote.
Arguably, the Judge felt that after three government-supported suits,
local officials would recognize the futility of further denying black citizens the right to participate fully in community politics. 2 5 But sub251 297 F. Supp. at 51.
252 Id. Considering the generality of this injunctive order and Dawkins' refusal to find

intentionality despite the strong evidence, it is unlikely that he would ever punish
discriminatory conduct through contempt. Rather, the entire history of Post I and Post 11
suggests that Dawkins would excuse a defendant who could show the thinnest justification.
253 See, e.g., United States v. Democratic Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 943 (M.D. Ala.
1968); Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.
1967); United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Sims v. Baggett, 247
F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La.
1963), af'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
254 Department of Justice attorneys themselves indicate that one government suit is
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sequent events proved otherwise, as the final resolution of Post 11
indicates. In the new election, held on May 20, 1969, Wyche did in fact
defeat Cox, by a margin of 1,949 to 1,796.255 Nevertheless, Wyche failed
to receive his commission within the usual time. Apparently the thought
of a black police chief still created consternation. On June 7, 1969,
LCDC filed a motion for an injunction requiring the Governor and
the Secretary of State to deliver the commission in question. Eventually the Governor complied, issuing Wyche the necessary document
on June 23. LCDC subsequently withdrew its motion, but Wyche by
this time had received the message. After winning one primary, one
suit, and a second election, he still had to contend with white officials
before he could take office.
C.

25
Toney v. White

In April, 1970, the focus of Madison Parish litigation shifted from
official interference with the process of general elections to a discretionary purge of voters prior to the Democratic primary. The black
community had attempted to gain political control of Tallulah for the
first time by nominating a full slate of eight candidates to run for town
and party offices. 257 Only Johnnie Crockett and Wyche, however, survived opposition in their respective races for the Democratic Executive
Committee and for village marshal. LCDC then filed suit against the
Registrar, alleging the purge of 159 black voters and eleven white voters
to be illegal and discriminatory. 258 The complaint requested that every
election be set aside, except the village marshal's, because Wyche was
the only winning candidate who still faced an opponent in the general
election. 259 One month later, the Department of Justice brought a
similar suit but extended its prayer for relief to invalidation of the
usually "enough" to convince local officials not to interfere with voting rights. Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
255 Madison Journal (Ia.), June 11, 1970, at 1.
256 Toney v. White, Civil No. 15,641 (W.D. La., filed May 4, 1970).
257 Compare the local reaction to this strategy:
Now I have never heard of anything more ludicrous than a "black ticket." Yet,

that's what we have in Tallulah right now-a black ticket ...

. . How they run for office is their business, except that they have turned the
election into a race issue, which I feel is significant and deserving of the comment
I have given it.
Madison Journal (La.), Mar. 26, 1970, at I (editorial by Carroll Reagan, a prominent
Tallulah citizen).
258 The action was brought on behalf of the six losing candidates, three black voters,
and their class under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a)(2), 1973, and 1983 (Supp. V, 1965-69). Civil No.
15,641 (W.D. La.).
259 The complaint did not actually state this reason, which is mentioned in Post-Trial
Brief for Plaintiff at 2.
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entire April 4 primary. 60 Wyche subsequently secured his post as village marshal by defeating Cox in the general election held on June 9.
Rather than argue the merits of Toney v. White prior to decision,
the following discussion focuses on two problems of relief generated
by the factual situation. First, the voiding remedy is analyzed to determine whether its conceptual underpinnings permit only part of an
election suit to be set aside. Second, the appropriateness of additional
relief is considered in the light of past Madison Parish litigation.
1. The "Selective" Purges. The key factual issue in Toney involves
the Registrar's allegedly illegal and discriminatory application of state
voter eligibility statutes.261 Louisiana law requires registrars to
purge from the rolls any elector who has not voted in the past four
years2 62 and permits removal of individuals believed to be illegally
registered. 26 3 In either instance citizens must be given personal and
published notice of the challenges and be provided an opportunity to
reinstate themselves within a specified period.2 If they fail to seek
reinstatement they may reregister by meeting standard state requirements. 26 5 However, registration books are closed thirty days prior to
any general or primary election, 266 thereby foreclosing the opportunity
for reregistration before the election for failure to meet the reinstate260 United States v. Bishop, Civil No. 15,747 (W.D. La., filed June 8, 1970). Private
and government suits were consolidated for the purposes of trial, held on January 18-19,
1971 after an initial postponement.
261 The selective purge of black voters revives a discredited tactic of the segregationist
era in Louisiana. During 1956-58, the Association of Citizens Councils mapped a two-step
plan to eliminate black voters from the rolls. Blacks would first be purged under the
various challenge statutes, then denied reregistration by rigorous application of the
interpretation test. See 1961 CIvIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 21, at 48-48; 1959 CIvIL
RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 18 at 101-06. An estimated eleven thousand voters were purged
from the voting lists of twelve Louisiana parishes within a few months in 1956 and 1957
alone. U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, THE Fury STATES REPORT 219 (1961). Moreover,
Judge Dawkins himself condemned several massive purges as blatantly discriminatory. See
United States v. Clement, 231 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. La. 1964); United States v. Crawford,
229 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. La. 1964); United States v. Wilder, 222 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. La.
1963); United States v. Association of Citizens Councils, 196 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. La. 1961).
But see United States v. Lucky, 239 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. La. 1965) (evidence not found tc
have supported a finding of discrimination).
262 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:240 (1969).
263 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:132 (1969).
2G4 The registrant is given ten days from the date of the letter, and three days fron
the date of newspaper publication, to appear at the registrar's office. While a registrani
who appears under § 18:240 must be reinstated upon satisfactorily identifying himsell
to the registrar, a person seeking reinstatement pursuant to § 18:132 must present affa.
davits of three bona fide registered voters of the parish that he is legally entitled tc
remain on the rolls.
265 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:135 (1969).
266 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:170 (1969).
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ment deadline.26 7 The timing of purges by Registrar Bishop has been
questioned because she did not mail letters of challenge to 130 blacks
and eleven whites until March 4,268 effectively forcing the persons in
question to appear at her office within ten days or forego voting in the
April 4 primary. 2 9 The newspaper announcement, however, did not
contain the required notice of reinstatement rights.2 7 0 Nor did Mrs.

Bishop keep her office open for more than five of the mandatory ten
days, although she added three days to the reinstatement period with271
out informing affected individuals.
While the above conduct is of questionable legality and affected a
disproportionately high number of black voters, the principal evidence
of discrimination appears from the selective purge of 29 black citizens
for residing at addresses different than those listed on their registration
records.2 72 The Registrar failed to challenge 141 whites who had moved
or changed addresses prior to March 23273 and failed to review the
eligibility, as required, of 62 white voters who had voted by absentee
ballot during the previous two year phase.2 4 Athough it cannot be
estimated how many of these white registrants would have been removed if challenged, it is known that 93 voted in the primary275 and
267 According to the Louisiana Attorney General, no purge under § 18:240 can be made
in good faith if the registrar waits until thirty days before an election. If, however, a
registrant is called to appear within the thirty-day period when the books are closed, he
must be reinstated and allowed to vote in the forthcoming election upon identifying
himself to the registrar's satisfaction. [1956-1958] LA. ATr'Y GEN. R P. & Or. 210-11.
268 Brief for Plaintiff Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee at 3 [hereinafter cited
as LCDC Brief]. This purge was conducted under § 18:240 exactly thirty days before the
April 4 primary, violating the requirements of good faith indicated by the Attorney
General. See note 267 supra.
269 Four persons did appear at the Registrar's office after the ten-day period and were
denied registration for this reason. Brief for Plaintiff United States Department of Justice
at 37 [hereinafter cited as Government Brief].
270 The notice simply indicated the individuals would be removed from the registration
rolls, although § 18:240 states that the publication must inform voters of reinstatement
procedures. Government Brief at 12. This omission was of particular importance to 65
registrants whose letters were returned as undeliverable. The published list provided
them notice of the purge but incorrectly implied they could not be reinstated.
271 Government Brief at 16.
272 Government Brief at 23. According to the Registrar, this purge was conducted
under § 18:132, although she received notice of the registration defects from two white
voters, including a candidate for alderman. LCDC Brief at 8.
273 Government Brief at 28-30.
274 Id.
at 31-32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1080 (1969) provides that registrars must
cancel an individual's registration if continued absentee balloting is unjustified. The
failure to purge absentee voters might well have been the decisive factor in the primary.
All eight black candidates out-polled their white opponents on the voting machines in
every race; however, absentee ballots provided the winning margins for white candidates
in six races. LCDC Brief at 6.
275 Government Brief at App. B.
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that 97 were stricken from the rolls afterward for failure to justify
continued registration.276 In contrast, only three of the 159 challenged
blacks voted in the primary, although eighty would have been eligible
to do so had the purge not been effected. 277 In short, the plaintiffs
charge Mrs. Bishop with selectively purging black voters, providing
misleading notice, and allowing insufficient reinstatement time, while
neglecting to challenge white voters with equally defective registration.
2. Refining Voiding Relief. If Judge Dawkins makes a finding of
discrimination in these circumstances, he should be prepared to grant
immediate relief which will eliminate the effects of discrimination,
and to impose remedies that will reduce the possibility of another
unfair election. Previous cases suggest that manipulation of the electoral
process will continue unless he increases the the severity of sanctions.
Hence, his first option is to overturn only those elections lost by black
candidates, thereby implementing the voiding remedy without rewarding those who engaged in discrimination. This solution could be
reached by tailoring general equitable principles of voiding elections
to fit the particular circumstances of Madison Parish. In Bell v. Southwell,278 as previously mentioned, the Fifth Circuit authorized setting
aside an election tainted by discrimination regardless of whether the
discrimination affected the outcome. The court based its decision on
the belief that discrimination caused "the body politic as a whole, both
Negro and white," to suffer. 27 9 Voiding relief was therefore ordered
to protect the right of voters to participate in an election conducted
free of impermissible racial distinctions.
If rigidly applied, this doctrine would require overturning every
April 4 primary contest. However, the underlying rationale of Bell
is that voiding relief provides one appropriate means of remedying
discrimination-not that all tainted elections must be overturned. Since
Wyche gained victory despite discrimination against his race, the necessity of setting aside his election disappears. New elections would not
eliminate, but would perpetuate, the harm flowing from the initial dis276 Id. at 30, 35. After the April primary, 72 of the 141 persons were removed
following a challenge made by black voters under LA. R v. STAT. ANN. § 18:133 (1969),

which authorizes third parties to present affidavits to registrars indicating that named
individuals are illegally registered. LCDC Brief at 8-9. The Registrar also removed 25 persons for failure to justify continued absentee voting after the filing of the complaint made
her aware of the applicable provisions. Government Brief at 35.
277 Government Brief at App. B. Assuming no purge had occurred, 79 black voters
removed from the rolls were not eligible to vote in the primary because they resided
outside Tallulah or were members of the States Rights or Republican Parties. Id. The
briefs do not indicate, however, how many black voters were discouraged from seeking
reinstatement because of the deficient notice or limited office hours.
376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967).
279 Id. at 662.
278
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crimination. The black incumbent would be forced to campaign again,
even though he had nothing to gain and everything to lose in a second
primary. Wyche would thus be penalized for the Registrar's purge
while his two defeated opponents reaped the benefits of discrimination
by obtaining a second chance to beat the black candidate. 28 0 Cox particularly does not deserve such a "windfall," because he was defeated
by Wyche in an election that no one disputed.
Admittedly, the court cannot presume that Wyche would have won
the primary had no discrimination occurred.28 ' On the other hand,
Judge Dawkins must not blind himself to the reality that a racial power
struggle exists in Madison Parish. 2 2 The dilution of black voting
strength could not conceivably help the black candidate or hurt the
white one. Retaining Wyche's election would therefore recognize the
plain fact that he overcame the discrimination.
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Thompson v. Brown,28 3 provides a
second reason for preserving Wyche's election. The court held that
two white candidates could not wait until after the general election
to contest the primary victories of their black opponents. 28 4 The critical
error was the failure to file a timely suit seeking to enjoin certification of
the election results. 2 5 The Fifth Circuit therefore found the primary
28o Wyche's position must first be distinguished from that of the six black losers, who
can claim that the purge may have deprived them of victory, and who can therefore
benefit from the new election. See note 274 supra.
A more difficult problem exists in distinguishing the situation of the six white
incumbents who must also face defeat at the polls in new elections. To this extent they
would be punished for the discriminatory acts of other officials who caused the first election to be voided. However, traditional voiding theory has not considered this imposition
too great when weighed against the necessity of redressing discrimination. In the case
of the black incumbent, this is the very question to be asked-whether new elections will
in fact redress the initial discrimination. Moreover, courts have assumed, however
implicitiy, that discrimination against black voters could only benefit white candidates.
New elections, therefore, would strip the white candidate of an impermissible advantage.
281 The court would have to indulge in vote counting, either adding the votes of
the purged black voters or subtracting the votes of the whites who should have been
challenged. Although it is highly likely that each person would vote for the candidates
of his race, this assumption is impermissible. Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir.

1967).

Judge Dawkins in fact made this observation at trial. Record at 79.
283 434 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1970).
284 Bearing in mind the fact that this was merely a contest of a primary, hallenging the right of appellants to appear on the election ballot as candidates, and
that no contest was filed after the election ....
the court asked counsel . . . to
282

show why the primary . . . has not been mooted by the uncontested general

election .... It is plain that the appellants have been serving for more than a
year as aldermen under an election which was not contested. Any question
touching on their qualifications to run in the election has been mooted for the
failure of the appellees or anyone else to challenge the election results.
Id. at 1096 (emphasis in original).
285 The passage quoted in note 284 supra does not clearly indicate whether the
white candidates could have avoided the mootness problem by seeking to void the
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challenge mooted because the aldermen in question had been serving
in office for more than a year after the uncontested general election.
Despite the obverse factual situation, this reasoning applies convincingly to Toney. Since neither the Department of Justice 88 nor Cox
sought to enjoin the general election or prevent certification of its outcome, both should be estopped from challenging Wyche's continued
tenure as marshal. Such an approach would again serve to limit the
adverse effects of the initial discrimination.
3. Increased Judicial Intervention. Previous Madison Parish cases
demonstrate that new elections for losing candidates provide only minimal relief. In the absence of strict judicial enforcement, local officials
persist in using questionable discretionary procedures. Given a history
of electoral misconduct and the necessity for intervention following
a finding of discrimination, the judiciary should be prepared to impose
sanctions with the potential to deter continuing discrimination.
To avoid future resentment and confusion, Judge Dawkins could
insist that election officials regain the voters' confidence by adhering to
higher standards of care than the law requires. Judge Pittman, who
recognized that local practices contributed to racial friction, 287 adopted
this position in Gray v. Main2 8 Although he did not find discrimination requiring relief, the Judge ordered a board of registrars to carry
out its duties under full public scrutiny2 9 and warned officials to improve their conduct:
This law suit probably could have been avoided, and similar
law suits in the future can be avoided, if the defendants and
all officials who occupy similar positions will take pains not
only to observe the legal requirements with reference to racial discrimination, but also to avoid participating in and
creating (and offer leadership to the electorate to avoid) situations which easily and quite naturally arouse suspicion of
290
racial discrimination.
primary after it was held, or whether the critical failure lay in not attempting to enjoin

the general election.
286 The Government filed suit on June 8 to void the whole primary, but did not
seek to enjoin the conduct or certification of the general election, held on June 9. The
distinction may be a technical one, since the Department of Justice took some action
before the general election, in contrast to the white candidates in Thompson.
287 Gray v. Main, 809 F. Supp. 207, 227 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
288 Id.
289 Id.

290 Id. at 226. Judge Pittman's assessment of the historical context offers an instructive
comparison with Madison Parish:
As for the defendants and white population of Bullock County, the transition
from dominant political control of their elected officials to the prospect of sharing
or losing this control to the Negro population, with a great number of those
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Despite repeated violations of electoral integrity, Judge Dawkins has
never specifically indicated to officials their increased responsibility.
Should the Judge recognize the necessity of an additional sanction
but reject imposition of a higher standard of care, he could institute
a reporting system. This procedure would require the defendants to
inform the court and counsel of all contemplated purges and changes
in electoral procedure. 29 1 The importance of such a remedy lies in
making public officials accountable for their conduct in advance, thus
eliminating the last-minute surprises which have characterized past
elections. The reporting device also places the initial burden of justification on the defendants, where it appropriately belongs. Once the
plaintiffs demonstrate irregularities which might taint the election, the
questionable procedure would be scrapped-for example, the purged
voter would be returned to the rolls or the dead elector removed. While
requiring diligent activity by the plaintiffs, such an order would in fact
only formalize efforts currently made to ascertain how local officials
intend to sabotage key election campaigns.
Finally, Judge Dawkins could tighten the language of his injunctions
to establish unambiguous foundations for contempt proceedings. Admittedly, this sanction has been used only in exceptional circumstances
since it depends on judicial willingness to expose local officials to public
obliquy. 292 But contempt can be effective if the court makes explicit
its intention to invoke the power when necessary.
While Judge Dawkins has shunned forceful measures in the past,
he may now have recognized the need for higher standards and additional relief. In fact, a statement made during an interlude at the
Toney trial suggests that he may be considering a procedure which
will increase the defendants' accountability:
The handwriting is on the wall and the entire country has to
start working as a team and start pulling together-black and
white-realizing that we need the best qualified persons of
both races as our leaders, we must eliminate this polarization
registered being illiterate and untrained, was undoubtedly a searing emotional
experience.
The Negroes were haunted by slavery and historical discrimination, and the
white population was haunted by 19th Century Reconstruction politics.
Id. at 224.
291 See id.; Hogue v. Auburtin, 291 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Ala. 1968).
292 See In re Herndon, Criminal No. CR 12,421-N (M.D. Ala., Jan. 7, 1971) (criminal
contempt), and Hadnott v. Amos, Civil No. 2757-N (M.D. Ala., Jan. 7, 1971) (civil

contempt), in which a county probate judge was held in contempt of court for failing to
follow an order requiring him to place black candidates' names on an election ballot.
But cf. United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965), in which the Fifth Circuit had
refused to hold former Governor Ross Barnett in contempt of court.
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of the races if this country is to survive. If we don't pull together as a team we're lost.293
IV.

VOTING RIGHTS LITIGATION: AN EVALUATION

The effectiveness of voting rights litigation must be measured in
terms of its immediate objective-securing the right to vote free from
discrimination-and its ultimate goal-insuring black political participation. 294 The foregoing discussion indicates that litigation did achieve
minimal success by providing relief from specific discriminatory procedures, but that the sanctions invoked proved insufficient to deter repeated violations of electoral integrity. Consequently, judicial enforcement of voting rights has not brought direct political gains. 295 White
officials still control the parish by neutralizing the potential voting
strength of the black majority. 296 More important, the present admin293 Madison Journal (La.), Jan. 21, 1971, at 1. This shortened tolerance of subtle
forms of discrimination reflects a gradual change in the Judge's attitude toward racial
hostility. Judge Dawkins, who had enjoined the holding of a 1959 Civil Rights Commission hearing with a curt "It is all part of the game," 1959 CIVI RIGrrs REPORT, supra
note 18, at 100-01 (for the complete story of this affair, see id. at 98-101), had been
characterized as "torn-a segregationist with respect for the law," Hamilton, supra note
124, at 88 (quoting a Department of Justice attorney), and had been severely criticized
by the Fifth Circuit, see Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930, 936-38 (1958). "Schooled" through
reversals, Judge Dawkins now renders opinions which acknowledge violations of plaintiffs' substantive rights. See the discussion of the Concordia Parish school litigation in 2
RACE REI. L. StrvEy, 174-75 (1970-71) (rejecting a school board's plan for sex separation
in the public schools). However, he adheres to the gradualist approach by granting limited
and often inadequate relief.
294 It might be argued that the sole purpose of voting rights litigation is to guarantee
the right to vote. Government attorneys involved in Madison Parish cases have expressed
this view, stating that local leaders must develop their own political organization.
Compare Attorney General Katzenbach's statement, quoted in P. WATrRs & R. CLEGHORN,
supra note 141, at 265-67. Nevertheless, it is clear that blacks cannot exercise political
power unless they can first organize effective votes. See generally H. HoLLowAY, THE
PoLIrrCs OF SourTlE.N NEGROES 68-90 (1969); E. LADD, NEGRO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE
Sourrr 233-318 (1966); D. MATrrrws & J. PROTHRO, NEGROES AND THE NEW SOUTHERN
PoLrIcs 203-235 (1966).
295 Only five black persons presently hold office in Madison Parish-two members of
the school board, one member of the Democratic Executive Committee of Tallulah, the
town marshal, and the town constable. All of these individuals have been elected by
virtue of the black voting strength in Tallulah and none hold parishwide offices. The
Voters League has not extended influence beyond the city limits, principally because
those blacks who live on white-owned plantations face threats of eviction for political
activity. See, e.g., PoLITacA PARTICIPATION, supra note 122, at 117. Self-employed farmers,
moreover, are not easily organized because they are located throughout the parish.
295 Another contributing factor to white electoral success is the difficulty of achieving
full black registration for the reasons stated in note 295 supra. Approximately 1,300
persons or 25% of the black voting-age population remain unregistered despite intensive
registration drives in 1966, 1968, and 1969. In contrast, virtually 100% of the white votingage population is on the rolls, giving whites a numerical superiority in parishwide
registration as of 1970. Figures, based on the 1960 census, available from Voter Education
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istration has ignored black interests; 97 in accelerating school desegregation, 298 securing urban renewal funds, 299 attracting new industry, 0°
and regulating the hours of liquor establishments.30 1
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to infer that litigation has made
no impact on local politics. Resort to the federal court has provided
blacks with the means to build organizational strength and to pressure
local government. Initially, the private suit of Wyche v. Ward performed the function of solidifying black leadership at a time when no
individual alone could hazard challenging the white power structure.
The plaintiffs' resolve to unify at all cost created a viable nucleus
which stimulated future registration efforts. Additionally, the litigants
who suffered defeat in court gained the experience of confronting
white officials.
United States v. Ward generated a second stage of development, the
formation of a distinct political organization. Black leaders founded
the Madison Parish Voters League&02 to encourage registration 0 3 by
providing the extensive coaching needed to pass the citizenship and
literacy test. Once the Voting Rights Act eliminated these obstacles,
the League began massive registration drives. The utility of establishing a working organization prior to August, 1965 can best be appreProject. Reports filed with the Voter Education Project, moreover, indicate that the
Registrar still manages to discourage registration, not only by conducting periodic purges
but also by dosing the office, opening at irregular hours, and limiting the number of
blacks allowed in at any one time.
297 The only voluntary improvement in the black residential community has been
installation by the police jury of street lamps and paving of dirt roads.
298 See text at notes 319-22 infra.
299 Black residents found it necessary to secure their own source of federal funds to
build a 120-unit public housing project under § 101 of the Housing Act of 1965. The
police jury would not initiate an urban renewal plan designed to eliminate the serious
housing shortage engendered by the prevalence of substandard housing. See 1967 DATA
BOOK, supra note 12, at 154.
300 Members of the Voters League regard the attraction of new industry as an important

means of stemming the flow of black emigration from the parish. See text and notes at notes
9-11 supra. Although the potential work force does not possess special skills, training, or
education in abundance, black leaders point to the qualified success of Charles Evers in
Fayette, Mississippi, indicating that rural areas can offer industry certain advantages.
Whites, however, contend that no business will locate in an area that is politically unstable-that is, where blacks could assume control. Interviews with local residents, in
Tallulah, La., October 26-28, 1970.
301 Bars presently operate on an unrestricted basis. The only police jury response to
demands for control has been an ordinance requiring segregation in such establishments.
Madison Journal (La.), Jan. 28, 1971, at SA.
302 The League's primary financial support comes from local blacks who contribute prior
to election campaigns and at weekly meetings held to sustain enthusiasm for political partidpation and to coordinate all civil rights activities. Additional funding to support eight-week
voter registration drives has been received from the Voter Education Project. The first grant
was made to the Congress on Racial Equality in 1966. Letter from Marvin Wall, Director,
Voter Education Project, to The University of Chicago Law Review, Dec. 31, 1970.
303 See Sanders, supra note 21, at 64.
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ciated by comparing Madison with East Carroll Parish. One month
after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the Registrar enrolled 1,800
of the 5,181 eligible blacks in Madison Parish;' 04 registration did not
exceed that figure in East Carroll, where federal examinersO 5 were appointed, until February, 1966. The difference, according to Attorney
General Katzenbach, could be explained in terms of the Voters League
308
campaign.
Subsequent voting rights litigation continued to unify the black community. Candidates explained their losses by arguing that no black
had ever received a fair election,3 07 while leaders pointed to the favorable court decisions as proof that the white administration could not
be trusted.3 08 Moreover, the increasing presence of federal observers,30 9
304 While complying, local officials did not process applications with dispatch when

mass registration began:
This was the wonderful part about the people in Madison Parish. They were so
patient standing in line for days, weeks, and months, until finally we had more
people registered on the books in Madison Parish than the whites and were able
in the end of 1965 to enter the political arena.

Wyche Interview, supra note 41. Moreover, the Registrar originally listed some 283 black
voters on the rolls of the State Rights and Republican Parties, thus rendering them
ineligible for at least six months to vote in the Democratic primary, Madison Parish's

most important local election. Field Reports on file at Voter Education Project (copies on
file at The University of Chicago Law Review).
305 In deciding which of these neighboring parishes should initially receive examiners,
the Government probably selected East Carroll rather than Madison because the Fifth

Circuit's decision in United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795, modified, 352 F.2d 329 (5th Cir.
1965), had not issued by August 6, 1965.
306 p. WATrRS & R. CLEGHORN, supra note 141, at 265-67, quoting Attorney General
Katzenbach. Parish blacks appear to agree. Rather than give credit for increased registration to federal presence, residents cite their own organizing efforts as the controlling variable in achieving political participation. Interviews with local residents, in Tallulah, La.,
Oct. 26-28, 1970.
307 Compare Wyche's contention that white officials "rigged" the voting machines in
the February 6, 1968 general election. Sanders, supra note 21, at 59.
308 Note the April 4, 1970 primary campaign in which black candidates pledged to keep
"the voters of Tallulah properly informed of all coming elections and any and all changes
in election procedures." Madison Journal (La.), Mar. 26, 1970, at 4A (advertisement).
309 The cost of sending federal observers to Madison Parish gives some idea of the heavy
expense involved in monitoring elections:
Number of
Date
Election
Observers
Cost
Aug., 1966
Primary
30
$11,500*
Nov., 1966
General Election
20
7,700*
Nov., 1967
Primary
32
12,300*
Dec., 1967
Primary
34
13,000*
Feb., 1968
Municipal Election
23
8,900'
Apr., 1968
Brown-Fulton Special Election
18
6,900*
Aug., 1968
Municipal Election
22
8,000
Nov., 1968
Municipal Election
19
6,275
May, 1969
Wyche-Cox Special Election
20
8,150
Apr., 1970
Primary
18
7,440
June, 1970
Municipal Runoff
18
7,440
Totals
254
$97,605
Estimated.
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attorneys, and agents, 310 who monitored parish elections, gave credence

to both points of view. Post I and II, therefore, strengthened the resolve
to run a black ticket that would gain control of local government. Concurrently, the Voters League assumed the role of a black Democratic
Party, organizing Tallulah by street, block, and precinct. The racial
polarization3 11 and bloc voting3 12 that characterized past elections made
such a strategy advisable.
By providing the Voters League with an effective bargaining instrument, voting rights litigation facilitated the development of black political organization in a second way. The white community realized
that should blacks bring suit to assert their rights, the success of voiding
suits could be repeated in other areas. Local officials, therefore, chose
to compromise on certain issues that did not directly challenge their
political control. The integration of businesses and public accommodations demonstrates this phenomenon. When the Voters League first
attempted to negotiate the hiring of black employees on a fifty-fifty
basis, local merchants refused to cooperate. In response, black leaders
organized an economic boycott of the town which forced seventeen
establishments to close before businessmen capitulated. 313 The boySource: Letter from David F. Williams, Director, Bureau of Management Services,
United States Civil Service Commission, to The University of Chicago Law Reveiw, Dec.

31, 1970.
310 The Federal Bureau of Investigation periodically inspects the Registrar's records and
generally observes parish elections. Department of Justice Interviews, supra note 71.
311 Editorials in the Madison Journal suggest the underlying bitterness of recent
elections:
The Journal prints many checks for Negro societies, churches and other organizations, and everyone of them must have a check book printed so that three
people can sign the checks. This shows that they cannot trust one another-even
brother and sister church members. If a Negro cannot be trusted with a small
amount of church or society funds, how could he be trusted with thousandseven hundreds of thousands of public money?
When one Negro sees a so called leader driving around in a big car with a cigar
in his mouth, telling others what to do, it is only natural for them to think they
are underdogs and the one doing the ordering is the one who is getting the gravy.
The Negro sooner or later will come to realize that when he needs help or wants
a favor it is to the white man that he will have to appeal.
Madison Journal (La.), Sept. 1, 1967, at 2. Compare a recent editorial which reprinted an
1880 "To Our Colored Voters" policy statement and then warned, under the title "To
Our Colored Voters-1969":
Just as the Madison Journal warned you of 'political tricksters' nearly 90 years
ago, we are today cautioning you against voting for Zelma C. Wyche for marshal
of this community.
Madison Journal (La.), May 15, 1969, at 1.
312 The two most recent elections indicate the extent to which voting follows racial
lines. In the August 15, 1970 Democratic primary for town constable, white candidate
D'Elmer Williamson received 536 votes in all-white Precinct 1 but only twelve votes in
all-black Precinct 5. His opponent Huey Daily received six and 577 votes in the respective precincts. Similarly, Cox recorded 750 and nineteen votes in the two precincts while
Wyche obtained 28 and 685 votes. Madison Journal (La.), Aug. 29, 1970, at 1.
813

See Sanders, supra note 21, at 58.
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cott's effectiveness turned partly on the knowledge that blacks could
rely on the federal government for legal assistance.3 14 Store owners recognized that continued resistance could only bring economic disaster
and a possible law suit as well.
The boycott, in turn, established a pattern of self help in which
litigation plays a supporting role. Rather than wait for local government to act, blacks have built a public housing project,31 5 contracted
for a rural development program,3 16 and lobbied for anti-poverty
funds. 317
It should be noted, however, that the threat of litigation has no effect where the white community sees its political control challenged.
While the voting rights cases illustrate this point, reapportionment
and desegregation suits demonstrate further the difficulty of effecting
meaningful change. Despite general acknowledgment that the configuration of ward boundaries caused extensive dilution of black voting
strength, the local administration refused to reapportion. When black
leaders filed suit,31 8 the police jury and the school board passed resolutions which further diluted the black vote319 and made the election
of a nonwhite candidate virtually impossible. Under the aegis of the
district court, however, the parties have accepted a temporary compromise until 1970 census figures become available in full detail. The
314 Bee see Wyche v. Louisiana, 394 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1967), and Wyche v. Hester, 273
F. Supp. 131 (W.D. La. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1970), arising out of attempts to

integrate a truck stop. In the first case, Wyche was charged with aggravated burglary for
"unauthorized entry" into the premises. The Fifth Circuit ruled that he was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on his petition to remove the state prosecution to federal court,
remanding for a determination whether Wyche's entry was in the exercise of his rights to
enjoy equal access to a place of public accommodation. In the second case, Wyche was
convicted of simple battery, but the court held that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding brought to test the validity of the state conviction.
315 See note 299 supra.
316 Wyche Interview, supra note 25.
317 The Voters League was instrumental in establishing the Delta Community Action
Project, funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, to run social welfare programs.
The project initially had difficulty in attracting sufficient white interest. A Head Start
pre-school program was terminated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
because it did not meet in the white part of town and did not enroll a proportion of
black and white children equal to the racial composition of Madison Parish.
318 Wyche v. Madison Parish Police Jury, Civil No. 14,503 (W.D. La., filed Apr. 7, 1969).
Ward 1, for example, had one police juror and school board member for 348 inhabitants
while Ward 4, where most of the parish's blacks live, had three representatives for 11,754
people. Id. Reapportionment problems are quickly replacing registration denials as the
most litigated area in voting rights discrimination. See 89 U.S.L.W. 8535 (June 8, 1971).
319 Exhibits A, B. The resolutions called for representatives to run on an at-large basis
throughout the parish. Since white voters constitute a majority of the voters registered in
the parish, see note 296, supra, the plan would effectively undercut the black power base
in Tallulah.
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reapportionment case therefore remains unresolved, three years after
its commencement.
Litigation has also proved necessary to implement and structure
school desegregation. Stated simply, the school board has refused to
take any steps toward integration, unless unequivocally required to do
so by court order.320 Despite years of judicial enforcement,3 21 moreover,
integration has progressed gradually, without dismantling of the dual
school system. 322 This situation is not likely to change in the near
future unless blacks gain control of the school board. However, blacks
cannot obtain that position unless reapportionment and fair elections
come first.
Litigation thus provides the essential means of pressuring whites to
compromise on basic issues of voting, reapportionment, and desegregation. While it is clear that blacks have not made dramatic gains this
way, they have nevertheless compelled white officials to effect a minimum degree of change that would not have been undertaken
otherwise. Yet the continued reliance on private and government suits
points to the very weakness of the black position-for litigation is the
32 3
tool of the politically powerless.
Burke Marshall has observed that
[O]nly political power-not court orders or other federal
law-will insure the election of fair men as sheriffs, school
320 Moreover, the school board would not sign a voluntary compliance agreement,
required by the Government for the grant of federal funds, until the district court ordered
integration.
321 The litigation history may be traced as follows: suit filed August 20, 1965; integration order on a freedom-of-choice plan beginning in September, 1968, Williams v. Kimbrough, 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 1899 (W.D. La. 1967); freedom-of-choice plan considered
best available, Conley v. Lake Charles School Bd., 293 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. La. 1968); reversed on statistical showing that freedom-of-choice did not offer prospects for effectuating
transfer to a unitary school system, 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1969); on remand, new desegregation plans required of school board, 303 F. Supp. 394 (W.D. La. 1969); Fifth Circuit
set aside three-step zoning procedure ending in 1971-72, accepted by the district court,
and ordered immediate adoption of effective unitary school plan, Williams v. Kimbrough,
421 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. La.
1969), aff'd, 415 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1061 (1970) (wrongful dismissal of four non-tenured black teachers prior to court-ordered faculty integration).
322 As of January 1, 1970, only 183 black students had entered formerly all-white schools
under the freedom-of-choice plan. Madison Journal (La.), Oct. 18, 1970, at 1. After the
February 1, 1970 court order implemented a zoning scheme, 764 white students and
eighteen teachers left the school system. A private school, Tallulah Academy, was
formed to accommodate this exodus of pupils. By September, 1970, however, more than
three hundred white students returned, bringing the total white enrollment to 20%.
Nevertheless, the majority of black students still attended all-black schools while white
students predominate at formerly all-white institutions. Id.
323 See Matthews, Political Science Research on Race Relations, in 1. KATz & P. GuamN,
RACE AND SocIAL ScEENCEs 113, 118 (1969).
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board members, police chiefs, mayors, county commissioners,
and state officials. It is they who control the institutions which
324
grant or deny federally guaranteed rights.
Madison Parish's experience supports Marshall's conclusion with bitter
irony.325 Three successful lawsuits have not brought fair elections. But
in the absence of fair elections, blacks cannot use their votes to gain
political power or to force recognition of black interests. Hence they
have no choice but to continue litigation.
The Voting Rights Act did not eradicate the need for litigation. It
was not intended to. Rather, this legislation was designed as the water.
shed between denial of the right to vote and participation in the electoral process. Registration is an accomplished fact. But the Act's potential has been lessened by reluctance to use enforcement provisions
and to invoke available judicial remedies. Arguably, it is still too early
to evaluate the impact of the Voting Rights Act by examining the
effects of litigation in Madison Parish. The dark realities of the past
continue to haunt the present. To paraphrase Judge Wisdom, even
though the stranglehold of racial discrimination may be broken, the
326
paralyzing effects remain.

324 B. MARSHALL, FEDMEALISN, AND Cvit RIGHTS 12 (1964).
325 Indeed, in light of the Madison Parish experience it must be asked: Is the only
affirmative obligation protection against discrimination at the threshold of the electoral
process, or does the fifteenth amendment include a duty to insure that deprivation of the
right to vote does not continue once individuals are in a position to influence political
life? The corollary to that question is, of course: Who must accept the responsibility for
protecting participation in the political process-the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, or the people themselves?
326 Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party v. Democratic Party, 362 F.2d 60, 63 (5th

Cir. 1966).

Factory-Built Housing: Statutory Solutions

American housing policy is characterized by a twofold failure. The
first is the inability to provide adequate housing for low- and moderateincome families. The most recent estimates indicate that housing costs
have risen to a level that puts unsubsidized housing beyond the reach
of seventy per cent of American families.' Moreover, the present rate of
housing starts must double in order to replace existing substandard
2
housing and to provide for new families entering the market.
The second failure is the perpetuation of artificial restrictions in
the suburban housing market which have effectively excluded lower
income groups from these communities.3 The residential segregation
which has resulted from this policy has frequently developed along
racial lines.4 This imprisonment of the poor within the inner city has
significantly frustrated national efforts toward social equality.5
A partial solution to both aspects of the current housing crisis may
lie in the cost reductions made possible through the use of new materials and mass production methods. Plastic pipe, fiberglass fixtures, and
plastic baseboards, as well as pre-assembled plumbing and electrical
systems, reduce required skill levels and offer the potential for major
1 Frelich & Seidel, Recent Trends in Housing Law: Prologue to the 70s, 2 URBAN LAW.

1, 3-4 (1970).
2

Id. at 3. For a detailed analysis of American housing needs, see generally NATIONAL

COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AmmxsucAN

CITy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st

Cong., 1st Sess. 66-93 (1968) [hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS REPORT].
3 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMb'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 474 (1968). Racial segregation is only one aspect of the problem. Equally significant is the high cost of housing
which effectively segregates along economic lines. "Even if new housing were made available on an open-occupancy basis, economic barriers . . . would exclude most Negroes."
G. GRIm & E. GRIER, EQUALrY AND BEYOND 84 (1966). Restrictive building practices play
an important part in maintaining the high price levels of the American housing market.
See generally DouGLAs REPORT, supra note 2, at 465-75.
4 G. Gram & E. GRE, supra note 3, at 17-25.
5 "Segregation in housing makes desegregation in many other areas of society much
more difficult to attain than it otherwise might be-in education (where it is almost inpossible despite 'busing' programs and similar arrangements); in many types of public
facilities; and in employment. By impeding the efforts of Negroes to obtain equal preparation for work and life, and by hampering America's two chief racial groups from
achieving a secure relationship based upon mutual understanding and respect, residential
segregation thus perpetuates the social and psychological barriers that complete the vicious
circle." G. GRIaR & E. GRIER, supra note 3, at 84. "Home ownership . . . would provide
many low income families with a tangible stake in society for the first time." NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIvIL DISORDERS, supra note 3, at 477.
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increases in output coupled with decreases in cost to the consumer.,
The close relationship between high housing costs and the present pattern of residential segregation7 indicates that significant reductions
in construction expense may have several important effects. Not only
will mass production methods provide adequate housing for a greater
proportion of American families, but they also will make possible the
integration of economic and social groups into suburban communities
where the high cost of home ownership has previously prohibited
entry.

However, opportunities implicit in the juxtaposition of new building techniques and vacant suburban land are often frustrated by municipal building codes. The municipal code, which defines the allowable
materials and construction processes within a particular area, is determinative of the process of American home building on two levels. First,
the substantive requirements of archaic building codes exclude the
new materials associated with manufactured housing;8 second, the
variety which exists among the thousands of separate codes precludes
the use of new mass production techniques. 9 Moreover, the power of
municipalities to determine the cost of new housing is an effective
mechanism for segregating disadvantaged groups from the closed communities of suburban areas. 10
6 3 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN

DEVELOPMENT, IN-CITIES EXPERIMENTAL HOUSING

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECt: PHASE I COMPOSITE REPORT I-1, -3 (1969).

While

in Europe "manufactured housing systems have established themselves and are sharing
a good portion of the housing market," there has been an actual retrogression in the
United States since World War II. W. ALONSO, S. HAssID & W. SMITH, INFORMATION ON
AND EVALUATIONS

OF INNOVATIONS IN HOUSING

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

TECHNIQUES AS

APPLIED TO LOW COST HOUSING 84 (1969). See also G. BEYER, HOUSING AND SOCIETY 515
(1965) and DOUGLAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 431-50.
7 See note 3 supra.
8 "[Cjodes have a pervasive influence on building and are crucial regulators in the
evolution of building technology." Wright, Performance Criteria in Building, 224 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Mar., 1971, at 18. "On a component level, the morass of building
codes . . . have been instrumental in blocking adoption of technological advances which
could contribute to lowering costs." Fisher, Low Cost Housing Systems, 2 URBAN LAw.
146, 159 (1970). See also ADVISORY CoMMra'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BUILDING
CODES: A PROGRAM FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 81 (1966): "Too many building codes
contain unnecessarily high standards, prevent the use of economical methods and materials in building, and include provisions extraneous to the basic purposes and objectives
of building controls."
9 See G. BEYER, supra note 6, at 497. For some indication of the diversity of code regulations with respect to specific practices, see A. MANUEL, LOCAL LAND AND BUILDING
REGULATION 8, 11-18 (1968). See also ADVISORY COm1,1'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
supra note 8, at 81: "Obsolete code requirements, unnecessary diversity of such require-

ments among local jurisdictions, and inadequate administration and enforcement, taken
together tend to place unjustified burdens on the technology and economics of building."
10 See G. BEYER, supra note 6, at 219; ADVISORY COMm'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-

TIONS, supra note 8, at 7.
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Despite its potential for abuse, the municipal building code finds
vigorous support at the local level, and attempts at reform are not
likely to succeed. Some factions within the financing industry have
strongly opposed new housing techniques. 1 The elimination of the
interim financing expense that is accomplished by mass-produced housing could result in a reduction of almost ten per cent in financing
costs.' 2 As one commentator explained, "[T]hese interests fear a carryover of the modular technique to more highly priced conventional
housing."' 3 The most powerful opponents of mass production, however, are the craft unions. Pro-automation statements from their national leadership have failed to prevent local craft union resistance to
changes which might reduce the number of skilled jobs. 14 According
to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, "[O]ff-site
performance of union tasks by non-union labor directly threatens the
position of the union and its relationship to the entire construction
process."'u As a result, unions have become involved in the creation and
perpetuation of building codes, 16 and their viewpoint is frequently incorporated into the enforcement process through building inspectors
sympathetic to organized labor.'7 Furthermore, local craft unions are
apt to receive strong reinforcement from the materials industries that
are closely linked to traditional building processes.,' The influence
of the unions is manifested by their role in effectively restricting the
growth of factory-built housing even in urban areas, where the demand
for low-cost housing is greatest. 19
When the development of low-cost housing systems is so successfully
opposed by organized interests in the cities, little code reform can be
11 ADVISORY COIM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 7. This opposition evidences a competitive struggle within the financing industry itself. Housing
produced by traditional methods is financed largely by savings and loan institutions
which are limited by statute to making long-term loans on security of real estate. On the
other hand, sales finance companies have garnered much of the burgeoning mobile home
market. Thus, the introduction of new housing technology has the effect of reallocating
the home financing market and triggers automatic opposition by the institutions detrimentally affected.
12 Fisher, supra note 8, at 156.
's Id.
14

Id. at 164. See also DOUGLAS

REPORT,

15 2 U.S. DEP'r oF HOUSING AND URBAN

supra note 2, at 465-75.
DEVELOPMENT,

IN-CrrIEs EPERImaerrAL HOUSInG

RzEsEcH AND DEVELOPMENT PRoJECr: PHASE I CoaosrrE REPORT m-74 (1969).
.6 Id.

17 Note, Suburban Zoning Ordinances and Building Codes: Their Effect on Low and
Moderate Income Housing, 45 NOTRE DAtM LAW. 123, 133 (1969).
1S ADVISORY COAsar'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,

supra note 8, at 7;

DOUGLAS RE-

PORT, supra note 2, at 467.

19 As late as 1968, Chicago alone had managed to provide even a limited factory-built
housing development, and this was achieved only after significant concessions to the
unions. Fisher, supra note 8, at 153, 164.
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expected in the suburbs. In addition to the restricting forces which
are operative in urban areas, the suburban dwellers resist any influx
of low-income groups. Provoked by fears of antisocial behavior and
educational deterioration, 20 communities characteristically respond to
low-cost housing by rezoning and by oppressively enforcing building
regulations.21 As one report concluded, "The problem of community
opposition at desirable sites .
22
now or in the future.1

.

. shows little hope of being overcome

In the face of this powerful opposition, the federal government has
relied on an incentive approach to encourage the alteration of building
codes and the development of modern techniques of home construction. The most recent program is Operation Breakthrough. 23 Under
this program, a number of communities have accepted prototype housing developments through which the government hopes to demonstrate
the feasibility of new construction methods.2 4 This incentive approach
to housing reform is not new. In a series of legislative enactments reaching back to 1949, the federal government has attempted to use housing
money as a stimulus for code reform.25 Furthermore, the President's
Task Force on Housing has urged HUD to use eligibility requirements
for participation in federal housing and community assistance programs to develop a national certification program for factory-built
26
housing.
The use of federal money as an incentive for building code reform is
nonetheless subject to severe limitations. While cities are becoming
increasingly dependent on federal housing aid, suburban communities
are usually able to forego contingent grants which contain unattractive
compliance requirements. Although suggestions have been made to
expand the contingent grants to areas other than housing,27 success
would be dependent on a continuous supply of money in order to "buy
21 Id.

at 172.
at 164.

22 G.

GREER & E.

20 Id.

GREER, PRIVATELY DEVELOPED INTERRACIAL HOUSING:

AN ANALYSIs

OF

ExPERIENcE 29 (1960).
23 Operation Breakthrough, launched in May, 1969, is an effort to channel sophisticated technological, legal, and financial mechanisms into the mainstream of housing
production. "It is directed at government and private constraints which effect the quantity and quality of housing production and environment." Burstein, A Lawyer's View of
Operation Breakthrough, 2 URBAN LAW. 137 (1970).
24 Id. at 141.
25 G. BEYER, supra note 6, at 468. For a survey of federal aid program requirements
affecting building construction and codes, see ADVISORY COIMu'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 37-38.
26 PRESmENT'S TASK FORCE ON Low INCOME HOUSING, TOWARD BETTER HOUSING FOR LOW
INCOME FAMsu.ms 6 (1970).
27 Fisher, supra note 8, at 165.
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-in" to each suburban community. Also, there are indications that attempts to expand the number and kinds of contingent grants may be
politically unrealistic. 28 Although more direct federal intervention in
local police powers could be an effective alternative, such action may
be beyond the range of affairs which the federal government can constitutionally regulate.
I. THE

STATE REsPONSE: STATUTORY ALTERNATIVES

The state appears to be the only level of government holding real
promise of establishing opportunities for the implementation of factorybuilt housing. At the outset, there appear three principal alternatives
involving state action: (1) the model building code, (2) the mandatory
building code, and (3) the factory-built housing statute.
Politically, the model code is the optimal solution at the state level.
It authorizes the state to evaluate new construction techniques and
materials and to incorporate the results in an optional code available
to all municipalities. Yet model codes have been notoriously unsuccessful on the national level. Presently, there are in operation at least four
different national uniform codes which a large number of municipalities purport to follow.2 9 Despite these efforts, recent studies indicate
that fewer than fifteen per cent of the large municipalities have maintained modernized versions of the model code. 0 The state effort in
the direction of a model code appears to be little more than a duplication of preexisting national efforts with an equally unsatisfactory
prospect of success. Whatever its advantages as an informational tool,
the optional nature of a model code places the primary decisionmaking power in the hands of local governments. Predictably, these
municipalities have been unresponsive to reform measures designed
to serve statewide and national needs that may be antithetical to the
felt necessities of their local constituencies.3 1
At the opposite end of the spectrum stands the mandatory code, a
solution recommended by the National Commission on Urban Prob28 Recently HUD has been urged to cut back on attempts to tie low-income housing
strings to water works development grants. H.R. REP'. No. 91-1556, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
7754-56 (1971).
29 A. LANWL, supra note 9, at 11, 12.
80 Id. at iii.
31 New York is among those states that have felt it worthwhile to maintain a model
code. NEw YoRx Exacurrv LAw §§ 370-87. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.83-16.87 (1967);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-7 (1968). The model code solution is also recommended by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations as making available the resources

of the state without disturbing the traditional authority of the municipalities.
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RMATIONS, supra note 8, at 93-95.
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lems.3 2 This alternative calls for the complete replacement of local

codes by a state code regulating all building construction. Unquestionably, a modern statewide code would destroy the local barriers to
low income housing presently created by municipal building regulations. However, proposals for such a comprehensive law can be expected to evoke determined political resistance by local interest groups.
Unlike the model code, mandatory legislation challenges deeply imbedded traditions of home rule, which in some states have been accorded protection through specific constitutional guarantees. Moreover,
there may be legitimate arguments for the retention of the general
building code power at the local level. At present, most housing is
constructed entirely at the building site. This localized nature of the
building function has been the keystone of the argument that building
is a purely municipal affair within the meaning of home rule constitutions. Where local sovereignty is protected by constitutional mandates,
the complete removal of the code function from the municipality may
prove legally impossible. Only one state has been able to enact a comprehensive mandatory building code.3 3 In general, centralized state
control presents a long-term goal, rather than an immediate solution
to problems that have already reached a critical stage.
Recently, attempts have been made to balance the political and constitutional imperatives for local building regulation against the statewide need for a broad low-cost housing market. The resulting statutes
have been termed "factory-built housing" laws, and constitute a response to what the President's Task Force on Housing called "the
single most important need today ...

a system of off-site certification

that will (a) [provide] every reasonable encouragement to producers
to use the most economical methods and materials, and (b) assure that
34
off-site certification will be accepted locally at the construction site.
Factory-built housing legislation has recently been enacted in California, 35 Virginia, 6 Washington,3

7

and Ohio.38 The statutes provide

for the development of state standards for factory-built housing which
supersede conflicting local regulations. A specified department of the
state government is vested with the responsibility to set official standards, to inspect factory-built homes, and to issue insignia of certifica82 DouGLAs REPORT, supra note 2,at 269-70.
33 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-395e (Supp. 1971).
34 PRESIDENT's TASK FORcE ON LOW INcoME HousING, supra note 26,

35 CAL. HEALTH & SA=ri

at

6.

CODE ANN. §§ 19960-94 (Deering Supp. 1970).

36 Ch. 305, [1970] Va. Acts 393.
37 Ch. 44, [1970] Wash. Laws 1st Sess. (41st Legis., 2d Ex. Sess.) 309.
38 Onio REv. CODE. ch. 3781 (1970).
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tion to complying housing units. The impact of that certification is
indicated by the language of the California statute:
All factory built housing bearing an insignia of approval...
shall be deemed to comply with the requirements of all ordinances or regulations enacted by any city, city and county,
county, or district which may be applicable to the manufacture of such housing.3 9
The statutes thus embody an attempt to isolate a category of housing
according to its method of construction, and to remove from local control the regulation of that housing. Their success depends on four
factors: (1) scope of coverage, (2) the certifying agency, (3) flexibility of
the standards, and (4) a mechanism for interstate certification.
In scope of coverage the statutes diverge significantly. Mobile homes
are included under the concept of factory-built housing in Virginia 40
and specifically excluded under the Washington statute,41 while California and Ohio are silent on the question. The issue has major practical significance since mobile homes currently provide an extremely
economical form of mass-produced housing.42 Their exclusion severely
limits the practical impact of any statute. Factory-built housing laws
could also be designed to cover new processes by which factories are
erected on the construction site for the manufacture of a large number
of housing units which are to comprise a single development. 43 Such
processes alleviate the costly diseconomies of transporting prefabricated
housing over long distances." Despite these advantages, Virginia's
definition of factory-built housing includes only buildings assembled
or systems manufactured "off-site," 45 and Washington's statute deals
only with a structure or room "substantially prefabricated or assembled
at a place other than a building site." 4 California allows assembly
on-site, but manufacture must take place off-site to be included under
the statute. 47 The Ohio statute is silent on the question. These difficulties in drafting appropriate coverage may be indicative of a gap
(Deering Supp. 1970).
40 Ch. 305, § 12 [1970] Va. Acts 395.
41 Ch. 44, §§ 1(3) [1970] Wash. Laws" 1st Ex. Sess. (41st Legis., 2d Ex. Sess.) 810.
42 E. EAVES, How THE MANY COSTS OF HOUSING FIT TO
HER 100-01 (1968). See also
DOUGLAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 438-40.
43 See An Assembly-Line Answer to the Housing Crisis, FORTUNE, May 1, 1969, at 99;
Will Homes Soon Be Built by a Factory That Travels? PRODUCT ENGINEERING, July 29,
1968, at 29. Note the suggestions for appropriate model legislation in COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNmENTs, 1971 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 55 (1970).
44 See E. EAVES, supra note 42, at 99.
45 Ch. 305, § 2(3) [1970] Va. Acts 393.
46 Ch. 44, § 1(3) [1970] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. (41st Legis., 2d Ex. Sess.) 310.
47 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 19971 (Deering Supp. 1970).
39 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. § 19981
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between developing technology and even the most recent legislative
response.
The second factor in the success of a factory-built housing statute
is the existence of an appropriate regulatory agency. Since craft unions
and associated industries are a major source of conservatism in building code regulation, 48 an independent agency, not closely associated
with industrial interests, can be expected to adopt the most progressive approach to factory-built housing standards; the agency selected
49
should be one for which the provision of housing is a primary duty.
More important, however, are the qualifications of the personnel who
formulate the regulatory standards. Significantly, the Washington statute specifies that local government, building trades, and manufacturing
interests will receive representation on its new advisory board. 50 The
California statute goes so far as to mandate that of its eleven-member
board, "five members shall be appointed from the legislative bodies
of cities and counties.""' Ohio, in contrast, makes no provision for
representation of private or municipal interests, but provides instead
for a board of building standards composed entirely of professional
52
experts and government employees from the several state agencies.
The third factor, flexibility of standards, is closely tied to the second. The agency should have the statutory responsibility to adopt the
most modem technology available, with the flexibility and speed demanded by the present housing shortage. Three states require the state
commission to take due regard of national model codes. 3 Virginia
goes furthest in this regard by providing for annual review of its code
in relation to the developing housing needs of the state.64 Ohio, on
the other hand, provides no statutory guidance for modification of its
code.
48 See notes 11-19 supra.
49 This appears to be the situation in California, where the agency is the Department
of Housing and Community Development. CAL. HEALTH & SArEY CODE ANN. § 19966

(Deering Supp. 1970). However, in the other states the selected agency does not appear to
have a similarly specialized focus. In Virginia, the certifying agency is the State Corporation Commission, Ch. 305, § 2(2) [1970] Va. Acts 893; in Washington, the Department of
Labor and Industries, Ch. 44, § 1(1) [1970] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. (41st Legis., 2d Ex.
Sess.) 310; and in Ohio, a board of building standards within the Department of Industrial

Relations, Ohio Rev. Code ch. 3781.07 (1970).
50 Ch. 44, § 6 [1970] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. (41st Legis., 2d Ex. Sess.) 311.
51 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 19994 (Deering Supp. 1970).
52 Omo REv. CODE ch. 3781.07 (1970). The Virginia statute makes no provision for any

special group below the State Corporation Commission, although it does provide for public
hearings after notification to all municipalities. Ch. 305, § 5 [1970] Va. Acts 394.
53 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 19990 (Deering Supp. 1970); Ch. 305, § 4 [1970]
Va. Acts 394; Ch. 44 § 7 [1970] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. (41st Legis., 2d Ex. Sess.) 312.

54 Ch. 305, § 6 [1970] Va. Acts 395.
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A mechanism for interstate certification, the fourth factor, is especially important to the success of factory-built housing. Any significant
reduction in housing costs can be achieved only by the creation of a
nationwide housing market responding to a multi-state reform in housing code provisions. 55 The state factory-built housing law can provide
the means to effectuate interstate cooperation in the realization of cost
reductions through mass production. However, only Washington's
statute establishes a framework for such a development:
If the director of the department determines that the standards for factory built housing prescribed by statute, rule or
regulation of another state are at least equal to the regulations
provided under this act, and that such standards are actually
enforced by such other state, he may provide by regulation
that factory built housing approved by such other state shall
be deemed to have been approved by the department.5 6
While none of the four statutes presently enacted incorporates all
four above mentioned factors, taken together they illustrate the most
promising route to the successful development of a factory-built housing market on a nationwide scale. Moreover, the statutes embody a
minimal governmental function-the state acts simply as an enlightened licensee of private entrepreneurial activity. As such it steers clear
of the government-as-developer role, 57 an alternative which, because
it demands extraordinary funding and dramatic extensions of state
power, has severe political limitations. Finally, the factory-built
housing law avoids the massive confrontation with home rule tradition
engendered by an attempt to remove the entire building regulation
function from local control by a mandatory code.
II.

OBSTACLES

To IMPLEMENTATION

The factory-built housing statute holds the promise of a significant
alteration in the pattern of American housing development. However,
55 Strong emphasis is placed on the importance of a nationwide certification program
in PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON Low INCOM HousiN, supra note 26, at 6.
56 Ch. 44, § 8 [1970] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. (41st Legis., 2d Ex. Sess.) 313.
57 The paramount example is the New York State Urban Development Corporation.
Ch. 173-77, [1968] N.Y. Sess. Laws 227. A similar alternative is the establishment of
a state housing development commission. See Salsick, Housing and the States, 2 URBaN

L.Aw. '40, 58-60 (1970).
58 Reilly & Schulman, The State Urban Development Corporation:New York's Innovation, 1 URBAN LAw. 129, 145-46 (1969). Moreover, the Kerner Commission concludes that
only if private enterprise becomes a major factor in the low-cost housing field will housing

units constructed meet housing needs.
supra note 3, at 476.

NATIONAL ADvIsORY COMM'N ON CIIL DisoRDERS,
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such a statute is faced with three obstacles: (I) possible invalidation
under home rule constitutions, (2) impact dilution due to suburban
zoning ordinances, and (3) substitution of the union contract as the
functional equivalent of the municipal building code.
A.

Constitutional Home Rule

While the limited scope of the factory-built housing statute avoids
the major legal conflicts of a mandatory code, the statute's constitutionality in some home rule states is still questionable. Home rule
involves a legislative or constitutional grant of power to localities to
adopt a government charter for the control of local affairs.5 9 About
half of the states provide home rule guarantees in their state constitutions.60 Usually, the wordifig is vague; it may, for example, grant local
control over "municipal affairs." 61 Consequently, where state and local
legislation conflict, the courts have been required to play a major
62
policy-making role in determining which shall yield.
In most instances the courts are strong adherents of legislative supremacy,6 3 so that unless preemption by the state is not explicit64 the
home rule doctrine will seldom pose a problem. Thus, in two of the
three factory-built housing states with home rule,"" a legislative intent
to supersede local building code regulations will usually be determinative in any court challenge. The language of the Ohio Supreme Court
is characteristic: "Surely, statutory enactments representing the general exercise of police power by the state prevail over police and similar
regulations adopted in the exercise by a municipality of the powers of
local self-government." 66
59 F. MicHuMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATMRUALS ON GOVERNmENT IN URBAN AREAS 302 (1970).
60 C. RnYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 4.3 (1957); 1 E. MCQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 3.21 (3d ed. 1949); Sandalow, The Limits Of Municipal Power Under Rome Rule: A Role
for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 645 (1964).

61 Sandalow, supra note 60, at 660.
62 Allocation of responsibilities for effective governing is a matter that, in comparison
with the legislature, the judiciary may be ill-equipped to decide. Note, Conflicts Between

State and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HAsv. L. Rxv. 737, 742 (1959).
63 Id. at 742. Both the political relationship of the parties and basic principles of
democratic politics argue for a legislative determination of what constitutes "municipal
affairs." Compare F. MicummL4.N & T. SANDALow, supra note 59, at 363-64, with Hanson,
Toward a New Urban Democracy: Metropolitan Consolidation and Decentralization,58

Gao. LJ. 863, 888 (1907).
64 For the difficulties of finding preemption in the face of vague legislative intent, see
generally Feiler, Conflict Between State and Local Enactments-The Doctrine of Implied

Preemption, 2 URBAN LAw. 398 (1970).
65 The applicable state constitutions with home rule provisions are CAL.
§ 6; OHIO CoNsr. art. XVIII, § 7; and WAsH. CONsT. art. XI, § 10.

CONsT.

art. XI,

e6 State v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 14, 17, 225 NE.2d 230, 233
(1967). See also Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 34 Ohio Op. 2d
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California, however, is representative of those states in which the
courts have jealously guarded constitutional home rule in its most
doctrinaire form. 67 The California courts separate the question of constitutionality (which arises when the state attempts to legislate on a
municipal affair) from the issue of preemption (in which the municipality passes an ordinance regulating some matter on which the
legislature has previously enacted a statute.) 6s In the former, the test
effectively favors state action by declaring that only "exclusive municipal concerns" will preclude state legislation. 9 In contrast, a twofold
test is applied to the preemption question, and the standards adopted
appear to favor municipal ordinances. First, the state must show that
the subject is a state concern rather than a purely municipal interest.7 0
Second, even if the subject is a statewide concern, the municipality
is not preempted unless that is shown to be the intent of the legisla71
ture.
Since the legislative intent in enacting the factory-built housing
statutes dearly was to preempt the area, 72 the essential question to be
determined in both instances is whether the regulation of factory-built
housing is to be considered a "municipal affair." In California, this
issue has been reserved to the courts. As stated in Bishop v. City of San
Jose,7 3 "[T]he legislature is empowered neither to determine what
constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter
of statewide concern." 74 The courts have traditionally held that building codes, like zoning, are a municipal matter appropriate for the valid
445, 215 N.E.2d 631 (1964). A similar approach is followed in Washington. See State v.
Ensminger, - Wash. 2d -, 463 P.2d 612 (1970); City of Spokane v. Carlson, 73 Wash. 2d
76, 436 P.2d 454 (1968); State v. Lundquist, 60 Wash. 2d 397, 874 P.2d 246 (1962). "[Iin
Washington a statute always supersedes a conflicting ordinance." Trautman, Legislative
Control of Municipal Corporationsin Washington, 38 WASH. L. REv. 748, 778 (1968). In
virginia, where there is no home rule, "an ordinance in conflict with state law of general
character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid." Hanbury v. Committee, 203 Va. 182, 185, 122 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1961).
67 For a characteristic example of the operation of California law in this field, see
os L.J. 635 (1966).
Note, Income Taxation and Preemption, 17 HA
68 Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 292, 384 P.2d
158, 168, 32 Cal. Rptr. 880, 840 (1963), cited with approval in Baron v. City of Los Angeles,
2 Cal. 3d 535, 537, 469 P.2d 353, 355, 86 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1970).
69 Id.
70 Id.

71 Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 452 P.2d 930, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1969);
Alta-Dena Dairy v. County of San Diego, 271 Cal. App. 2d 66, 76 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1969).
72 See text at note 89.
73 Bishop v. San Jose, I Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
74 Id. at 68, 490 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469. There has been considerable uncertainty as to the effect of a legislative definition of municipal affairs. Compare Note,
Municipal Corporations,53 CAL. L. REv. 902 (1965) with Note, 50 CAT. L. REv. 740 (1962).
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exercise of local police power.7 5 Yet the courts have recognized the
dynamic nature of the "municipal affair" concept:
[T]he constitutional concept of municipal affairs changes with
the changing conditions on which it is to operate. What may
at one time have been a matter of local concern, may at a later
time become a matter of state concern controlled by the gen7
eral laws of the state.
Today, as in the past, the large volume of home building takes place
on-site with few or no manufactured parts. As a local process, it fits
easily into traditional geographic concepts of what constitutes a municipal concern. However, as population and community interdependence increase, the simplistic geographic model appears progressively
inadequate. Land use requirements can have a major impact beyond
local borders, 7 7 trapping large numbers of the population within narrow urban confines.7 8 Significant economic effects can result from the
ability of the municipality to constrict the growth of a nationwide
industry by what amounts to local trade barriers.7 9 Closely tied to the
concept of extraterritorial impact is the failure of the local political
process to represent those groups most directly affected by the exclusionary consequences of regulatory policy.8 0
While the argument springing from extraterritorial impact might
just as easily apply to all kinds of housing, factory-built housing lays
75 See Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 144 P.2d 4 (1943) (building
permits); Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 313, 21 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1962) (zoning). See
also 2 E. McQUILLAN, supra note 60, at §§ 4.112A, 4.91.
76 Bishop v. San Jose, 1 Cal. d 56, 63, 460 P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 469 (1969).
77 "Recent reevaluation of minicipal home rule is primarily a result of increasing awareness that the powers exercised by municipal governments wholly within their boundaries
may have consequences in surrounding areas." Sandalow, supra note 60, at 700. See also
Report of the California Commission On Preemption, 2 URBAN LAW ANNUAL 130 (1969),
concluding that the need for statewide uniformity in regulation becomes greater than the
need for the city to impose its will when "local regulation would have significant adverse
effects on the movement of persons or goods within the state." Id. at 138.
78 See Sager, Tight Little Islands of Exclusionary Zoning: Equal Protection and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rxv. 767, 781 (1969); Sandalow, supra note 60, at 707.
79 Note, Building Codes: Reducing Diversity and Facilitatingthe Amending Process, 5
HARv. J. LEcIs. 587, 596 (1968).
80 Sandalow, supra note 60, at 710-11. "A use of governmental power which threatens
established state policies might not be deemed a 'local' or 'municipal' affair for the
same reason that 'municipal' regulations with too great an extraterritorial impact are not
considered to be 'local' . . . the inadequacy of the political process at the local level to
cope with such problems." Id. at 717. At least one author sees the home rule struggle as an
attempt to prevent municipal Balkanization in areas of special concern. "Only a standard
of statewide uniformity can fully implement the values of free speech and due process,
the rights of privacy, and other fundamental values." Blease, Civil Liberties and the
California Law of Preemption, 17 HAsS=ics L.J. 517, 569 (1966).
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claim to an extralocal category on an independent ground. Unlike
other kinds of housing, the factory-built process takes place off-site
and even out-of-state. This form of construction, even under traditional rules based on the location of the activity, is not a purely municipal concern.
A further ground for the recognition of mass-produced housing as
a statewide concern is the inability of local procedures to provide adequate protection against defects in safety. In its modem context, housing has become a "scientific" area which cannot adequately be administered by local authorities who lack the requisite expertise to supervise
health and safety regulation. As stated in the Virginia code:
Industrialized building units ... because of the manner of
their construction, assembly and use and that of their systems
components . . . having concealed vital parts, may present
hazards to the health ....
[T]here is also the possibility of
defects not readily ascertainable when inspected by purchasers, users, or by local building official.81
Recent studies for the National Commission on Urban Problems indicate that most of the regulating governments are too small to retain
full-time employees for such work.8 2 Moreover, even in those situations
in which people are employed on a full-time basis, salaries are too low
8 3
to attract those who are well trained in professional or technical skills.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations concludes:
The qualifications possessed by many building officials are inadequate to properly advise on the administration of modern
performance-type building codes. While it is possible that
these officials can deal competently with the ordinary run of
traditional buildings, the advances expected in building technology will demand a more expert knowledge of a wide variety of building practices and materials.8 4
When local processes are inadequate to protect health and safety, and
would in any case be wasteful and duplicative with respect to massproduced housing, the matter should be treated as a statewide concern.
The isolation of a particular kind of building for special treatment
is not foreign to the law of California or indeed of most other states.
For example, in Hall v. Taft, 5 the Supreme Court of California held
81 Ch. 305, § 8 [1970] Va. Acts 394 (emphasis added).
82 A. MANvEL, supra note 9, at 2.
83 Id.
84 ADvIsoRY Comam's ON INraaovEaNmNTAL R-AnIONS,
85 47 Cal. 2d 177, 502 P.2d 574 (1956).

supra note 8, at 99.
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that school construction could not be controlled by municipal building regulations where the state legislature had established regulatory
agencies and adopted standards for such buildings.8 6 Moreover, the
courts of a majority of jurisdictions have, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, exempted state agencies from local building regula87
tion.
While the factory-built housing law represents an infringement on
traditional areas of local control, little justification exists for invalidation in light of the widespread social and economic effects, the nonlocal construction process, and the necessity of expertise in creating
and implementing health and safety standards. Activities once dearly
local now take on larger proportions. This transformation raises the
fundamental question: Can the home rule concept maintain its integrity and at the same time respond flexibly to the fluid concept of
"municipal affairs"? In view of the growing pressures to strip municipalities of all control of land use, it may be that the survival of
home rule in any form depends on the kind of compromise embodied
in the factory-built housing law.
B. Zoning
Although the factory-built housing statutes provide a possible solution to the problem of exclusionary building codes, they are careful
to protect a classic alternative device.8 Exclusionary zoning can be
effective in limiting any breakthrough in mass-produced housing by
barring those low-income groups among whom the demand for such
housing is greatest. It is on zoning, however, that the statutes of California, Virginia, and Washington appear to have achieved absolute
agreement. In the language of the California statute:
Local use zone requirements, local fire zones, building setback, side and rear yard requirements, site development and
property line requirements, as well as review and regulation
of architectural and aesthetic requirements, are hereby specifically and entirely reserved to local jurisdictions notwithstanding any requirement of this part. 9
While legislative silence on the issue of zoning would not automat86 Id. at 188, 302 P.2d at 581 (1956).
87 Note, Municipal Power To Regulate Building Construction and Local Land Use by
Other State Agencies, 49 MinN. L. R-v. 284, 286 (1964).
88 "The most effective subterfuge for segregating disadvantaged minority groups is the
device of economically discriminating zoning restrictions." Note, supra note 17, at 128.
89 CAL. HEArLH &cSArary CODE ANN. § 19995 (Deering Supp. 1970). See also Ch. 305,
§ 12 [19 70] Va. Acts 395; Ch. 44, § 3 [19 70] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. (41st Legis., 2d Ex.
Sess.) 311.
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ically have invalidated local land use requirements, it could have set
the stage for a judicial challenge to zoning practices that contravened
the broad policy set forth in both the California and Virginia statutes.
As the former states:
The legislature further finds and declares... its intention to
encourage the reduction of housing construction costs and to
make home ownership more feasible for residents of this
state.90
With a clearly enunciated policy of removing barriers to low-cost
housing, sympathetic state courts could have been expected to frown
upon zoning practices which vitiated the legislative intent. The major
paradox of the factory-built housing statutes is that they invite, in explicit terms, what the courts probably would have found to be antithetical to the statutory scheme-the construction of zoning barriers
to replace those previously provided by building codes.
The express statutory reservation of the zoning power to local governments calls into question the practical significance of the factorybuilt housing laws. Undoubtedly, when exclusion is the objective, no
instrument is more effective than the zoning power.9 1 Yet to conclude
that nothing has been achieved by factory-built housing laws may be
to ignore both the complexities of the problem and the significant case
law developments that have invited increased judicial scrutiny of the
zoning power.
While the suburban communities have directed their antipathy
toward low-cost housing, they have simultaneously shown a greater
92
willingness to accept middle class inflows of both whites and blacks.
One of the characteristics of a building code is that it increases the
cost of housing at all levels regardless of the group that was intended
to be excluded. If the building codes are eliminated, suburban communities must take new initiatives to effectuate a policy that selectively
excludes certain social groups. In this context, there is little reason to
90 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 19961. See also Ch. 305, § 3 [1970] Va. Acts 394.
91 See note 88 supra. This is not to suggest that zoning is the only weapon of local
control still available. Delays and costs may be imposed on a developer by local regulation of access to sewers, water, and roads as well as by property valuation and requirements of licenses and construction bonds. See Fischer, supra note 8, at 164. Moreover,
where the developer plans on an economically integrated housing development (consisting
of low-income manufactured homes and high-income conventional housing), the conventional housing portion of his construction will still be under local control. A home
producer who plans a large development over a ten- or fifteen-year period may be unwilling
to sacrifice the goodwill and cooperation of local authorities by taking advantage of unpopular state-controlled factory-built housing options.
92 Fisher, supra note 8, at 172.
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believe that factory-built, middle-income housing will be confronted
with the same zoning obstructions as will low-income developments.
While failing to maximize economic integration, the statutes thus at
least could be instrumental in alleviating the large portion of the housing shortage that extends to the middle-income group. Moreover, any
significant movement of middle-income families may be expected to
create vacancies for low-income families as part of the so-called "filtering down" process.9 3
The systematic exclusion of low-income housing, on the other hand,
probably will not be overcome without further action by the courts.
The advantage gained by the factory-built housing law is that it removes the barrier least susceptible to judicial erosion. The traditional
zoning weapons, including such mainstays as minimum lot and floor
sizes, and aesthetic requirements, have been the object of increasing
criticism 9 4 And although judicial challenges have so far produced
uneven results, 95 some commentators maintain that the courts will
eventually place sharp restrictions on the use of the zoning power,9
At the same time, the courts are more inclined to leave building codes
93 F. K sSTor, URBAN HousING Naxrs THROUGH THE 1980's! AN ANALYSIS AND PRojEcroIN
69 (1968). "Most of the gains in Negro housing have occurred through the turnover which
occurs as part of the 'filtering down' process-as the white middle class moves out, the
units it leaves are occupied by Negroes. Many of the units are very old. Without proper
maintenance, they soon become dilapidated, so that the improvement in housing resulting from the fitering-down process is only temporary." NATiONAL AnvsORY COm'N ON
CrM DIsoiRDs, supra note 3, at 473.
94 See generally Sager, supra note 78. Michelman suggests that exclusionary municipal
regulation may be attacked under three theories: "1) by the same style equal protection
argument which ... may also yield a constitutional right to be housed; 2) by arguments
focused on the political or participatory claims of those who must suffer the consequences
...
though afforded no voice in the fashioning of exclusive regulations, or 3) appeals
to the conflict between such regulations and federal policies calling for provision of subsidized housing outside areas of racial concentration." Michelman, The Advent of a
Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HAv. Crv. RIcHts-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 207, 216
(1970).
95 See Sager, supra note 78, at 782-83; Note, supra note 17, at 128-29.
96 See Michelman, supra note 94, at 216-17. As late as 1969, Sager's assessment was that
"[e]qual access to housing is regarded by the Court as a matter of the most serious social
and constitutional concern.... While it has been manifest in the context of racial discrimination, there is reason to expect it will be evoked on behalf of the indigent as
well." Sager, supra note 78, at 790. On the other hand, the Court's recent decision on the
California public housing referendum law was an implicit refusal to apply fourteenth
amendment protections to cases of economic discrimination. James v. Valtierra, 91 S. Ct.
1331 (1971). Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether that decision, supported by only a narrow majority, has finally put to rest the question of equal access to housing for all income
groups. Moreover, lawyers are arguing persuasively that because a large proportion of
blacks have low incomes, racial implications are inherently linked to the economic issue,
and that economic discrimination consequently becomes an appropriate basis of fourteenth amendment relief. See THE WALL STRarr JouRNAL, April 27, 1971, at 2, col. 4 (Midwest ed.).
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untouched. Courts avoid making judgments about "technical" matters
related to engineering and physics, which are far from their own area
of competence.97 Nor are they willing to sacrifice safety considerations,
even in the face of the most pressing social needs. Thus, where the
legislature has acted to limit the effect of building regulations, the
path is cleared for judicial initiatives to restrict zoning practices and
to open the suburbs to low-cost housing for all economic groups.
Finally, a failure to realize statutory goals due to local zoning practices may quickly give rise to statewide zoning legislation to provide
selective protection for factory-built housing. The most recent proposals of the Council of State Governments suggests exactly this kind of
legislation.98 Moreover, limited state zoning regulations have already
been adopted in Massachusetts in connection with state-approved nonprofit efforts to erect low-cost housing.99 As Michelman notes, "[A]
claim not to have housing choice restricted on account of one's socioeconomic status as a practical matter entails a claim to be free of unreasonable land use restrictions; it calls for legal limitations on cost
97 See K.C. DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 30.09, at 240 (1958). Professor
Davis analyzes the factors which guide the exercise of judicial discretion in choosing
either to substitute judgment or to use the rational basis test in reviewing administrative
action. "Among these factors the one that stands out above all others is the comparative
qualification of the agency and of the court to decide the particular issue. Variation in
intensiveness of review in accordance with comparative qualifications is so natural as to
be inevitable whatever the theory." Id. at 241. "In some cases, of course, the specialization
of the agency or its staff is so clear as almost to compel use of the rational basis test.
When problems 'touch matters of geography and geology and physics and engineering,'
hardly surprising is the Supreme Court's action in announcing that 'Plainly these are not
issues for our arbitrament .... Id. at 243, quoting Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan, Nichols
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
98 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 3, at 58 n.2. Clearly, a nationwide breakthrough in low-cost housing may be dependent on the willingness of a large number of
states to adopt effective legislation. Yet the brunt of the housing crisis falls on the cities,
and the state governments have traditionally been indifferent to the wide range of urban
problems. Coleman, Making Our FederalSystem Work: A Challenge for the 70's, I URBAN
LAw. 302, 304 (1970). Moreover, the same opposition can be expected from the craft unions
in the statehouse as appeared at the local level. On the positive side, there is evidence
that reapportionment may have altered the traditional rural-urban balance, even though
seniority procedures may delay its impact. See generally Hawkins & Whelchel, Reapportionment and Urban Representation in Legislative Influence Positions: The Case of
Georgia, 3 URBAN ArAIzas Q. 69 (1968). In addition, while the housing shortage is most

acute in the city, the extent of the demand reaches deep into suburban communities as
well. "The stereotype of the wealthy suburb is misleading." DOUGLAS REPORT, supra note
2, at 74. Finally, the new study by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, while
critical of the limited input resources available to legislators, nevertheless admits to a
general improvement in the quality of state lawmaking bodies. See TIaM, Feb. 15, 1971,
at 16. With four states passing factory-built housing laws within one year, it may not be
unrealistic to expect continued positive development with its origins in the state capitols.
99 Ch. 40-B, § 21-23 [1969] Mass. Gen. Laws. See Recent Cases, 2 URBAN LAw 255, 258
(1970).
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inflating municipal regulatory powers. Such limitations are plainly in
'1
the offing."'
C. The Union Contract
Should the craft unions fail to prevent the passage of factory-built
housing statutes, it is reasonable to expect attempts to incorporate
the substance of the traditional building code into their construction
contracts. The Supreme Court decision in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB 10 1 appears to legalize union efforts
contractually to protect members from job loss due to "onrushing technological change."' 1 2 The impact of the decision is to allow the unions
both to restrict widespread use of prefabrication through building
contracts, and to cast the determinative vote as to the supply of housing
and its costs. 03
The right of the unions to bargain so as to restrict materials and
processes is especially significant when the weakness of the employer
contractors is juxtaposed with the unified economic power of the
unions.' ° 4 However, union opposition to prefabrication may be misplaced. Selling more homes at lower prices could provide a stable
100 Michelman, supra note 94, at 216. Recently, the American Law Institute gave tentative approval to the MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3,1971). Article 7
of that draft sets up a device for limited state government interference with local zoning
in matters of state interest. Developments may be matters of statewide concern (1) because
of natural resources or previous development, as in the case of new towns, id. at § 7-201;
(2) because of their very nature, including developments substantially subsidized by state
and federal agencies, id. at § 7-301; or (3)because of their size, for example, a huge
housing development, id. at § 7-401. While the initial decision on these matters is made by
the local land development agency, standards are set up which insure that the state
interest is considered, and the local decision is subject to a right of appeal to a state
board.

This model legislation may become especially important in light of legislation currently
proposed by the Nixon Administration which would require states to maintain a system
by which local land use regulation could be superseded. S. 992, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).

101 386 U.S. 612 (1967). The Court upheld a union agreement under which union members were excused from handling preassembled door units. The contract was challenged
under § 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(e) (1964): "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any
contract ... whereby such employer ceases . . . or agrees to cease . . . handling, using

...or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer... and any contract
. .containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible [sic] and void."
Nevertheless, the Court held that § 8(e) does not prohibit primary agreements, and that
exclusion of products is a legitimate subject of bargaining where such products threaten

job security.
886 U.S. at 640.
103 See generally Petro, Unions, Housing Costs and the National Labor Policy, 32 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 319 (1967); Note, Union Restrictions on the Use of Prefabricationin
the Housing Industry, 55 IowA L.Rrv.270 (1969).
104 Note, supra note 103, at 278.
102
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labor demand. 0 5 While skilled wages may be expected to decline in'
the face of mass production methods, the worker's annual income
may remain the same due to the more regular work schedule. 06 As
the Douglas Commission concluded, "[M]any of the onerous practices
that seem insoluble in the framework of widely fluctuating employment and construction patterns could more readily be resolved if the
construction industry were expanded and stabilized. 1 07 Such a transition, however, cannot be made without sacrificing the interests of
some. Until the craft unions become convinced of the long-run potential of the mass production market, the union contract will remain
a substantial limitation on the factory-built housing statute.
III. CONCLUSION
The factory-built housing statute provides unique opportunities for
state governments to shape a more productive and equitable pattern
of housing development. The impact of these statutes will be measured by the extent to which state legislators can deal effectively with
groups having a vested interest in the maintenance of an archaic construction process. However, the difficult issues of home rule, zoning,
and the union contract have yet to be squarely faced. Whether in the
statehouse or in the courtroom, it is the resolution of these issues that
will determine whether the full promise of factory-built housing statutes will in fact be realized.
105 Id. at 285.
106 Id. at 286.
107 DouGLAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 465.

Copyright Protection for Mass-Produced,
Commercial Products: A Review of
the Developments Following
Mazer v. Steint
By holding that commercial use does not invalidate copyright registration, the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein1 ushered in a brave
new world of copyright law, filled with costume jewelry,2 toy dolls,3
fabric designs,4 artificial flowers, 5 and plastic Santa Clauses. 6 The
extension of copyright status to such mass-produced, two- and threedimensional objects7 has placed great stress on a system designed
t Entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The plaintiffs in Mazer had secured copyrights on statuettes of
male and female dancing figures and subsequently used the statuettes as lamp bases. When
the defendant marketed identical lamps, the plaintiffs sued for infringement of their
copyrights. The defendant claimed that the intended and actual commercial use of the
statuettes invalidated the copyright registration. The Court rejected this defense. Id. at
218.
2 See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Co. v. Grossbardt, 428 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1970);
Dart Kasoff, Inc. v. Novelty Jewelry Co., 309 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1962); Boucher v. Du Boyes,
Inc., 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel,
Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
3 See, e.g., Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 389 US. 801 (1967); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966);
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1962); Rushton v. Vitale, 218
F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1955).
4 See, e.g., Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Brothers Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315 (2d
Cir. 1969); H.M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 315 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1963); Millworth
Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1960); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin
Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
5 See, e.g., Florabelle Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Rico, Ltd. v. Hub Floral Mfg. Co., 206 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Prestige Floral Societe Anonyme v. California Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
6 Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961), afJ'd, 304 F.2d
251 (9th Cir. 1962).

7 The term "mass-produced products" as used in this comment refers to items which do
not fall within the normal concept of works of fine art, for example such items as toy
dolls, fabric designs, artificial flowers, and plastic Santa Clauses. It is not intended to
include mass-produced works of fine art. Although this distinction is not self-defining,
the courts should not have great difficulty in administering the test. After all, before
Mazer the courts denied copyright protection to two- and three-dimensional objects which
did not qualify as works of fine art.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that commercial products and works of
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basically for literary works.8 Strict9 notice requirements 0 have been
virtually ignored in order to avoid denying protection to some copyrighted articles. Thus, courts have approved notice located on the
underside of an artificial flower leaf, 1 the clasp of a necklace,' 2 and
other places where close scrutiny is required to locate the inscription.' 8
Moreover, even this obscure, nearly microscopic14 notice is unnecessary
on fabric designs. Notice may be placed on the selvage of the cloth,
which often winds up on the cutting room floor as the fabric is
made into finished retail products. 15 Consequently, anyone attempting
to copy a dress design acts at his own peril, 16 unless he can prove
that notice could have been incorporated into the design without
destroying its market value. 17 Furthermore, some courts have sugfine art are not totally separate concepts. Therefore, many of the comments made about
the former are also applicable to the latter. However, any detailed analysis of works
of fine art is beyond the scope of this comment.
8 The first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710), covered only
books. While insuring statutes over the next 250 years gradually added other forms of
expression, the basic conceptual framework of the copyright law remained tied to the
ViEw oF CoPYRIGHT 1-7 (1967).
literary model. See generally B. KAPLAN, AN UNHuRRI
9 The notice provisions of the Act have been described as "do-or-die" requirements,
KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 81, and the sine qua non of copyright protection, NnRm , CoPyRIGHTS § 82, at 302 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NaimRE].
10 Publication of works without statutory notice or with inadequate notice normally
destroys the right to secure copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1964); 87 C.F.K § 202.2(a)(2) (1971).
The precise manner, form, and placement of notice are prescribed by statute. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 10, 19-20 (1964). Only accidental omissions of these requirements are excused. 17 U.S.C.
§ 21 (1964).
11 Prestige Floral Societe Anonyme v. California Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287,
291 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
12 Trifari Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 184 F. Supp. 551, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
13 See, e.g., Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(stamped on the base of a brass striker between the bells on the top of an antique telephone); Scarves By Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 625, 628
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (woven label sewn into sideseam immediately adjacent to bottom opening
of garment).
14 Microscopic notice would be invalid. 37 C.F.R. § 202.2(b)(8) (1971).

15 See, e.g., H.M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 315 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1963); Peter
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1960).
16 Publication ... is considered to have occurred on sale of the printed goods to the
dress manufacturers, and notice at that time is to be held constructive notice to

all dress manufacturers, provided the notice was sufficient. In that event, a copier
acts at his peril if he takes the design from a finished dress.

Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 280 F.2d 800, 808 (2d Cir. 1960);

accord, Loomskill, Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 845, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 330 F.2d 952
(2d Cir. 1964).
17 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1960);
Loomskill, Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 845, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 830 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.
1964).
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gested that even that defense is not available to a willful infringer
8
with actual notice.'
Despite these significant changes in the notice rules, the greatest
impact of the Mazer decision has been in more substantive areasthe concept of originality, the test for infringement, and the distinction between ideas and expression. This comment will examine the
substantive problems raised by Mazer, focusing particularly on the
idea-expression distinction, which is central to the entire concept of
copyright protection. This survey will then be used as a basis for reexamining the Mazer decision itself.
I.

COMMERCIAL COPYRIGHT AND THE IDEA-ExPRESSION DISTINCTION

The idea-expression distinction is a basic tenet of copyright law. 19
It marks the boundary line between the protected and the unprotected, between the elements of a copyrighted work which others may
not copy and those elements which may be freely appropriated. Ideas
have traditionally been placed in the unprotected category, 20 because
of the fear that
[t]o grant property status to a mere idea would permit withdrawing the idea from the stock of materials which would
otherwise be open to other authors, thereby narrowing the
21
field of thought open for development and exploitation.
Expression, on the other hand, falls squarely within the ambit of the
protected classification. Curiously, the justification for granting copyright status to expression is quite similar to the rationale for denying
it to ideas. That is, expression must be protected in order to persuade
' 22
authors to share their ideas and thereby "advance the public welfare."
Unfortunately, the idea-expression distinction defies exact definition.
Over forty years ago, Judge Learned Hand tried to describe it in terms
of a series of abstractions:

18 Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
$89 U.S. 801 (1967); Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Novelty Jewelry Co., 309 F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1962);
Prestige Floral Societe Anonyme v. California Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287, 291
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
19 For early formulations of the idea-expression distinction, see Holmes v. Hurst, 174
U.S. 82, 86 (1898); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
20 The unprotected status of ideas, at least those contained in some tangible medium
of expression, does not seem to be constitutionally required. NIUa=m § 8.4, at 22; KAPLsN,
supra note 8, at 64.
21 Nimm.a § 143.11, at 621.
22 Mazer v. Stein, 847 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number
of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as
more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than a general statement of what the play is
about, and at times might only consist of its title; but there is
a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the
use of his "ideas" to which, apart from their expression, his
2
property is never extended.

3

Obviously Hand's formulation is not a definition at all, but rather a
way of viewing the problem. Although everyone seems dissatisfied
with such a hazy solution, attempts to articulate more concrete standards have largely failed. Chafee has suggested that copyright protection covers the pattern of the work, which, in the case of a play, includes "the sequence of events and the development of the interplay
of the characters." 24 Nimmer advocates a combination of the Hand
and Chafee approaches. 25 Others have urged reformulating the ideaexpression distinction in terms .of a "spine-idea" test 20 or a content
analysis. 27 However, none of the above concepts provides a precise
definition of where to draw the line between ideas and expression;
like the abstractions test, they remain means of approaching the problem, not an answer to it.
These definitional problems apparently led Judge Hand to abandon
any attempt to find a unifying principle. Almost thirty years after
enunciating his abstractions test, he remarked:
Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator
has gone beyond copying the "idea," and has borrowed its
"expression." Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.28

The complex task of separating ideas from expression becomes
more complicated in the area of commercial copyright. First, the subject matter involved is usually a two- or three-dimensional object
whose impact is quite different from that of a novel or play: more
visual and immediate, appealing more to the aesthetic and less to the
23 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
24 Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUm. L. REv. 503, 513-14 (1945).
25 NiMaER § 143.11, at 623.
26 Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 16 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 30 (1968).
27 Sorensen & Sorensen, Re-examining the Traditional Legal Test of Literary Similarity:
A Proposalfor Content Analysis, 37 CoRNELL L. Q. 638 (1952).
28 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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intellectual sensibilities of the viewer. Since articles such as fabric designs, costume jewelry, and artificial flowers evoke a Gestalt response,
they cannot easily be broken down into component parts like plot,
theme, and character development and, thereby, analyzed in terms of
a series of abstractions or a pattern test. As a result, the idea-expression
distinction becomes "even more intangible." 2 9
These difficulties are compounded by a second factor-the absence
of major substantive barriers to obtaining copyright registration. Un30
like patent law, copyright law does not demand novelty or invention.
Nor must a copyrighted work possess a great degree of creativity. Although the Copyright Regulations state that a work of art "must embody some creative authorship in its delineation or form,13 1 the courts
have been quite unwilling to sit in judgment of artistic merit.32 As
Justice Holmes stated:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth
of pictoral illustrations outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would
be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make
them repulsive until the public had learned the new language
in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted,
for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of
Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the
first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
Yet, if they command the interest of any public, they have a
commercial value-it would be bold to say that they have not
an aesthetical and educational value-and the taste of any
public is not to be treated with contempt. 33
29 Id.

30 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). Two courts have stated that a copyrighted
work must possess some degree of novelty. Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Novelty Jewelry Co., 309
F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1962); Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir. 1955). However,
in both cases the term "novelty" seems to have been used interchangeably with "originality" and use of the former term did not impose any requirements on copyright registration
other than those already contained in the latter concept.
Similarly, the patent law standard of contribution to the prior art has been employed
in one case, but only to support the conclusion that the copyrighted product possessed the
requisite originality. Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551, 553
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
31 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1971).
32 Lack of creativity has been used to bar copyright protection only where the Register
of Copyrights refused registration, Bailie v. Fisher, 258 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1958), or where
the copyrighted work also failed to meet the originality requirement, Gardenia Flowers,
Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
33 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 US. 239, 251-52 (1902). Much the
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The courts have also failed to make use of a Regulation3M disqualifying from copyright registration works whose sole intrinsic function
is utility. Here, however, the inaction of the courts does not reflect
judicial restraint. Rather, the Regulation itself has little applicability.
There are no two-dimensional works and few three-dimensional objects whose design is absolutely dictated by utilitarian considerations.
In essence, then, the initial burden of excluding commonplace matters
in the public domain, such as ideas, from copyright status has been
left solely to the originality requirement. Unfortunately, it does not
perform this function very effectively.
The originality requirement is extremely minimal. Most courts ask
only that the "artist" contribute something more than trivial to his
work.3 5 Frequently, all that is required of the copyrighted work is that
it not be an exact duplicate of another article. 86 Thus, sufficient
originality has been found in the reduction of an existing threedimensional design to two-dimensions; 37 in the reduction in size a
Rodin statue;3 8 in the printing of nineteenth century drawings of Beethoven, Brahms, and Bach on sweatshirts; 39 and in the production of a
three-dimensional plastic Santa Claus. 0
The effect of these and numerous other decisions 41 has been to
grant copyright status to objects comprised mainly of material in the
public domain. Furthermore, in many cases the attractiveness or commercial value of the copyrighted work, public domain elements included, depends on its incorporation into another product. Few of
the numerous design cases in the Southern District of New York
same philosophy also seems to have pervaded the Mazer decision: "Individual perception
of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art." 847
U.S. at 214.
34 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1971) provides in part:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the artide is
unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art.
35 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951).
36 Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultree Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
37 Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovitz, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
38 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
39 Eagle-Freedman Roedelheim Co. v. Allison Mfg. Co., 204 F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
40 Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. Cal. 1961), afl'd,
304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
41 See, e.g., Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 873 U.S. 913 (1963) (arrangement of educational flash cards already in public
domain); Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1955) (toy doll modeled after a live
chimpanzee); Loomskill, Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 330 F.2d 952
(2d Cir. 1964) (minor variations in Audubon book drawing of birds); John Wolf Textiles,
Inc. v. Andris Fabrics, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 865, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (replica drawings of
people from Cleopatra's era).
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would likely have arisen if the designs involved had been sold by
themselves as works of art instead of incorporated into fabrics which
could be made into dresses and other retail products. The courts are,
therefore, forced to distinguish protected expression not only from
public domain elements in a particular design, but also from the
product into which that design is incorporated. As previously mentioned, the subject matter of most commercial copyrights makes
drawing such fine distinctions exceedingly difficult.
Instead of facilitating this task, a third factor-the standard of infringement-exacerbates the problem. The normal test for infringement is "whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work." 42 Thus,
despite the difficulty of distinguishing between ideas and expression
in commercial copyright cases, the court is forced to formulate its
judgment on the basis of an overall impression-precisely the level
at which the public domain elements are most likely to predominate.
Close examination to detect disparities is discouraged; 43 expert testimony is viewed with distrust, if not hostility. 44 In short, the test for
infringement may deprive the court of the very tools it needs to handle
the complicated idea-expression distinction.
Faced with such complex and bewildering problems, most courts
have seemed to follow human instinct-they have simply ignored the
questions raised by the idea-expression distinction. Frequently, the
courts conclude their inquiry by pointing to evidence of actual copying. Such a resolution of infringement proceedings, however, is less
than satisfactory. In terms of the idea-expression concept, evidence
of actual copying is irrelevant if only ideas are appropriated. A careful
judicial examination is still needed to determine specifically which
elements of the copyrighted work may or may not be protected. WithIdeal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960); Prestige Floral Societe Anonyme v. California Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287,
293 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
44 The traditional hostility to expert testimony in copyright cases was expressed by
Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931):
We cannot approve the length of the record, which was due chiefly to the use of
expert witnesses. Argument is argument whether in the box or at the bar, and its
proper place is the last. The testimony of an expert upon such issues, especially
his cross-examination, greatly extends the trial and contributes nothing which
cannot be better heard after the evidence is all submitted. It ought not to be
allowed at all; and while its admission is not a ground for reversal, it cumbers
the case and tends to confusion, for the more the court is led into the intricacies
of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to stand upon the firmer, if more
naive, ground of its considered impressions upon its own perusal.
This attitude may have changed somewhat in recent years. See the use of expert testimony
in Mattel, Inc. v. S. Rosenberg Co., 296 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
42
43
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out such an investigation, reliance on actual copying will provide
unwarranted protection for many items within the public domain.
Two cases involving toy dolls illustrate this point.
In the first case, Remco Industries, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Manufacturing Co.,45 the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had infringed

its copyright on dolls resembling the Beatles. The court found similarity and copying without discussing either concept. On this basis,
it issued a preliminary injunction forbidding the defendant from
manufacturing or selling "a doll approximately five inches tall, representing a male figure wearing a dark suit and exhibiting a 'mop'
'40
haircut associated with the musical group known as the Beatles.
The problem with the decision is in attempting to define the original expression that is protected. Certainly the plaintiff could not
claim the exclusive right to make dolls resembling the Beatles. The
Beatles were in the public domain and any semi-accurate representation would, of necessity, have to involve a male figure with a "mop"
haircut. Arguably the original expression came either in dressing a
Beatle figure in a dark suit, or in making the doll five inches high,
or both. But what if the defendant had put a different color suit
on its doll? Or altered the height of the doll by a half inch?
Similar problems are raised by a second doll case, Hassenfeld
Brothers, Inc. v. Mego Corp., 7 in which the plaintiff held a copyright
on a soldier doll called "GI Joe." After the plaintiff had spent over
four million dollars in advertising and the product had sold seven
million copies, 48 the defendant attempted to market a considerably
less expensive version called "Fighting Yank." Actual copying seemed
obvious, since both dolls had an identically misplaced right thumbnail.
Considering the average lay observer test satisfied, the court granted
a preliminary injunction.
Again, specifying the original expression which justified the injunction is a difficult if not impossible task. In reaching its decision, the
court pointed to three types of similarities: first, features of the head,
torso, legs, arms, and hands, including the misplaced thumbnail;
second, the fact that the dolls were sold with a variety of accessories
and changes of clothing; and finally, the mechanical construction of
both dolls, which allowed them to be posed in various attitudes. The
defendant surely had the right to copy the mechanical construction,
which was unpatented and not part of the registered copyright. Similarly, the defendant should not have been prohibited from either
45 141 U.S.P.Q. 898 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
46 Id. at 899.
47 150 U.S.P.Q. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
48 Id. at 786-87.
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selling dolls with accessories or dressing those dolls in standard Army
uniforms and equipping them with standard guns and hand grenades.
Thus, the plaintiff's original expression, if it subsisted at all, must
have been in the dolls themselves. The court purported to find such
expression and to find it infringed. Although differences existed in
the face and head of the two dolls, "they are both faces which depict
a well groomed young man with black hair with head and nasal fea49
tures which are very similar.1
Yet if copyright protection rests on the dean-cut appearance of the
soldier, obvious problems arise. Must one who manufactures an American soldier doll with standard uniforms and weaponry also give that
doll an unshaven appearance? More basically, is it even possible to
change the facial expression of the dolls sufficiently to alter the overall similarity which is undoubtedly comprised of elements within the
public domain-the human body, the soldier's uniform, and the military weapons? The fact that the defendant's doll is an obvious copy
of the plaintiff's may explain the court's avoidance of these questions,
but it can hardly serve as a justification.
Not all courts placing primary reliance on evidence of actual copying ignore these implications. In Sunset House Distributing Corp. v.

Doran,5° the court examined two painted plastic bags which, when
completely stuffed with crumpled newspaper, turned into threedimensional Santa Clauses. Characterizing the defendant's product
as a "lazy copy," 51 the Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. Perhaps troubled by the possibility of giving the plaintiff a monopoly on all three-dimensional plastic Santa Clauses, it sought to
clarify its decision:
The court below has not enjoined defendants from making
a Santa Claus, a red and white plastic Santa Claus, or a
Santa Claus with a slit in his back to permit him to be stuffed
with newspapers.

52

The result is doubletalk. The defendant's product had a different
belt buckle than the plaintiff's; different material was used for the
figure's face and the hood of its tunic. 53 The only points of identity
between the two products seem to be the very features the court said
the defendant could appropriate-a three-dimensional figure of Santa
49 Id. at

50
51
52
53

788.

304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'g 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
Id. at 252. The defendant had even copied plaintiff's instruction sheet.
Id. at 252.
197 F. Supp. at 940, 947-48.
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Claus, plastic material, and the slit in the back to permit the bag to
be stuffed with newspapers. In short, the defendant could have copied
the plaintiff's product if they had not been so "lazy" in doing so.
The obvious course of conduct for potential copyists, therefore, is
not to be lazy. A knowledgeable entrepreneur can usually place the
courts in a position in which they cannot ignore the problems raised
by the idea-expression distinction. At least one New York firm of
fabric converters, the Slifkas, seems to have pursued this strategy
successfully. They were able to win three cases, despite admitting
in each case that the plaintiff's copyrighted design had been the basis
for their own design.54 A variety of techniques were used to focus
judicial attention on the idea-expression distinction. In one case, the
Slifkas took a copyrighted design and "cross-bred" it with pictures
found in a design form book. Although their product was strikingly
identical to the copyrighted article in those features most likely to
attract consumer attention-structural characteristics, spatial arrangements, and use of shadings, stippling, colors and color combinations, 5
they could point to specific pictures in the design form book which
served as the basis for their own design. 56 The court concluded that
the Slifkas had "sedulously borrowed each of plaintiff's ideas" but
denied relief because "defendant's designs are aesthetic mutations,
reflecting major changes and significant alterations that keep clear
57
of plaintiff's expression."
Another tactic used successfully by the same defendants was to
show that the copyrighted article was appropriated from a public
domain work."" The plaintiff had taken an embroidery known as
"Schiffli," photographed it, and worked for months to develop an arrangement of colors that would give the flat-surface design a threedimensional effect. The Slifkas bought one of the plaintiff's dresses,
softened some of the features including the three-dimensional effect,
and used the design for their own product. Although the Second
54 Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 444 (2d Cir. 1960); Condotti,
Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Clarion Textile Corp. v. Slifka, 139
U.S.P.Q. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

55 Condotti, Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
56 Id. at 413-14.
57 Id. at 415.
58 Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1960).

Similar
strategy has been employed in a number of other cases, Florabelle Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph
Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph
Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Adanta Novelties
Corp., 223 F. Supp. 866, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Elekes v. Bradford Novelty Co., 183 F. Supp.
730, 732-33 (D. Mass. 1960), but not always with the same success, Concord Fabrics, Inc. v.
Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 296 F. Supp. 736, 738 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 409 F.2d 1315 (2d Cir.
1969).
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Circuit found that the plaintiff's design possessed the requisite
originality, 59 it denied relief. Since the design was in the public
domain and therefore could be freely copied, the court applied a
stricter test of infringement:
We need not determine whether if the basic design had been
original with plaintiff, defendant's fabric might not be sufficiently imitative to infringe under the test laid down by Judge
Hand in Peter Pan. For here, in contrast, the basic design was
in the public domain and plaintiff was entitled to relief only
if the defendants copied its "expression".....6G
Another successful stratagem the Slifkas employed was to change
the colors used in the copyrighted design. 6' Since the normal test
for infringement encourages the court to make a judgment based on
an overall impression, identity of public domain elements such as
color or dress design 62 may cause the viewer to disregard or minimize
differences in detail. This psychological effect, however, works both
ways. While identity of color obscures differences in design, disparity
in color highlights those differences. Thus, in copying a fabric design
consisting of flowers enclosed in staggered rectangles, the Slifkas made
some minor alterations" in the design and then changed the color
on some but not all 6 4 of their fabrics. In denying a request for a
preliminary injunction, the court concluded:
The designs are enough alike so that a woman wearing plaintiff's Capri #751 in brown and green would exclaim "There
goes my dress" if she saw a woman wearing Slifka Fabrics
No. 9074 in the same color scheme. My belief is, however,
50 Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1960).
60 Id.; accord, Mattel, Inc. v. S. Rosenberg Co., 296 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Manes Fabrics Co. v. The Acadia Co., 139 U.S.P.Q. 339, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
61 Clarion Textile Corp. v. Slifka, 139 U.S.P.Q. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). For another fabric
design case where use of the same tactic may have contributed to denial of a preliminary injunction, see Prestige Fabrics, Inc. v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 903, 905
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
62 Uncopyrighted dress designs have the same effect as color in obscuring differences in
fabric patterns. Therefore, the defendant's chances of success are increased if the court
compares the plaintiff's and the defendant's designs as they appear on rolls of cloth before
they are made into dresses. See, e.g., Manes Fabric Co. v. Miss Celebrity, Inc., 246 F. Supp.
975 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
63 The flowers in the plaintiff's designs were impressionistic masses which would
overflow the boundaries of the rectangles if not cut by them. The Sliflkas made their
flowers individual sprays, dearly defined and fitted into the rectangles with unoccupied
margins. Clarion Textile Corp. v. Slifka, 139 U.S.P.Q. 340, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
64 "Among the various color schemes of the fabrics bearing defendant's design there
are three which exactly duplicate the three color schemes used by plaintiff on fabrics
bearing its design." Id. at 340.
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that there would be no such exclamation if the Slifka Fabrics
65
No. 9074 were in light green and cerise.
Had the defendants in the toy doll and plastic Santa Claus cases
employed tactics similar to the Slifkas', the results might have been
different. After examining the copyrighted work, the defendants in
all three cases could easily have obtained pictures in the public
domain upon which to base their products. 66 Furthermore, at least
on the Beatle dolls, the color of the outer clothing could have been
changed on some of the copies without destroying their commercial
value. Confronted with this set of facts, the court would have been
hard pressed to find infringement.
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the issue would have been
resolved in this manner. 67 In attempting to advance human thought
and development by protecting expression, some courts have lost sight
of the public purpose involved; eliminating appropriation or commercial piracy has become an end in itself. 68 As a result, even careful
copyists may find the idea-expression distinction of no help in an
infringement action. Three recent court of appeals cases vividly illustrate this possibility.
In Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 69 a case involving
copyrights on seven studio greeting cards, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with a defendant who had covered his tracks well. For example, the defendant duplicated the public domain aspects of one
of the plaintiff's cards-the uncopyrighted caption was the same;
the general mood of the two cards was similar.7 However, the art
work was quite different-the plaintiff's card had a forlorn boy sitting on a curb weeping; the defendant's portrayed a forlorn and
71
weeping man.
Despite the obvious difference between the two cards, the court
reversed judgment for the defendant. The majority concluded that
65 Id. at 341.
66 Of course, even this strategy may involve extra expense for toy doll copiers who use
the copyrighted work itself to make a mold for their own product.
67 Even the resourceful Slifkas felt the sting of judicial wrath. Loomskill, Inc. v. Slifka,
330 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1964); Cortley Fabrics Co. v. Slifka, 317 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1963).
68 [T]he intensity of the search to find what was the plaintiff's original contribution,
then to judge whether that was somehow taken by the defendant . . . has
sometimes driven out other considerations. When thus detached, the law of
plagiarism drifts toward excessive protection, with reciprocal excessive constraint,
out of proportion to any needed incentive to the producer (the major consideration), and unjustified by any collateral objectives of copyright.
KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 76.
69 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
70 Id. at 1109.
71

Id. at 1110.
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"in total concept and feel the cards of United are the same as the
copyrighted cards of Roth." 72 In reaching a decision which seems to
extend copyright protection to an intangible mood, the court appeared
influenced by the manner in which the plaintiff and the defendant
operated their respective businesses. The plaintiff employed both a
writer who developed textual material and an artist who designed
the comprehensive layout of the cards. The defendant, on the other
hand, employed no writers or artists. Its vice-president admitted that
he did the art work himself after obtaining many of his ideas while
visiting greeting card shops and gift shows.7 3 In other words, the defendant simply pirated its ideas from other card manufacturers.
The court's apparent reliance on the business morality of the respective litigants represents a significant departure from traditional
copyright principles. The amount of time, money, and effort the plaintiff expended in developing his product has no legal significance under
the idea-expression distinction. If his original expression has not been
appropriated by the defendant, the plaintiff should not be able to
buy protection for his ideas no matter how much money he has spent.
Likewise, the defendant should not be punished solely because he
deliberately capitalized on an idea that the plaintiff made commercially successful. The unprotected status of ideas under copyright
law is not confined to those which are commercially valueless. If an
idea did not have any worth or value, no one would care whether
it were copied. Furthermore, the rationale for leaving ideas unprotected is to expand the field of thought open for development and
exploitation; that public purpose can be achieved only if the most
valuable ideas are available for appropriation. Therefore, commercial
success should be viewed as a reason for encouraging, not restricting,
copying of an idea.
The same considerations of business morality, however, also seem
to pervade the Fifth Circuit's decision in Tennessee FabricatingCo. v.
Moultree ManufacturingCo.74 The plaintiff had secured a copyright on
a twelve-inch square architectural metal casting unit intended for use
in combination or singly for a decorative screen or room divider to
"finish up" space.7 5 A filigree pattern of intercepting straight and arc
lines covered the surface of the unit. The defendant had come into
possession of one of the plaintiff's products on which the copyright
notice had been obscured. Using the unit to make a mold, the defendant marketed the identical product. After receiving actual notice of
72 Id.
73 Id. at

1103.

74 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970).
75 Id. at 280.
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the copyright, it redesigned the unit by "adding four intercepting
straight lines in the form of a diamond to the filigree pattern." 76
The court held such action insufficient to avoid infringement. Without actually analyzing the features of the two units, the court concentrated on the defendant's conduct. Having emphasized the commercial
success of the plaintiff's product, the court concluded that "the defendants displayed a persistent desire to reproduce or capitalize on
the unit." 77 As in the Roth case, the right of the defendant to "reproduce or capitalize" on the public domain elements of the plaintiff's product seems to have been ignored.
The extent to which concern for commercial morality can blind
a court to the problems raised by the idea-expression distinction was
again demonstrated in Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Brothers Textile Corp.7 8 The fabric design involved was used primarily on women's
handkerchiefs. It consisted of a series of squares, each containing a
smaller square which in turn contained a circle. Not only did the
Second Circuit minimize differences in the color and design of the
defendant's fabric, but it also viewed those changes as evidence of its
culpability:
[W]e feel that the very nature of these differences only tends
to emphasize the extent to which the defendant has deliber79
ately copied from the plaintiff.
Although the court was not without precedent in viewing the "studied efforts" of the defendant to change the plaintiff's work as proof
of infringement, 0 its reasoning seems clearly incorrect. By protecting
expression and not protecting ideas, copyright law encourages authors
and artists to make individual variations on common themes. Certainly actions which the law encourages should not be used as evidence
of infringement.
Moreover, even if the differences between the plaintiff's and the
defendant's products are taken as evidence of copying, the court's inquiry should not end. In order to find infringement, the court still
must determine that the defendant has appropriated the plaintiff's
protected expression, not merely his ideas. However, the Second Circuit never took this necessary step. Concerned mainly with preventId. at 281.
Id. at 282.
78 409 F.2d 1315 (2d Cir. 1969).
79 Id. at 1316.
80 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. S. Rosenberg Co., 296 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Hassenfield Bros., Inc. v. Mego Corp., 150 U.S.P.Q. 786, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Peter Pan
Fabrics Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Scarves By Vera,
Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
76
77
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ing commercial piracy, the court brushed aside all differences between
the two products as unsubstantial without ever discussing what those
differences were."'
Despite the court's curt treatment of the issue, an examination of
the lower court opinion suggests that the differences between the two
products were anything but insignificant. The district court had found
that the motifs of the two handkerchiefs were distinguishable in that
the defendant's work had approximately 25 daisies which did not appear in the plaintiff's while the latter had twelve geometrical shaped
designs which had no counterpart in the defendant's pattern 2 More
importantly, the district court noted that the basic design of the plaintiff's handkerchief-the series of larger squares-had been common
and popular throughout the women's clothing industry for many
years-a fact never mentioned by the court of appeals.8 3 Thus, only
by concentrating on the defendant's conduct and ignoring the type
of detailed examination which the district court conducted could the
Second Circuit escape the conclusion that
[a]t worst, what defendant has done here is to use an idea of
plaintiff's, to wit, the imposition of a smaller square and a
circular design therein within the framework of a large hand8
kerchief design.

4

The real importance of these three decisions is not that they depart
from traditional doctrine, but that they threaten to introduce an amorphous, far-reaching principle into the already unsettled world of substantive copyright law. The factors which support the decisions-the
commercial success of the plaintiff's product, the amount of time,
money, and effort expended by the plaintiff, the defendant's actual
use of the plaintiff's work in making his own product-are many
of the constituent elements of the common law doctrine of unfair
competition.8 5 Moreover, the prevailing philosophy in all three opinions appears to be identical to that of unfair competition cases: that
the primary function of the courts is to prevent the "competitor from
reaping the fruits of complainant's efforts, and expenditures, to the
partial exclusion of complainant."8 6
81 409 F.2d 1315, 1316 (2d Cir. 1969).
82 296 F. Supp. 736, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
83 Id.
84 Id.

85 See, e.g., Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (1952);
Peerless Oakland Laundry Co. v. Hickman, 205 Cal. App. 2d 556, 23 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1962);
Western Electro-Plating Co. v. Henness, 196 Cal. App. 2d 564, 16 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1961);
California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (1948).
86 International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241 (1918).
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The problem with this misappropriation principle is that it has no
bounds. Carried to its logical extreme it might completely eliminate
all competition, since any time a businessman uses a competitor's idea
he is "reaping the fruits" of the latter's efforts and expenditures. Because of these implications, attempts have been made to limit the
doctrine.s7 Only seven years ago, the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck 6 Co. v. Stiffel Co.88 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc.8 9 appeared to place severe restrictions on the area in which state
unfair competition law could operate. However, what may be occurring in the three recent court of appeals decisions is that the misappropriation doctrine is being resurrected phoenix-like from the ashes
of Stiffel and Compco and enshrined in substantive copyright law.
Such a development would replace the ephemeral idea-expression distinction with a concept of even more uncertain and baffling proportions.

II. Mazer v. Stein

REvisiTED

The developments in the seventeen years following Mazer v. Stein
represent a departure from traditional copyright principles that
should be unsatisfying to all but ardent protectionists. Due to the
misapplication or non-application of the idea-expression concept,
commercial copyrights have been upheld on a plethora of objects
which belong in the public domain. Moreover, the introduction of
the misappropriation doctrine threatens to destroy the few enclaves
of non-protection which still exist. Copyright law, therefore, stands
in danger of becoming "a game of chess in which the public can be
checkmated."9 0
Some of these problems can be eliminated or at least controlled
by a rigorous analysis of each case in terms of the idea-expression
distinction. However, one wonders whether it is worth the trouble.
The idea-expression distinction has always been an ephemeral concept, a hazy guide to analysis rather than a well-defined standard
for decision. In the commercial copyright area, the difficulties of application have been accentuated. The logic of the situation demands
not merely the reapplicatihn of a nebulous principle, but a complete
reevaluation of the Mazer decision itself.
87 For example, in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930), Judge Learned Hand tried to confine the International News
Service case to its facts. "The difficulties of understanding it otherwise are insuperable."
Id. at 280.
88 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
89 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
90 Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (Ist Cir. 1967).
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Given the manner in which the Supreme Court formulated the
issue in Mazer, it is hard to see how it could have reached a different
decision:
This case requires an answer... as to an artist's right to copyright a work of art intended to be reproduced for lamp
bases. 91
The purpose of copyright law is to protect the commercial value of
copyrighted works, thereby providing the monetary incentives necessary to encourage the activities of authors and artists. Since the entire copyright system is so commercially oriented, it would seem absurd to deny copyright status to a statuette merely because it was to
be put to a commercial use.
However, changing the characterization of the problem yields a
different perspective. According to the defendant's petition for certiorari,
is: Can
Stripped down to its essentials, the question presented
92
a lamp manufacturer copyright his lamp bases?
Viewed in this manner, 93 the wisdom of the Supreme Court's decision
is highly questionable. The copyright system has run into problems
whenever it has been applied to something other than the type of
literary work for which it was originally designed. 9 Therefore, extending the system to items such as lamp bases which did not even
fall within the ordinary conception of a work of art was bound to
cause extreme difficulties. Seventeen years of experience has only confirmed the weaknesses inherent in the basic policy of attempting to
fit fabric designs, artificial flowers, and plastic Santa Clauses within
the mold of standard copyright law.
The sensible solution would be to take the problem of protecting
mass-produced, commercial articles entirely out of the copyright system. This action would necessarily involve concurrent restrictions on
copyrights covering works of fine art. Otherwise, fabric converters
could copyright their fabric designs as paintings, or doll manufacturers
register their dolls as sculpture. A more subtle means by which a
commercial user could achieve the same end would be secretly to hire
another to do the necessary art work under his guidance; this "inde91 347 U.S. 201, 205 (1954).
92 Id. at 205.
93 The Supreme Court might have had difficulty in accepting the defendant's characterization because the statuettes were not used solely as lamp bases. The plaintiffs also sold
them separately as works of art.
94 K^rLAN, supra note 8, at 85.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 38:807

pendent" artist would then secure a copyright and immediately grant
an exclusive license to the manufacturer. In either case, the courts
would remain beset with the same perplexing problems which they
presently endure.
These difficulties could be overcome by completely eliminating the
right of copyright holders to bring infringement actions for unauthorized use of their works in mass-produced, commercial products. However, that solution may conflict with the legitimate interest of artists
in protecting the value of their creations as works of fine art. Conceivably, that value could be diminished or destroyed if their works were
used in mass-produced, commercial articles.
Fortunately, protecting this legitimate artistic interst can easily
be reconciled with the removal of mass-produced, two- and threedimensional objects from the realm of copyright law. For example,
owners of copyrights on works of fine art could be allowed to bring
regular infringement actions against commercial exploiters of their
work, as long as the copyright owner (1) did not use the copyrighted
work in his own commercial product; (2) did not license others to
use the work in their commercial products; and (3) did not enforce
his copyright in such a way as to grant de facto licenses to certain
people. Under this approach, the copyright owner would retain all
his present powers to protect his work as a work of fine art; he merely
would be prevented from profiting from the use of that work in massproduced, commercial products.
While the elimination of commercial copyright problems need not
substantially affect the amount of protection afforded works of fine
art, the same statement naturally cannot be made concerning the
commercial products themselves. They will be completely deprived
of copyright protection. Yet such action does not necessarily mean
that these products will be left entirely without legal protection. The
withdrawal of copyright status might serve as an impetus for special
legislation tailored to the particular subject matter involved. Such
legislation would, in fact, provide greater security for present commercial copyright owners who must still face the prospect that some
courts will engage in a rigorous idea-expression analysis, an analysis
usually leading to the conclusion that
there were few similarities that could figure as unexcused
limitations of "expression," and those so discrete and of such
a dimension as to be nonactionable. 95
In any event, whether mass-produced, commercial articles remain
95 Id. at 49.
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legally protected or unprotected, they should be judged on their own
merits. They should not receive protection because of their tenuous
connection to a system which was not originally designed for them
and remains unequipped to handle them.

The Civil Service-Collective Bargaining Conflict
in the Public Sector: Attempts at Reconciliation
The recent growth of public employee unionism poses a serious challenge to the control which civil service commissions1 have traditionally
exercised over the terms and conditions of public employment. 2 Public
employee unions are seeking collective bargaining over a broad range
of issues 3 -hiring, promotions, transfers, discipline, and dischargewhich are presently governed by civil service. 4 Union attempts to supplant civil service may be attributable to several considerations,
including alleged civil service bias against employees,5 union confi1 The term "civil service" as used in this comment refers to the broad range of constitutional provisions, statutes, administrative rules, ordinances, and ad hoc administrative
determinations relating to the terms and conditions of public employment. It encompasses
the activities of personnel boards, agencies, and directors as well as of civil service commissions. The discussion in this comment is applicable to all centralized state or local
laws relating to public employment.
Usually a state constitution (see, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 5-6), state statute (see,
e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.01-.02 (Supp. 1970)), or city charter (see, e.g., GRANDo RArs,
MicH., CI ARTEn tit. VIL § 3) authorizes the establishment of civil service agencies and
prescribes certain minimal requirements for these agencies to meet (see, e.g., Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 63.25 (Supp. 1970)). The civil service commission then establishes its own rules
within this grant of power, setting standards which it will follow in every case (for example, setting the exact amount of credit to be given seniority in awarding promotions,
Cook County, Ill., Rules of the Civil Service Commission, Rule VIII (1968)) or making
case-by-case determinations (leaving the weight to be given seniority to be determined as
each promotional opportunity arises, Grand Rapids, Mich., Civil Service Rules § 701.3
(1955)).
2 Twenty-three states have civil service systems covering more than 50% of their employees. Every city of more than 500,000 and 95% of cities with 100,000 or more population also have some form of civil service. However, fewer than 5% of the nation's counties
BY ALL
have such a system. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE ...
THE PEOPLE 63-64 (1969).
3 For an examination of the issues most often causing conflict between civil service and
public employee unions, see Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems? 31 PuB.
PEns. RaV. 108 (1970).
4 All compilations of civil service regulations do not cover the same matters. However,
subjects generally covered by such regulations are procedures to be followed by the civil
service commission, coverage of the regulations, examinations, appointments, probationary
periods, demotion, dismissal, discipline, appeals procedures, and political activity. See,
e.g., Nevada Personnel Division, Rules for State Personnel Administration (1969); Oregon
State Civil Service Rules (1966); INSTITUTE FOR URBAN POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION,
GRADUATE

SCHOOL OF PUBLIC

AND

INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS,

UNIVERSITY

OF

PITTSBURGH,

MODEL RULES AND REGULATIONS AND FoRms FOR CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA

(1970); LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, A SUGGESTED PERSONNEL SYSTEM (1966).
5 The opinion of Thomas Beagley, of Cook County District Council 19, American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, reflects the union rhetoric:
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dence in its ability 'to make better decisions than civil service concerning working conditions, and a possible desire by unions to assume
greater importance in the eyes of their members. Whatever the cause,
the conflict between collective bargaining and civil service in the public
sector presents a choice between two separate decision-making processes
-- on one hand, unilateral determinations by a civil service commission,
and, on the other, collective bargaining between public employers and
public employees. 6 At stake is final decision-making power over many
aspects of the employment relationship.
To reconcile civil service laws and public sector collective bargaining, and to assign distinct roles to each, is not an easy task. Any resolution of the conflict necessarily involves making assumptions concerning
a plethora of issues-the extent of similarity between the public and
private sectors, the possibility that public employees may strike to enforce demands on bargainable matters, the desirability of uniformity
imposed by civil service regulation in lieu of individually bargained
terms of employment, and the potentiality of using civil service to
7
achieve important governmental objectives.
Moreover, the difficulty in reconciling civil service laws and public
unionism may reflect their origins in different historical eras as responses to totally different forces. Civil service, which evolved in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was intended to eliminate
the evils of the spoils system-inefficiency, extravagance, and arbitrary
dismissals of personnel following each change of political power.8 Com[I]f a person seeks employment through the Civil Service Commission procedures
in the City of Chicago, he finds that the Civil Service Commission . . . is appointed by the Mayor who also appoints the department heads, one of which
will be his boss. Since 2 of the 3 commissioners may be members of the same
political party, the incumbent Mayor is reasonably sure of majority support on
the Commission. Politics being what it is, it is difficult to believe that the Commission is not subject to pressure and/or suggestion from the person appointing it.
Beagley, Problems from the Viewpoint of Employees and Unions, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC EIMPLOYEES 13, 14 (18th Annual Central Labor Union Conference 1966).
See also the account of striking Waukegan, Illinois policemen who refused to appear
before a civil service commission hearing because of its alleged management bias. BNA
Gov'r EMPL. RE.L. RE'. No. 362, Aug. 17, 1970, at B-15.
6 As two surveys have indicated, the dichotomy between civil service decisions and
collective bargaining is not absolute. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations found that a civil service commission was the city's representative in collective
bargaining in twelve out of 978 cities. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
LABOR MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNmENTS 28 (1969). A survey by
the California State Personnel Board found that civil service was a negotiating party in
one out of twelve cases. BNA Gov'T EmPL. REL. REP. No. 303, June 30, 1969, at D-5.
7 These issues are discussed in text and notes at notes 68-82 infra.
8 K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS

IN PUBLIC

EMPLOYMENT 7

(1969); LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTEMS OF MASSACHUSETTS, THE MERIT SYSTEM IN MASSACHUsm-rs 3 (1961); Kassalow, Prospective on the Upsurge of Public Employee Unionism, in
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mitted to the creed of individualism, reformers sought to assure every
citizen the opportunity to present his qualifications for government
employment and to guarantee that the hiring decision would be based
solely on merit. Their effort resulted in the establishment of an independent civil service commission, a bipartisan agency appointed by the
executive which formulated rules for recruiting, examining, and certifying individuals for appointment by the executive-employer. 9
The work of the civil service expanded with the passage of time.
Personnel practices scientifically developed in private enterprise were
adopted to classify and to rate employees for efficient performance. 10
And since there were no other administrative bodies supervising public
employment, civil service authority was gradually extended to include
a number of tasks not related to merit hiring, such as training, salary
administration, attendance control, morals, safety, and grievances."
With the expansion of responsibilities, the original justifications for
civil service-to protect against the evils of the spoils system and to assure equal opportunity to compete for public employment-no longer
explained the full range of civil service authority. Thus, civil service
administrators justified their agencies as a means to protect advancement opportunities for minority groups, 12 to determine qualifications
for new scientific and technical government positions, 3 and to attract
14
the most efficient employees to government service.
Public employee unionism, with a few exceptions, developed after
the introduction of civil service. 15 Public employees realized, as did
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION FOR PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES 20, 25 (R. Woodworth &

R. Peterson ed. 1969).
9 Civil service commissions traditionally nominated a group of three candidates who
scored highest on civil service examinations, from which the executive could select one.
Such a practice deferred to the executive's appointment powers. F. MosHR, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 69 (1968).
3o Id. at 71.
11 ADvIsoRy ComM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 6, at 77; NATIONAL
GovERNoRs CONFERENCE, REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LABOR
RELATIONS 18 (1967); Kaplan, Civil Service-75 Years, 47 NAT. MUN. REv. 220, 221 (1958);
Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L.
Rv. 919, 927 (1969).
12 Hearings on S. 699 and S. 1485 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1967)
(testimony of Charles Meyer) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
13 See generally ACHIEVING ExCELLENE IN PUBLIC SERVICE (S. Sweeny & J. Charlesworth
ed. 1963), indicating that civil service will be instrumental in filling the highly technical
and scientific government positions opening up in the future.
14 "[M]any local governments are vitally concerned with the 'quest for quality' and
... the public service is making a real effort to obtain the best person and not only
those who have minimum qualifications." Hearings, supra note 12, at 197.
15 W. HEISEL & J. HALLIHAN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON PUBLIC EmPLOYEE NEGOTIATION

8 (1967).
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their counterparts in private enterprise, that they could achieve better
wages and working conditions if they organized-a conclusion which
instantly placed public unionism in complete opposition to the individualistic bias of civil service.' Some commentators 17 offer an additional explanation for the growth of public employee unionism. The
amount of remuneration they could obtain from legislatures which set
pay scales being restricted, employees attached more importance to the
less tangible satisfactions found in participation in the formulation and
administration of personnel policy. The pursuit of this goal, as well as
the tendency of public employees to identify civil service commissions
with the state, county, and city employers which they served, brought
unionism into direct conflict with civil service.
As might be expected, the responses of state legislatures to this complex, and at times highly controversial, problem have varied greatly.
Since collective bargaining by public employees is of questionable
legality in the absence of express statutory authorization, the conflict
between collective bargaining and civil service is somewhat muted in
the nineteen states which have no public collective bargaining laws. 18
And although public employees in these states occasionally engage in
collective bargaining, the power of civil service is virtually absolute.
In those states with both collective bargaining laws and civil service
regulations, the response to the conflict has been uneven. One group
of fourteen state legislatures has attempted to reconcile the conflict by
statute-six of these states give absolute primacy to civil service, 19 four
20
give primacy to civil service only on certain specifically defined issues,
and four leave the public employer free to determine whether to pursue
collective bargaining or to preserve civil service. 21 In these fourteen
states, the statutory resolution provides a degree of certainty. And although the wisdom of the various reconciliations may be open to question, the particular distribution of authority is at least clearly defined.
16 MOSHER, supra note 9, at 176. See also Morse, Shall We Bargain Away the Merit
System? in DEvELopMENTs IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 154, 158 (K. Warner ed. 1965).
17 M. GODINE, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: A STUDY OF POLITICAL
PLURALISM 11-12 (1951); Rubenstein, The Merit System and Collective Bargaining in Delaware, 20 LAB. Lj. 161, 163 (1969).
18 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and West Virginia.
19 Hawaii, Massachusetts (municipal employees), New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island (state employees), and Vermont. The statutes of these states are discussed in text
and notes at notes 86-88 infra.
20 Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana (transit employees), and Maine. The statutes of
these states are discussed in text and notes at notes 101-03 infra.
21 California, Nevada, Washington, and Wisconsin (state employees). The statutes
of these states are discussed in text and notes at notes 97-100 infra.
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Employers, employees, civil service commissions, and courts are guided
22
by relatively fixed standards. In another group of nineteen states,
however, no statutory attempt has been made to resolve the conflict. As
a result, the parties are left in an uncertain and often confused position.
This comment will first proceed to examine judicial attempts to resolve the conflict in those states in which no legislative guidance is
provided. It will then discuss several alternative solutions to the problem, including those adopted by various state legislatures.
I.

JUDICIAL

RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT IN THE

ABSENCE OF LEGISLATIVE DIRECTION

In the nineteen states having both collective bargaining and civil
service statutes without legislative reconciliation, the courts themselves
must reconcile the two competing decision-making processes. Three
states in particular have had extensive judicial consideration of the
conflict. The New York courts have established absolute civil service
23
authority over questions concerning the conduct of examinations,
the use of performance ratings,2 4 the arbitration of discharges,2 5 and the
classification of positions.2 6 -Wisconsin and Michigan, on the other

hand, have permitted bargaining on position classification and reclassi-

fication,27 department reorganization,

28

fringe benefits, 29 and agency

shop provisions.80
22 Alabama (firefighters), Alaska, Idaho (firefighters), Florida (firefighters), Kansas
(teachers), Massachusetts (state employees), Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Maryland
(teachers), Montana (nurses), Nebraska (teachers), New York, North Dakota (teachers),
Oregon, Rhode Island (municipal employees), South Dakota, Wisconsin (municipal employees), and Wyoming (firefighters). A discussion of court attempts to resolve the collective bargaining-civil service conflict follows.
23 Selover v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Misc. 2d 688 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
24 Kenmore Club v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Misc. 2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
25 Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 906 (Sup.
Ct. 1970). See also City of Auburn v. Firefighters Local 1446, N.Y. Pub. Emp1. Rel. Bd.
Dec.
1-620 (1968), in which a fact finder advised against a discharge arbitration clause
in a collective agreement because no court decision had ever ruled one to be valid.
26 District Council 37, AFSCME v. City of New York, N.Y. Office of Collective Bargaining Dec. No. B-3-69 (1969).
27 City of Detroit, Civil Serv. Comm'n v. District Council 77, AFSCME, 71 L.R.R.M.
2026 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969); Local 594, Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, AFSCME Petition to
Initiate Fact Finding, WERC Dec. No. 9754 (1969); Local 594, Milvaukee Dist. Council 48,
AFSCME Petition to Initiate Fact Finding, WERC Dec. No. 8137-B (1967).
28 Local 594, Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, AFSCME Petition to Initiate Fact Finding,
WERC Dec. No. 9904 (1970), BNA Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. No. 368, Sept. 28, 1970, at B-1,
enforced, WERC Dec. No. 9904-B, BNA Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. No. 387, Feb. 8, 1971,
at B-9.
29 Rayburn v. Board of Educ., 71 L.R.R.M. 2177 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
80 Nagy v. City of Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969); Clampitt v. Bd
of Educ., 68 L.R.R.M. 2996 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968).
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The New York judiciary, in resolving the conflict in favor of civil
service, has relied on the absence of any specific indication in the
Taylor Law (New York's public employee bargaining statute) that
collective bargaining was intended to supplant civil service procedures
and powers. As a result, the courts have denied union requests for injunctions against civil service examinations which were to be conducted
contrary to the procedures specified in collective bargaining agreements, 31 holding that a bargaining agreement between a municipality
and its employees "although basically sanctioned by the Taylor Act
has . . . [no] precedence and makes no claim to any precedence over
the Civil Service Law."3 2 In another case, a court voided a contract
provision calling for arbitration of discharge disputes because the
General Municipal Law specifically excluded discipline and discharge
disputes from arbitration. While noting that the Taylor Law authorizes negotiation of grievances, the court relied upon the failure of
the statute to define "grievance" in ruling that the General Municipal
34
Law voided the contract arbitration clause.
Similarly, in an administrative agency decision, 35 the New York City
Office of Collective Bargaining denied a union claim that the city must
negotiate on the issue of the creation of additional positions for elevator
starters, citing bargaining unit considerations and the management
rights provision in the contract between the city and the union. Although the Taylor Law authorized collective bargaining over salaries,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, the Office
ruled that to require mandatory bargaining would violate the right of
the city to determine the method, means, and personnel by which its
operations were to be conducted. In addition, the Office noted that
bargaining over the creation of new positions would interfere with the
jurisdiction of another union which represented the elevator starters.
New York, then, has construed the Taylor Law narrowly by requiring
explicit statutory language authorizing bargaining on provisions con31 In Selover v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Misc. 2d 688, 689 (Sup. Ct. 1970), a bargaining
agreement specified that "examinations for all ranks above fire driver-fire fighter shall be
open to all employees who have at least five (5) years of continuous service... " The civil
service commission was allowed to open an examination for the position of fire chief
only to assistant fire chiefs and fire captains. In Kenmore Club v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
61 Misc. 2d 685, 687 (Sup. Ct. 1970), the agreement stipulated that "personal ratings shall
not be used to affect competitive rating ....
" The court refused to enjoin an examination which contained a personal performance rating of 20%.
32 Selover v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Misc. 2d 688, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
33 Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 906 (Sup.
Ct. 1970).
34 Id. at 918.
35 District Council 37, AFSCME v. City of New York, N.Y. Office of Collective Bargaining Dec. No. B-3-69 (1969), 3 CCH LAB. L. RnP.
49,995.15 (1969).
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trary to the civil service laws. In adopting this approach, the courts
have refused to consider the merits of the questioned agreements and
have failed to explain why they were rejected. Any policy considerations
the courts may have relied upon, such as the cost involved in arbitration or doubts about the desirability of arbitration arising from its
performance in the private sector, went unstated. Neither public policy
nor legislative history was cited.
In striking contrast to the New York decisions is the variety of rationales developed in Wisconsin and Michigan to allow employees to
negotiate on some matters covered by civil service regulations. These
rationales are of two types-those relating to any conflict of statutes and
those relating specifically to the unique problems of the civil servicecollective bargaining conflict.
In the former category, the general doctrine establishing the superiority of state statutes to local ordinances has been relied upon by at
least one Michigan court3 6 in resolving the conflict between civil service
and collective bargaining. In that case, the court rejected the claim of
the Detroit Civil Service Commission that it had exclusive jurisdiction
over classification and position allocation. To reach this result, the
court cited Michigan constitutional provisions subordinating city ordinances to state statutes and concluded that the state public employee
bargaining statute prevailed over the local civil service regulations.3 7
This approach, however, has only limited potential for resolving the
conflict between civil service and collective bargaining. Later decisions
noted,38 for example, that the establishment of local civil service commissions is authorized by the Michigan state constitution, and that
a civil service system cannot be modified or discontinued without approval by the majority of voters within a chartered locality.39 Since civil
service regulations are products of constitutional authorization and
popularly enacted city charters, they cannot be supplanted by collective
bargaining agreements which derive their legitimacy only from statutes.40
The general supremacy argument is even less convincing where the
36 City of Detroit Civil Serv. Comm'n v. District Council 77, AFSCME, 71 L.R.R.M.
2026 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
37 Id. at 2028.
38 Sloan v. Warren Civil Serv. Comm'n, 76 L.R.R.M. 2479 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); Nagy
v. City of Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
39 Sloan v. Warren Civil Serv. Comm'n, 76 L.R.R.M. 2479, 2481-82 (Mich. Ct. App.
1970), citing MICH. CONsr. art. XI, § 6.
40 "To permit the Common Council by simple ordinance to summarily sweep aside
a merit system established by constitutional authority and by a vote of the electorate
would be a mockery of our democratic process which in this day is already battered and
bruised with too much abuse." Nagy v. City of Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362, 2369 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1969).

1971]

Civil Service-Collective Bargaining

state has constitutional provisions for home rule. In these jurisdictions,
the court's inquiry would only begin, not end, with the determination
that a state statute conflicted with a local ordinance. The court would
also have to determine whether the state statute was intended to preempt the field and whether the interests involved were statewide or
local in nature. As past experience in constitutional home rule states
has shown, these determinations are anything but automatic. 4 1
Finally, the entire general supremacy theory collapses in those states
in which either local civil service commissions are authorized by state
statute or civil service itself is operated by a state commission. Under
the general supremacy theory, courts in these states would be confronted with the Orwellian task of determining whether one state
statute was more equal than another state statute.
A second general theory of reconciling statutes that has been employed in the civil service-collective bargaining context involves the
argument that specific statutes override more general legislation. Thus,
one Michigan court42 ruled that collective bargaining took precedence
over civil service because the Michigan Public Employment Relations
Act was specific while the local civil service regulations were general.
Employees, therefore, could choose whether they were to be governed
43
by collective bargaining agreements or by civil service regulations.
The major defect in this approach is that, like the general supremacy
theory, it is difficult to apply. Whether a particular statute is "general"
or "specific" and whether it is "more specific" than another piece of
legislation are complex and rather unrealistic questions. Indeed, prior
to the decision noted above, the Michigan Attorney General had ruled
that the public bargaining statute was general, and that it did not take
precedence over specific statutes allowing school administrators to set
44
fringe benefits for teachers unilaterally.
Similar criticism can be leveled against a third method of statutory
reconciliation-the subsequent enactment doctrine. The Wisconsin
41 See, e.g., the problems California courts have had in determining whether state
statutes overruled local ordinances. In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr.
857 (1962) (concurring opinion) (court must determine conflict between local ordinance
and state statutory scheme by examining statute and facts and circumstances under which
the statute operates); In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964)
(chartered counties and cities can legislate in regard to municipal affairs unless state
legislature has preempted field or expressed desire to preempt, or if transient citizens
will be harmed); Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1969) (overruling Hubbard, stating that legislature's desire to deal with subject on statewide basis is not conclusive).
42 City of Warren v. Firefighters Local 1383, 68 L.R.R.M. 2977 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968).
43 Id. at 2978.
44 MIcH. ATT'Y GEN. OP. No. 4583 (1968), discussed in Rayburn v. Board of Educ., 71
L.R.R.M. 2177, 2178 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
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Employment Relations Commission (WERC) and Wisconsin courts
have resolved some conflicts between collective bargaining and traditional employer-civil service prerogatives by viewing Wisconsin's public bargaining statute as a subsequent enactment which has modified or
limited earlier statutory provisions. Under this approach, the public
employment statute's prohibition of discharge for union activity has
been interpreted as limiting the statutory power of employers to discharge their employees; 45 and fire and police chiefs, formerly given
complete control over the working conditions of their men by state
statute and city charter, have been required to bargain over wages,
hours, and working conditions. 46 The subsequent enactment approach

assumes legislative awareness of existing statutes and, in the event of
unreconcilable conflict, infers that later statutes were intended to limit
previously adopted legislation.4 7 Such a presumption, however, is particularly suspect on the state level, since few states publish legislative
hearings, committee reports, or floor debates. Thus, while the subsequent enactment doctrine may provide a simple means for reconciling
the collective bargaining-civil service conflict, it fails to consider the
important policy issues raised by these competing approaches.
Eschewing these more general approaches to statutory resolution,
some courts in Michigan and the WERC have employed methods of
analysis tailored more specifically to the collective bargaining-civil
service conflict. Two lines of cases have relied heavily on specific
statutory language to compensate for the dearth of materials recording
legislative intent. The first concentrates on the words "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment 48 which define the
bargaining duty in most public bargaining statutes. Emphasizing that
this language is used also in the National Labor Relations Act49 and
in many state employment peace acts,5" these courts assume that legislators using such language in public bargaining statutes were aware of
the meaning attributed to it in the private sector. Because the public
employee bargaining statutes usually contain no provisions limiting
the bargaining obligation (as is noted below, 51 some statutes require
45 Muskego-Norway Consol. Schools Joint School Dist. 9 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 35 Wis. 2d 540, 557, 151 N.W.2d 617, 625 (1967).
46 Professional Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, WERO Dec. No.
9429 (1970); Ruditys v. City of Milwaukee, WERC Dec. No. 8420 (1968).
47 Moberly, Developments in Municipal Labor Law, 42 Wis. BAR BuLL. 16, 17 (1969).
48 See, e.g., CONN. STAT. ANN. § 7-469 (Supp. 1970) (duty to bargain "with respect to
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment').
49 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964) ("wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment').
50 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454(32) (1968).
51 See text and notes at notes 85-87 infra.
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bargaining over "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment" but then exclude civil service matters from this bargaining duty),
the statutory language has been broadly interpreted to include any
aspect of employment that "has any reasonable relation to" 52 or which

"directly and intimately affects"' 53 wages, hours, and working conditions. Under this approach, the courts and the WVERC rely upon
decisions from the private sector and upon their own interpretations of
the bargaining duty in requiring bargaining over many matters traditionally under civil service regulation, such as job classification," union
security,55 and department reorganization5 6 (which involves reclassification, determination of new job duties, and elimination of jobs). And
employees have been allowed to bargain in these areas even where
previously enacted statutes specifically foreclosed them from bargaining.

57

The reliance of this approach on private sector case law is questionable, however, and may not be well suited to the resolution of the
collective bargaining-civil service conflict. The analogy between the
public and private sector is tenuous at best. Since public employers
lack the same profit motive as private employers, they might forego
hard bargaining in favor of a mutually acceptable accommodation with
public unions. No guarantee exists that such an accommodation would
not completely eliminate civil service and reinstate, to some extent, the
spoils system. It is at least doubtful whether state legislators, in using
the words "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment,"
meant to invite the complete destruction of civil service.
A second line of cases relying on statutory construction examines the
language of city charters which outline the powers of city governing
commissions over the working conditions of their employees. In a case
in which the city charter granted the city commission "the legislative
and administrative powers of the city," and in which prior court deci52 Rayburn v. Board of Educ., 71 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2179 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
53 Local 594, Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, AFSCME Petition to Initiate Fact Finding,
WERC Dec. No. 9904 (1970), BNA Gov'r EMPL. REL. RaP. No. 368, Sept. 28, 1970, at B-i,
enforced, WERC Dec. No. 9904-B, BNA Gov't FPL. REL. RaP. No. 387, Feb. 8, 1971,
at B-9.
54 Local 594, Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, AFSCME Petition to Initiate Fact Finding,
WERC Dec. No. 9754 (1969); Local 594, Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, AFSCME Petition
to Initiate Fact Finding, WERC Dec. No. 8137-B (1967).
55 Nagy v. City of Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969); Clampitt v. Board
of Educ., 68 L.R.R.M. 2996 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968).
56 Local 594, Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, AFSCME Petition to Initiate Fact Finding,
WERC Dec. No. 9904 (1970), BNA Gov'r EMPL. REL. REP. No. 868, Sept. 28, 1970, at
B-I, enforced, WERC Dec. No. 9904-B, BNA Gov'T EMPL. REL. REp. No. 387, Feb. 8, 1971,
at B-9.
57 See cases cited notes 46 & 52 supra.
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sions had upheld the right of the city commission to dismiss employees
on good faith grounds, the court allowed the city to enter into a bargaining agreement requiring payment of the equivalent of union dues
as a condition of employment and dismissal of employees who failed to
meet this condition.-58 The civil service board was limited to a procedural adjudicatory function. It could only examine whether the employee had in fact failed to pay union assessments; it could not determine whether failure to pay was a valid ground for discharge. 59 Such
an interpretation allows the public employer to enter into collective
bargaining agreements which infringe upon the substantive rulemaking power of civil service, provided he submits to its procedural
adjudicatory power.
Thus, although the two statutory language approaches relate specifically to the problems of the collective bargaining-civil service conflict,
they, like the more general methods of reconciliation discussed previously, attempt to resolve the conflict on an all-or-nothing basis. The
inquiry centers on whether, on an abstract level, the collective bargaining statute is superior or inferior to the civil service authorization. To
avoid this problem, some courts and the WERC have adopted an entirely different approach. Rather than establishing an all-encompassing
hierarchy, this approach considers the public policy reasons behind
both civil service and public employment bargaining statutes and
attempts to evaluate individual contract terms in light of those policies.
Under this approach, a number of collective bargaining agreements
have been upheld even though contrary to civil service regulations.
Agency shop clauses, for example, have been validated on two grounds.
In some cases they were found compatible with the goals of civil service-retaining competent employees and insulating them from arbitrary political and personal interference, 06 and in another case the court
ruled that "the more logical rationale behind the agency shop outweighs the more emotional arguments of its opponents." 61 The logical
rationale to which the court referred stipulated that members of a
58 City of Grand Rapids v. Local 1061, AFSCME, 72 L.R.R.M. 2257 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1969). This general contract-making power was recognized in Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 74 L.R.R.M. 2080 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970), where an agreement called
for a Teacher Tenure Commission (the equivalent of civil service for teachers) hearing
for teachers accused of not paying agency fees required by the same contract.
59 The court compared the requirement of agency fees to mandatory contributions to
a pension fund: the employer could require employees to contribute to both. The court
illustrated the procedural role of civil service by noting that if an employer sought to
discharge an employee for constant tardiness, civil service could determine only whether
in fact the employee had been tardy; it could not decide whether 8:30 rather than 8 a.m.
is a reasonable starting time.
60 Clampitt v. Board of Educ., 68 L.R.R.M. 2997, 2999 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968).
61 Nagy v. City of Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362, 2363 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
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bargaining unit should pay for their representation by the union and
that failure to observe a union security provision could well "undermine the whole principle of fair collective bargaining,"' 2 since strong
unions were needed to stand up to employers and to make negotiations
productive. No empirical data were cited to support this rationale.
Similarly, public policy has been invoked as the basis for the extension of collective bargaining to both fringe benefits6 3 and department
reorganizations. 4 The court which allowed fringe benefit agreements
relied on a legislative purpose to give public employees "many of the
rights and kinds of contractual benefits gained by workers in private
employment by the collective bargaining process, except as the same
would be repugnant to existing laws or an abuse of the authority of the
public employer .. ."5 The department reorganization rested on the
possibility that union suggestions would contribute to government
efficiency:
If the petitioner is given an opportunity to bargain with
respect to the decision to reorganize the department of public
welfare, as well as its effect on the work of bargaining unit
employees, it can attempt to persuade the municipal employer
that the proposed reorganization might not be as efficient as
contemplated. It would be able to propose suggestions and
comments as to how the reorganization might better be implemented to achieve the goals desired by the municipal em66
ployer.
Public policy considerations have not, however, operated consistently
to expand the scope of collective bargaining. One court, for example,
refused to allow the employer and union to exclude the civil service
commission from bargaining sessions, relying on the need to prevent
the return of the spoils system. 67
It is difficult to deny the inherent advantages of a policy-oriented
Id. at 2364.
63 Rayburn v. Board of Educ., 71 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2178 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
64 Local 594, Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, AFSCME Petition to Initiate Fact Finding,
WERC Dec. No. 9904 (1970), BNA Gov'r EMPL. REL. REP. No. 368, Sept. 28, 1970, at
B-1, B-2, enforced, WERC Dec. No. 9904-B, BNA Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. No. 887, Feb. 8,
1971, at B-9.
65 71 L.R.R.M. at 2178. Instead of relying upon legislative hearings, reports, or debates, the court turned to an article concerning the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act, written by Robert G. Howlett, Chairman of the Michigan Labor Relations
Board.
60 Local 594, Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, AFSCME, Petition to Initiate Fact Finding,
WERC Dec. No. 9904 (1970), BNA Gov'T EiPL. REL. REP. No. 368, Sept. 28, 1970, at B-I,
B-2. It should be noted that this broad language could justify bargaining on almost any
civil service topic.
67 Nagy v. City of Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362, 2366-69 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
62
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analysis. Only an academic heretic would prefer either a mechanical
legal standard or a test based on bare statutory language to a reasoned
decision reflecting underlying policies. Yet it would be wrong to minimize the difficulties which arise from this approach. The court must
consider a number of issues which may touch upon the legislative
domain 68 and, as previously mentioned, 69 it will usually have to do so
without much assistance from legislative hearings, committee reports,
or floor debates. The attendant difficulties may readily be perceived.
To determine the scope of public collective bargaining, for example,
the court must evaluate the effect of public employee strikes. It may be
desirable to give public employees greater control over their working
conditions because theoretically they cannot strike to obtain higher pay
from cost-conscious officials.7 0 One may also seek alternate ways of
settling disputes-among them, arbitration of grievances-so that
strong public employee unions will not feel forced to strike illegally
to gain satisfactory resolution of such disputes.7 Conversely, the tendency of public employees to engage in strikes, legal or illegal, over
bargainable issues may militate against expansion of bargaining into
civil service matters. The legislature may not have wanted some matters,
such as examinations, hiring practices, and promotions, to be determined by strikes and other displays of force. It may be better to exclude
such matters from bargaining altogether.
A more basic policy decision which a court must make in determining
the scope of bargaining concerns the goals to be served by civil service.
If one views civil service merely in terms of its original function of
eliminating the spoils system, 72 then the role of collective bargaining
68 Employment relations boards, in their role as adjudicatory and policy-making
agencies, may be better suited than courts to consider such issues. It has been argued
that the difficulty and complexity of some types of policy determinations require that
the legislative body provide specialized administrative tribunals to develop policy on a
case-by-case basis. 1 K.C. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATvE LAw TREATISE § 2.05, at 98-99 (1958).
Perhaps these boards present the best possibility for resolving the collective bargainingcivil service conflict.
69 See text following note 47 supra.
70 See authorities cited note 17 supra.
71 Courts have used this rationale to justify a broad construction of grievance arbitration provisions. Greenfield Educational Ass'n v. Joint School Dist. 6, BNA Gov'T EMPL.
REL. RFY. No. 360, Aug. S, 1970, at B-2 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1970); City of Madison v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 65 L.R.R.M. 2488, 2491 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1967).
72 See authorities cited note 8 supra. See also MOSHER, supra note 9, at 65:
[A]lthough some protagonists mentioned efficiency as an argument for a merit
system, this was at best a secondary consideration---"and not a very close second
at that," to quote Paul P. Van Riper's analysis of the movement. [The civil service reform movement] was essentially a negative movement designed to stamp
out a system which was a "disgrace to republican institutions"-to eradicate evil.
There was not very much original thought about the best kind of substitute for
spoils beyond competitive entrance examinations and security of tenure.
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should be greatly expanded. The important function performed by the
civil service system under this view is the elimination of unwarranted
employer discretion and the enforcement of non-arbitrary standards,
rather than the determination of the actual content of the standards.
Collective bargaining could be given final authority to establish fixed
rules governing hiring, promotion, transfer, discharge, and employment
conditions without presaging a return to the spoils system.7 3 The necessary task of identifying clear and intelligible standards for controlling
executive discretion can be accomplished as effectively by the collective
bargaining process as by a civil service commission.7 4 Though a merit
evaluation program devised unilaterally by civil service may produce
more efficient employees than would a seniority system produced by
negotiation, 75 the latter method certainly prevents arbitrariness through
application of objective and uniform criteria. Similarly, whatever one
may think about the ability of private arbitrators,7 6 they do not seem
more biased toward either union or employer than are civil service
commissions. 7 Although union security agreements place an extra condition on public employment-that is, the payment of dues-they do
7
not subject employees to arbitrary discrimination.
The decision for a court becomes more difficult if purposes other
than the elimination of the spoils system are attributed to civil service.
Thus, if efficiency of governmental operations is seen as an important
goal, much of the previous argument collapses. The content of objective
73 "Apart from the employment of new applicants, the 'merit principle' probably should
be pursued through collective bargaining and not through a civil service system." Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE LJ.
805, 864 (1970).
74 Some commentators have observed and documented the arbitrariness of certain civil
service commissions. U.S. CO nf'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 65-68. See also
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MAssACHUsETTs, supra note 8, at 34:
The procedure followed by many public personnel agencies in determining
the relative weights to be assigned to experience and education, as well as other
parts of the test battery, is simply the guess of the examiner as to the importance
of each.
Unions could provide the "aggressive, militant approach" toward determining the
validity and importance of civil service testing processes and improving the techniques
of examinations which has been sorely lacking. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 221.
75 Nigro, The Implications for Public Administration, 28 PuB. AD. REv. 137, 144 (1968).

76

P.

HAYs, LABOR ARwrrRATxON:

A

DmssENTING

VIMV 49, 59, 61-70, 112 (1966).

77 See text at note 5, supra. Commentators have suggested the introduction of arbitration into public employment to encourage reasonableness in the earlier stages of grievance
resolution and to uplift employee morale. Killingsworth, Grievance Adjudication in
Public Employment, 13 ARm. J. 3, 15 (1958). Killingsworth suggests that civil service
commissions are inherently incapable of impartiality because of their dual functions of
representing the public interest in protecting public servants and of performing managerial tasks. Id. at 11-12.
78 See discussion of this point in City of Grand Rapids v. Local 1061, AFSCME, 72
L.R.R.M. 2257, 2262 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 38:826

standards governing hiring, promotions, transfers, and grievances cannot be left to the employer and union because the public employer,
unlike his counterpart in the private sector, lacks the profit incentive
to engage in hard bargaining to maximize efficiency.
Similarly, the use of civil service to achieve social goals, such as
transferring teachers into inner-city schools or advancing minority
group employment, may be antithetical to expansion of collective
bargaining. The sheer number of bargaining units negotiating independently of one another may make any uniform policy impractical to
administer. 79 Moreover, even disregarding these unit determination
problems, the mutual interests of employers and employees may prove
quite different from the social policies sought to be advanced.80 Expansion of collective bargaining, therefore, might increase the impediments
to achieving those goals.
These difficulties are not insurmountable, however, and civil service
is not the only means of solving them. For example, minority groups
8
may be aided by public sector equivalents of the Philadelphia Plan, 1
civil rights laws, and equal opportunity regulations. Conceivably, judicial review could be used to secure the fulfillment of vital government
objectives. A New Jersey court 82 recently invalidated a collective bargaining clause which impeded the promotion of black teachers in innercity schools. Yet it is questionable how far a court should go, as a
matter of policy, in requiring that social objectives presently achieved
through civil service be pursued via alternate means.
The above problems should not be taken as a mandate either for
judicial inaction 88 or for adoption of one of the mechanical tests previ79 N.Y. GOVERNOR'S COMMa. ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL RIEPORT 10-12 (1966).

80 Stanley has observed resistance on the part of public employee unions to the granting of preferred positions to less privileged workers for selection and training purposes.
Stanley, supra note 3, at 110.
81 For a description of the plan, see Contractors Ass'n v. Shultz, 62 CCH LAB. GAs.
1 9421 (E.D. Pa. 1970). The court upheld the plan against charges that it violated the
1964 Civil Rights Act.
82 Porcelli v. Titus, 108 N.J. Super. Ct. 301, 261 A.2d 864 (1969). The collective bargaining agreement between the school board and the teachers' union called for promotions on merit alone, but the court applied a "changed circumstances" contract theory to
declare the bargaining agreement void.
83 Courts may do much to increase bargainable topics without disturbing valid civil
service regulations. For example, courts can allow bargaining to define the meaning of
certain civil service regulations. In Zekas v. Baldwin, 310 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Wis. 1970), a
court granted a temporary restraining order against dismissal of a welfare worker because the regulations under which he was dismissed were overly broad. There should be
no opposition to bargaining for the purpose of clarification when the alternative is
unconstitutionality. Similarly, collective bargaining could provide for penalties for the
violation of civil service laws when the laws themselves are silent. In Miami v. Gioia, 69
L.R.R.M. 2735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), the court held that an employer had violated
civil service regulations by working firemen more than thirty days in a higher classification,
but determined that no extra pay would be given the firemen because no regulation so
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ously described. Although the legislature may have failed to provide
any clear indication of its intent in enacting the public employee bargaining statute, the judicial function requires that the court, when the
issues are properly presented, decide conflicts between the respective
spheres of civil service and collective bargaining. Of course, it is preferable that the court's decision rest upon sound considerations of policy
rather than upon the artificial characterization of a statute as "general"
or "specific." But the policy questions which must be resolved are
varied and complex, and the judicial forum may not be the most
appropriate one in which to resolve the decision. Both the nature of
the questions and the difficulty of answering them present a strong case
for legislative intervention.
II.

EXISTING AND ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTIONS
OF THE CONFLICT

A.

Existing Legislative Resolutions
In a number of states, legislatures have attempted to reconcile the
competing power claims of civil service and public employee collective
bargaining. Five different approaches have been adopted. First, six
states8 have resolved the collective bargaining-civil service conflict by
excluding all civil service matters from collective agreements. Through
statutory language subjecting collective bargaining settlements to civil
service regulations,85 excluding civil service matters from negotiation, 6
required. Bargaining should fill such gaps. Finally, courts should scrutinize the statutory
grants of power to civil service and allow bargaining to govern categories outside these
grants. Courts have limited the rule-making power of civil service commissions in the
past, and can do so in the future to open new areas for bargaining. Essling v. St. Louis
County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 283 Minn. 425, 168 N.W.2d 663 (1969) (civil service commission could not set mandatory retirement age when statute establishing commission did
not include such authority); State ex rel. Baranowski v. Koszewski, 251 Wis. 383, 29
N.W.2d 764 (1947) (civil service commission could not both bring charges against employee and then adjudicate them, for legislature had not given commission such power).
84 See note 19 supra.
85 R.I. Gm. LAws ANN. § 36-11-5 (Supp. 1970):
Whenever the procedures under a merit system statute or rule are exclusive
with respect to matters otherwise comprehended by this chapter, they shall
apply and be followed.
Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 904(b):
This chapter shall not be construed to be in derogation of, or contravene the
spirit and intent of the merit system principles and the personnel laws.
§ 905 provides:
The governor, or a person designated by him, ..
shall act as the employer
representative in collective bargaining negotiations and administration. The representative shall be responsible for insuring consistency in the terms and conditions in various agreements throughout the state service, insuring compatibility
with merit system statutes and principles, and shall not agree to any terms or
conditions for which there are not adequate funds available.
86 Hawaii Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act, § 9(d), No. 171, [1970] Hawaii
Acts 316:
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or forbidding any diminution of the power of civil service commissions, 8 7 this legislation effectively preserves the authority of civil service. These laws assume that civil service regulations are generally
preferable to negotiated agreements. As a result, such regulations are
granted legislative protection without regard to their desirability.
Moreover, employers in these states can eliminate bargainable issues
simply by having the civil service commission expand the scope of its
regulations.
In some situations, it might be to the union's advantage to bargain
to increase the power of civil service. 88 It is quite possible in these six
states for agreements between unions and public employers to designate
civil service and personnel boards as higher appeal agencies in localities
where unions fear arbitrariness in discharge actions and have sufficient
trust in civil service.
Second, in those states8 9 in which legislatures have not authorized
public employers to bargain with their employees, the conflict seems
Excluded from the subjects of negotiations are matters of classification and
reclassification, retirement benefits and the salary ranges and the number of inThe employer and the
cremental and longevity steps now provided by law ....
exclusive representative shall not agree to any proposal which would be inconsistent with merit principles or the principle of equal pay for equal work . . .
or which would interfere with the rights of a public employer to (I) direct
employees; (2) determine qualifications, standards for work, the nature and contents of examinations, hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in
positions, and suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disciplinary actions
against employees for proper cause; (3) relieve an employee from duties because
of lack of work or other legitimate reason; (4) maintain efficlency of government
operations; (5) determine methods, means, and personnel by which the employer's operations are to be conducted; and take such actions as may be necessary
to carry out the missions of the employer in cases of emergencies.
N.J. RFv. STAT. § 34.13A-5.3 (Supp. 1970):
Nothing herein shall be construed to deny to any individual employee his
rights under Civil Service Laws or regulations.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has apparently interpreted this provision and the entire bargaining law to exclude any changes in civil service regulations. Lullo v. Firefighters Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 440, 262 A.2d 681, 697 (1970).
PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1971):
The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or implement
a provision in a collective bargaining agreement if the implementation of that
provision would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any
statute or statutes enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania or the provisions of municipal home rule charters.
87 MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 178N (Supp. 1970):
Nothing in sections [178F-178M, which authorize municipal employees to bargain] shall diminish the authority and power of the civil service commission....
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 98-C:7 (Supp. 1970) guarantees the exclusive right of the
state to appoint, promote, discharge, transfer, or demote employees; to direct and supervise; to lay off unnecessary employees; and to maintain the efficiency of government
operations. Ch. 98-C:4(b), however, allows negotiation to establish procedures and steps
for conferring upon and considering recommendations for improvement in personnel
policies and changes in classifications and allocations.
88 Local 572, AFSCME v. City of Dover, 109 N.H. 299, 301, 249 A.2d 681, 683 (1969).
89 See note 18 supra.
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to have been resolved as if there had been an explicit legislative pronouncement forbidding collective bargaining from displacing civil
service regulations. The state courts have reached this result on the
grounds (1) that control over working conditions is a discretionary
power that cannot be delegated, or (2) that the proposed agreements are
incompatible with statutorily authorized civil service goals. The first
approach, which is premised on the belief that employment conditions
-qualifications, classification, tenure, working rules-should be determined solely by legislative fiat, 90 has both broad and narrow applications. Under the broad reading, parties may not bargain on any matter
relating to employment, even in those areas where a civil service commission has not passed any regulations. 91 The narrow reading allows
parties to bargain over employment matters,92 but only if the civil
service commission has not yet adopted regulations to cover such
matters.93 Of course, if the civil service commission later enacts regulations that conflict with previously bargained-for agreements, inconsistent clauses of the bargaining contract are invalidated. 94 The second
approach evaluates the effect of contract terms upon the civil service
90 Fort Smith v. Council 38, AFSCME, 245 Ark. 409, 433 S.W.2d 153 (1968); City of
Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d
305 (1949) (superseded in California by passage of a public employee bargaining act);
Fellows v. La Tronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Wichita Pub. Schools Employees Local 513 v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 397 P.2d 357 (1964); Hagerman v. City of Dayton,
147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947). See also Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public
Service, 1961 Wis. L. RiEv. 601, 618-19.
91 "Labor unions have no function which they may discharge in connection with civil
service appointees." Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 328-29, 71 N.E.2d
246, 254 (1947). In Foltz v. City of Dayton, 75 L.R.R.M. 2321 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970), the
court upheld the invalidation of a union security clause in a bargaining contract, relying
on Hagerman. The two concurring judges expressed their hope that the Ohio Supreme
Court would overrule Hagerman, believing that collective bargaining was the most
satisfactory way of handling a government's relations with its employees. Hagerman has
been cited numerous times in other states which have denied bargaining rights to
public employees.
92 Local 611, IBEW v. Town of Farmington, 75 N.M. 393, 405 P.2d 233 (1965); Local
266, IBEV v. Salt River Project, Agr. Impr. & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393
(1954).
93 This narrower theory is more plausible than the broader one which forbids any
delegation of power. It is easy to see under the narrow theory why parties should not be
allowed to circumvent by collective agreement civil service regulations already on the
books-allowing people to agree to ignore laws would hardly be consistent with orderly
government. But the broader theory forbidding parties to agree on matters not yet
covered by civil service regulations is questionable. The nondelegation rule has been
attacked on the grounds that it overstates the reasons for prohibiting delegations of
legislative authority (see State v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 300 (Wyo. 1968)), and
that collective bargaining poses no compulsion to sign an agreement and does not deprive
the employer of final decision (see State Board of Regents v. Packinghouse, Food &c
Allied Workers Local 1258, - Iowa -, 175 N.W.2d 110, 113 (1970)).
94 Local 611, IBEW v. Town of Farmington, 75 N.M. 393, 397, 405 P.2d 233, 236 (1965).
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system. Although this analysis would seem to allow courts to uphold
collective bargaining agreements having only minor adverse effects on
civil service, the courts have consistently used this approach to uphold
the power of the civil service commissions. For example, the courts have
voided union security agreements on the ground that dismissal of employees for failure to pay union dues is incompatible with civil service's retention of employees on merit. 95 Similarly, arbitration by an
outside party has been prohibited because an arbitrator would be unacquainted with the civil service laws he was supposed to enforce.98
Thus, in the absence of an express authorization of public employee
bargaining, the courts tend to subordinate the policy considerations to
a questionable legislative intent to have employment and tenure depend solely on merit as measured by civil service regulations.
97
A third type of legislative reconciliation, adopted in four states,
imposes a duty to bargain collectively or to "meet and confer" upon
public employers and unions, but exempts civil service matters from
this duty. These statutes generally retain certain public employer
prerogatives through a management rights section, but do not prohibit
agreements affecting civil service regulations. 98 A public employer is
95 Petrucci v. Hogan, 5 Misc. 2d 480, 27 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Ballard, BNA Govr EAPL. REL. REP. No. 344, Apr. 13, 1970, at B-1 (Ohio
C.P. 1970). An alternative holding in Ballard was that the agency shop clause was invalid
because it violated the equal protection clause-nonunion employees would be treated
differently under the bargaining contract than without it because they would have to
pay agency fees.
96 City of Cleveland v. Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees Div. 268 (Ohio C.P.
1945), reported in C. RHYNE, LADOR UNIONS AND MumscrMAL EMPLOYEE LAw (1946).
97 See note 21 supra.
98 CAL. Gov'r CODE § 3500 (Supp. 1971):
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to supersede the provisions of
existing state law and the charters, ordinances, and rules of local public agencies
which establish and regulate a merit or civil service system or which provide for
other methods of administering employer-employee relations. This chapter is
intended, instead, to strengthen merit, civil service and other methods of administering employer-employee relations through the establishment of uniform
and orderly methods of communication between employees and the public
agencies by which they are employed.

§ 8504 provides:
The scope of representation shall include all matters relating to employment
conditions and employer-employee relations ....
except, however, that the scope
of representation shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity, or
organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order.
The failure of the prohibitory section to exclude civil service matters from the scope of
representation can be interpreted as permitting negotiation over such matters, if the
employer and union so wish. § 3500 can then be read as merely removing civil service
matters from the scope of mandatory bargaining.
Nxv. REv. STAT. § 288.150(2) (Supp. 1970):
Each local government employer is entitled, without negotiation or reference
to any agreement resulting from negotiation:
a. To direct his employees;
b. To hire, promote, classify, transfer, assign, retain, suspend, demote, discharge
or take disciplinary action against any employee;
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apparently free to negotiate agreements contrary to civil service regulations. For example, in one case a union sought to enforce a strike settlement agreement by which a county employer consented to reinstate
employees who had violated civil service regulations prohibiting unjustified absences from work.99 In holding that the union had stated a
cause of action, the court said:
[T]he statute neither requires collective bargaining nor precisely defines the rights which flow to public employees and
the nature and scope of the contract that can be entered into
by the parties. The statute does, however, apparently envision
that agreements reached as the result of such conferences and
meetings are now compatible with civil service and merit systems.10 0
c. To relieve any employee from duty because of lack of work or for any
other legitimate reason;
d. To maintain the efficiency of its governmental operations;
e. To determine the methods, means and personnel by which its operations are
to be conducted; and
f. To take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out its responsibilities
in situations of emergency.
Wis. STAT. § 111.91(2) (Supp. 1970):
Nothing herein shall require the employer to bargain in relation to statutory
and home rule provided prerogatives of promotion, layoff, position classification,
compensation and fringe benefits, examinations, discipline, merit salary determination policy and other actions provided for by law and rules governing civil
service.
WAsH. Rv. CODE § 41.56.100 (Supp. 1971):
[N]othing contained herein shall require any public employer to bargain collectively with any bargaining representative concerning any matter which by
ordinance, resolution or charter of said public employer has been delegated to
any civil service commission or personnel board similar in scope, structure and
authority to the board created by chapter 41.06 RCW.
§ 41.56.130 of the Washington public employee bargaining statute incorporates § 41.06.150
of the personnel laws. The latter statute provides that the personnel board shall establish the basis and procedures for dismissal, suspension, demotion, appeals from disciplinary action, certification for filling vacancies, examinations, appointments, probationary
periods, transfers, sick leave, hours, and layoffs. It stipulates further:
Provided,That in making such determination the board shall consider the duties,
skills, and working conditions of the employees, the history of collective bargaining by the employees and their bargaining representatives, the extent of organization among the employees, and the desires of the employees; certification and
decertification of exclusive bargaining representatives; agreements between
agencies and certified exclusive bargaining representatives providing for grievance
procedures and collective negotiations on all personnel matters over which
the appointing authority of the appropriate bargaining unit of such agency may
lawfully exercise discretion ....
It is conceivable that employer voluntary agreements to change civil service regulations
may still run afoul of the problems discussed in the text at notes 38-41 supra.
99 East Bay Municipal Employees Local 390 v. County of Alameda, 3 Cal App. Sd
578, 83 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1970). Civil service regulations required that employees absent
without excuse be terminated immediately with full loss of seniority benefits. In addition, terminated employees could be reinstated without prejudice only if they presented
a reasonable excuse within three days after their absence.
100 Id. at 584, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (emphasis in original). Other courts have refused
to enforce strike settlement agreements granting nondiscriminatory reinstatement or
increased remuneration to returning strikers. See, e.g., Almond v. County of Sacramento,
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The court concluded that when a public employer engages in bargaining with public employees, any agreement that the public agency is
authorized to make and does make should be valid and binding on
all parties-union, employer, and civil service commission.
This case illustrates a major disadvantage of such "permissive" legislation. The union used an illegal strike to convince the employer to
participate "voluntarily" in meaningful negotiations. Other unions
may resort to similar displays of power if they perceive that the employer can be forced to negotiate civil service provisions, deemed
important to their members. As a result, the negotiability of civil
service regulations is determined by shows of force rather than by
rational decisions as to the desirability of isolating these rules from
negotiation.
A fourth legislative approach, adopted by Connecticut and Maine,10 1
allows collective bargaining agreements to supersede civil service regulations, but forbids negotiation relating to rules for the conduct and
grading of examinations, candidate rating, and promotions from rating
lists. These statutes recognize that civil service rules should not present
a monolithic barrier to all bargaining and reflect a legislative judgment
as to which aspects of civil service should be immune from bargain1 02
ing.
276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969); Head v. Special School Dist. No. 1, - Minn.
-, 182 N.W.2d 887 (1970); Goldberg v. City of Cincinnati, 23 Ohio App. 2d 97 (1970).
101 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(f) (Supp. 1970):
Where there is a conflict between any agreement reached by a municipal
employer and an employee organization and approved in accordance with the
provisions [of this act] and any charter, special act, ordinance, rules or regulations
adopted by the municipal employer or its agents such as a personnel board or
civil service system, ...
the terms of such agreement shall prevail.
§ 7-474(g) provides:
Nothing herein shall diminish the authority and power of any municipal civil
service commission, personnel board, personnel agency or its agents established
by statute, charter or special act to conduct and grade merit examinations and to
rate candidates in the order of their relative excellence from which appointments
or promotions may be made to positions in the competitive division of the classified service of the municipal employer served by such civil service commission
or personnel board. The conduct and grading of merit examinations, the rating
of candidates and the establishment of lists from such examinations and the appointments from such lists and any provision of any municipal charter concerning
political activity of municipal employees shall not be subject to collective bargaining.
The Maine statute is almost identical. ME. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, § 969 (Supp. 1970).
102 The report which provided the impetus for the Connecticut law noted:
We have also included in this section a provision to protect the authority of
civil service or other similar commissions in the matter of merit system examinations from which appointment and promotion lists are drawn. These procedures
are not to be subject to collective bargaining. However, in order to clarify
any question that may arise if a provision of an agreement is in conflict with
other rules or regulations in the municipality we are providing that the terms
of the agreement shall prevail. We are not nullifying or repealing such rules
and regulations, but, as a practical matter, it is not possible to have two separate
rules in effect at the same time covering the same subject matter.
CoNN. INTRIm COiM'N TO STuny COLLECtiVE BARGAINING BY MUNICIPALnTE,

(1965).

REPORT 17
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Finally, in Delaware the legislature has adopted a blanket rule
favoring collective bargaining. A 1967 law repealed the section of
Delaware's collective bargaining statute stipulating that merit procedures and statutes were not to be affected by bargaining, and guaranteed public employees a role in the formulation of certain aspects of
10 3
personnel policy.
B.

Alternative Resolutions
The federal resolution of the conflict between public collective
bargaining and civil service is found in Executive Order 11491, issued
on January 1, 1970 by President Nixon. 0 4 This order specifies that federal officials and employees are governed by the regulations of the
FederalPersonnel Manual,0 5 and that the government retains certain
exclusive management rights, including the rights to hire, promote,
demote, and discharge. 00 The Civil Service Commission has indicated
that certain fundamental principles, such as competitive selection of
appointees, grading of positions according to legislative standards, promotion, and job protection, would not be subject to bargaining. 10 7 The
federal approach, then, restricts bargaining ability significantly.
Another possible resolution is the mandating of minimum civil
service standards by a higher authority, as was proposed in the Intergovernmental Personnel Bill introduced in 1967.108 The bill would
have required localities seeking government funds to meet certain
minimum merit standards promulgated by a presidentially appointed
commission. The standards would have covered recruitment, selection,
and advancement on the basis of relative ability, knowledge, and skills;
provided equitable and adequate compensation; trained employees to
assure high-quality performance; and assured fair treatment of applicants and employees in all aspects of employment. 0 9 The application
103 The law recognizes that "the statute establishing the merit system of personnel
administration for the employees of the state did not expressly define its relationship
to the statute recognizing the right of public employees to organize" and provides that
collective bargaining could establish rules for classification, uniform pay scales, competi-

tive examinations, promotions, eligibility lists, rejections for unfitness, appointment of
superior applicants, leaves, veterans preference, and residency preference. Ch. 876, § 5938,
[1967] Del. Laws 1297.
104 The predecessor of this order was Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962), issued by President Kennedy. The provisions of the Nixon order relating to civil service
are quite similar to those of the Kennedy order.
105 Exec. Order No. 11491, § 12(a), 3 C.F.R. 191, 199 (1969 Comp.).
106 Id. at § 12(b), 3 C.F.R. 191, 199-200 (1969 Comp.).
107 U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL ch. 711.
10 S. 699, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), introduced by Senator Muskie. The Johnson

Administration introduced its own version, The Intergovernmental
S. 1485, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
109

Hearings,supra note 12, at 21.

Manpower Bill,
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of these principles above the minimum standards set by the commission
would be a proper subject for negotiation between unions and employers." 0 The bill was not enacted into law, however, partially due to
opposition from local officials who have insisted that federal control is
unnecessary."' A state mandating of standards may be more accept2
able."
A final alternative is illustrated by the proposed National Public
Employee Relations Act, written by the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees." 3 This Act would allow parties to
agree on contract provisions superseding all merit regulations, but
would require submission of the entire contract to the appropriate
legislative body for ratification." 4
III.

CONCLUSION

It is beyond the scope of this comment to evaluate each of the
alternatives discussed above. However, one point continues to emerge
from the commentary and cases in this area. The central problem has
been the failure of legislatures to define the respective parameters of
the civil service commission and the collective bargaining process. This
abdication of responsibility has placed the courts in the position of
having to decide issues which involve subtle policy judgments concerning the purpose and function of the civil service system. It is understandable, therefore, that courts have usually attempted to avoid the
problem by applying the traditional, if formalistic, rules of judicial
construction. Even those courts which have tried to grapple with the
underlying policies have often succeeded only in
adding to the confusion. If the situation is to be remedied, legislative direction is indispensable. The Maine and Connecticut approach 1 5 is illustrative of
the manner in which a statutory response can facilitate the purposeful
11o Hearings, supra note 12, at 193 (remark of Senator Muskie).

III For a summary of the Senate hearings on the bill, see BNA Gov'r EhipL. REL. REP.
No. 191, May 8, 1967, at B-2.
112 Opposition even to state control would arise from home rule advocates. ADvisoRY
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 6, at 83-84.

113 H.R. 17383, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
'14 § 13 of the proposed Act states:
This Act shall supersede all previous statutes concerning this subject matter and

shall preempt all contrary local ordinances, executive orders, legislation, rules or
regulations adopted by any State or any of its political subdivisions or agents such

as a personnel board or civil service commission.
§ 5(c) defines the duty to bargain as the duty
. . . to negotiate about matters which are or may be the subject of regulation
promulgated by any employer's agency or other organ of a state or subdivision
thereof or of a statute, ordinance, or other public law enacted by any state or
subdivision thereof, and to submit any agreement reached on these matters

to the appropriate legislature.
115 See text and notes at notes 101-02 supra.
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interaction between a civil service system and public employee unionism. Moreover, legislative action can carefully adjust the scope of
allowable collective bargaining in accordance with the issue involved,
and thereby avoid the mechanical tendency to treat all terms and conditions of employment alike. 16 The important point, though, is that
the legislatures should act to resolve the present conflict between civil
service and collective bargaining; for in the absence of such legislative
direction, employers, employees, civil service commissions, and the
judiciary are set adrift on a sea of doubt, usually leaving the courts as
the scene of the ensuing shipwreck.
116 It is anticipated that the Wisconsin legislature will amend its bargaining statutes

for public employees this year to make illegal bargaining over recruitment, position
classification, allocation of classifications to salary levels, examinations, and probationary
periods. Other matters currently under civil service regulation would be subject to
mandatory bargaining. Wis. GovRuNoR's AnvIsoRY CO tm. ON STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS, TENTATIVE REPORT 8 (1970). A public employee bargaining statute recently
defeated in Illinois adopted essentially the same approach. Clark, Public Employee Labor
Legislation: A Study of the Unsuccessful Attempt to Enact a Public Employee Bargaining
Statute in Illinois, 20 LAn. L.J. 164, 168 (1969).

Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records:
Judicial Response

On August 10, 1965, Dale Menard was taken into custody by the Los
Angeles Police Department on a charge of burglary.1 He was held two
days without a hearing and then released, the police being satisfied that
"there [was] no ground for making a criminal complaint against the
person arrested. ' 2 Under a California statute the arrest was classified
as "detention only." However, the record of his arrest, including fingerprints, had been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which incorporated it into criminal identification files.3 Menard filed
a complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia alleging
that he was arrested without probable cause and seeking to compel the
Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the FBI to
remove his fingerprints and accompanying notation from the Bureau's
files. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed in an
opinion by Judge Bazelon stating that the FBI's authority to retain
and disseminate Menard's record was not without limit. The court
nevertheless remanded the case for trial, declaring that the issues presented required a more complete factual development before a final
decision could be reached. 4
Full resolution of the legal issues presented by Menard v. Mitchell
could have a substantial impact on the present system of criminal justice in the United States. The practice of taking fingerprints, photographs, and other identification data of every person arrested by local,
state, and federal law enforcement officers and disseminating that
data at their discretion prior to final disposition of the case is well
I Menard

v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 488 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2 Id. at 488.
3 Id. at 487.
4 Id. at 494. On remand, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
FBI's authority to disseminate arrest records outside the federal government was limited
to distribution to law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes. The action
for expungement could not, however, be maintained until administrative remedies were
exhausted, and then Menard's first resort would be in the state courts. 39 U.S.L.W. 2725
(D.D.C. June 15, 1971).

Arrest Records

established.5 In fact, the collection 6 and immediate transmission 7 of
data to state and federal law enforcement agencies are often required
by statute. Even in the absence of statutory mandate, these procedures
are usually held to be well within the authority of police.8 After a dis5 The number of people affected by this practice is staggering. Although the total
number of individuals arrested in the United States is unknown, the FBI reported, on
the basis of returns representing 71% of the population, that in 1969 a total of 5,773,988
arrests were made. FEDERAL BuRAu OF INVEsTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNrrED STATEs: UNIFORM CRIlME REPORTs-1969, at 107-08 (1969). One study has estimated
that "about 40 percent of the male children living in the United States today will be
arrested for a nontraffic offense sometime in their lives." PRESIDENT'S COMMr'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT & ADMINIsTRATION OF JUsTICE, REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
Faxx Socirry 247 (1967). The statistics do not reveal how many people arrested are not
convicted; however, the FBI reports may show a rough trend. Data covering a population exceeding 66 million showed that in 1969, of 2,402,979 persons charged, 15.9% or
382,074 were acquitted or had charges dismissed and 18.5% or 444,551 were referred
to juvenile courts. FEDRAL BuRaAu OF INvEsTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, supra, at 102.
Many more individuals would be included in the arrested but not convicted category
if figures existed for those, like Menard, who were arrested but not formally charged.
6 Local law enforcement officials are often under a statutory duty to take fingerprints,
photographs, and other identification information of all persons arrested for felonies,
persons reasonably suspected to be fugitives, "well known and habitual criminals," and
persons arrested for certain specified misdemeanors. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 30.81
(1969); ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 206-2 (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-857 (1970).
Some courts have extended the scope of statutory authorization to collection of identification data on all arrested persons, holding that statutory authority to maintain
records, at police discretion, of persons arrested for certain offenses implies the authority
to maintain records of all arrests, unless the statute specifically prohibits record keeping
in certain instances. See, e.g., United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D.
Ohio 1968); Poyer v. Boustead, 3 Ill. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d 838 (1954).
7 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8511 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 30.31(2) (1969);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206-3 (1970); INn. ANN. STAT. § 47-859 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 165.84 (1970).
8 United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio 1968); United States
v. Krapf, 180 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1961); United States
v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932); Shannon v. State, 207 Ark. 658, 182 S.W.2d 384 (1944);
Owensby v. Morris, 79 S.V.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). See also Annot., 83 A.L.R. 127
(1933). The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit these
practices. United States v. Laub Baking Co., supra; Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923
(9th Cir. 1966). If the arrest is lawful, the fourth amendment will not bar fingerprints
and photographs taken after arrest as evidence for trial. United States v. Laub Baking
Co., supra. The courts further hold that the invasion of privacy involved in taking the
fingerprints, photographs, and the making of the record is justified. See, e.g., Kolb v.
O'Connor, 14 Ill. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957).
Furthermore, dissemination of data before disposition of the case is usually upheld.
See Poyer v. Boustead, 3 Ill. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d 838 (1954); Voelker v. Tyndall, 226
Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548 (1947); McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 NJ. Eq. 341, 54 A.2d 469
(Ch. 1947); Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). Many states also
authorize local police to establish, with the cooperation of the state identification bureau,
their own identification files in which data may be maintained. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 8514(l) (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-858 (1970).
Some courts declare that the taking and dissemination of arrest data before disposition
is justified because no stigma attaches to fingerprinting and photographing since the pro-
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position of the case is reached 9 the arrest data, often with notation of
subsequent processing of the individual through the criminal justice
system, are retained in local, state, and federal criminal identification
files or computer data banks. 10 If the arrest did not lead to a conviction,
the information retained constitutes what is called the "arrest record.""
Although these records are often declared confidential, they are widely
cedures are primarily for identification purposes. See, e.g., Sterling v. Oakland, 208 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962); Poyer v. Boustead, 3 11. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d
838 (1954). Moreover, data may be required in some cases even without arrest or criminal
charge. See Thorn v. New York Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (fingerprinting required for employees of stock exchange firms); Norman v. City of Las Vegas,
64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947) (fingerprinting required for liquor store employees).
These procedures are also held to be necessary as a practical matter to facilitate the
performance of law enforcement functions such as investigation and prosecution. See,
e.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Laub Baking Co.,
283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53 (1909); Barletta v.
McFeeley, 107 N.J. Eq. 141, 152 A. 17 (Ch. 1930), afJ'd, 109 N.J. Eq. 241, 156 A. 658 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1931), aff'd, 113 N.J. Eq. 67, 166 A. 144 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
For a survey of the law relating to the authority to take and retain fingerprints, see
A.

MOENssENs, FINGERPRINTS AND THE LAw 39-72, 85-107 (1969).
9 The term "disposition" will be used to signify some terminal point in the prosecu-

tion of a case, such as acquittal, dismissal, charges dropped, no charges brought, or investigation discontinued.
10 For examples indicating the rapid move toward the computerization of arrest files,
STATE IDENTIFICATION & INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, SYsTEM DEvELOPMENT PLAN
CALIFORNIA CRIME TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION, PROjECr SEARCH: STANDARDIZED DATA ELEMENTS FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY FILES (1970). Some of the computerization

see NEw YORK

(1967);

projects are making their first attempts to deal with the problems presented by these
records. See, e.g., id.
11 "Arrest record" is a term describing nonconviction arrest data retained after dispo-

sition. It is important to make several distinctions between the arrest record and other
information that is also stored. While facts surrounding a current arrest are technically
part of the record, they should for three reasons be subject to separate consideration by
the courts. First, until a final disposition is reached obviously it is impossible to tell
whether the arrest record is actually an arrest record. Second and more important, the
public has a right to know the basic facts surrounding the arrest in order to prevent
secret arrests and to ensure public supervision of the police. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Third, any dissemination or publication
of present arrest facts, as long as they are true, is probably constitutionally privileged.
See, e.g., Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
Another part of criminal identification files is current investigative data, which are and
should be restricted in order to protect current police investigations and informants.
See note 63 infra. After an investigation has terminated without arrest, however, such
data retained in files should be subject to the same considerations as are discussed below
concerning arrest records.

Finally, where there is a conviction, the record becomes
use of such records does not involve harm to an innocent
they are beyond the scope of the present analysis. For
problems raised by conviction records, see Gough, The

a true criminal record. Because
or potentially innocent person,
an excellent discussion of the
Expungement of Adjudication

Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147.
See also National Council on Crime & Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction of Crime:
A Model Act, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 97 (1962).
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disseminated and used without restriction both within and without
the criminal justice system.12 To anyone desiring to determine the extent of a person's past involvement with law enforcement authorities,
the arrest record is extremely important: it is the only way to obtain
this information efficiently and inexpensively through identification of
the person by name alone.' 3
Widespread use of the arrest record, however, can inflict definite
and demonstrable harms on the arrested individual. Inside the criminal
justice system, he may be subjected to unfair treatment by police, prosecutors, and courts; 14 outside the system, he may suffer damage to his
reputation and to his economic and psychological well-being. 15 It is
questionable whether any such consequences should be permitted to
occur to a person who has not been judged guilty but who is presumed
innocent. Until recently, most courts have neglected the problem; in
the absence of legislative action they have left decisions concerning the
retention, dissemination, and use of these records entirely to police
discretion.' 6 But there is a current effort to reexamine the problem
with a view toward eliminating some of the adverse consequences of
arrest records. On one level, some state legislatures have enacted statutes providing for return or expungement of a record when certain
criteria are met.' 7 Unfortunately, these statutes exist only in a few
states. Furthermore, they are limited in effect, they have varying criteria for expungement, they usually do not apply to local identification
bureaus, they seldom contain provisions for return of records disseminated beyond these bureaus, they rarely contain enforcement provisions, and they do not apply to the FBI, the largest collector of arrest
records. In the absence of expungement statutes a few courts, as in
Menard, have recognized the need to restrict the scope of the police
12 See, e.g., A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 34-35 (1971); CoMrrMTE TO INVEmSGATE THE
EFFECTS OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE DisTcr OF COLUMBIA, RE-

PORT 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DUNCAN REPORT]; Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls
Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CoNTEmP. PGOB.
342, 365-66 (1966).
13 But see text at note 126 infra.
14 See text and notes at notes 24-31 infra.
15 See text and notes at notes 76-81 infra.
16 See text and notes 20 & 70 infra.
17 Expungement statutes as of 1966 are listed and analyzed in detail in Gough, supra
note 11, at 162-68, 174-78. Since 1966 several states have added their own acts. See, e.g.,
ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 206-5 (1970). See generally Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal
or Juvenile Record, 40 CALIF. ST. BJ. 816 (1965); Booth, The Expungement Myth, 38 LA.
BAR BULL. 161 (1963); Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction: Expungement from the General Public Access, 3 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 121 (1967); Comment, Guilt
by Record, 1 CAL. WsT L. REv. 126 (1965). The term "expungement," it should be noted,
is really a misnomer; most of the statutes cited provide for return or sealing of records
rather than their destruction.
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discretion in light of the debilitating effects on the individual resulting
from the widespread use of his arrest record. This comment will analyze the judicial response to the problems raised by (1) retention and
use of adult'18 nonconviction arrest records within the criminal justice

system, and (2) dissemination of these records at police discretion outside the system. In addition, it will offer suggestions, focusing primarily
on the common law, 19 for the further development of judicial responsibility in this area.
I.

RETENTION AND USE OF ARREST RECORDS WITHIN THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A.

Retention: the "Usefulness" Doctrine

Most courts have been extremely hesitant to interfere with police
discretion. In the absence of legislative action, they declare that all arrest records can be retained and exchanged freely within the criminal
justice system. 20 However, specific reasons for this position are rarely
articulated. 2 ' The proposition generally adopted is that retention of
arrest records is justified by their potential future usefulness in help22
ing police prevent crimes and apprehend criminals.
18 The problems raised by juvenile records are equally significant. See, e.g., In re Smith,
810 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Family Ct. 1970). See generally PaREswrc's COMm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
& ADMINISMATION OF JUSTICE supra note 5, at 44, 74 (1967). However, because of the
special status of juvenile records, they should be the subject of separate consideration
and are not included specifically in this analysis. See Gough, supra note 11, at 168-78. See
also S. RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, 145-63 (1961).
19 Many of the issues presented may have a constitutional dimension. Thus far, however, there has been no specific judicial discussion of any of the possible constitutional
issues. But see notes 46, 50, 110, & 129 infra.
20 Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966); Sterling v.
Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962); Walker v. Lamb, 254 A.2d 265,
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 259 A.2d 663 (Super. Ct. Del. 1969); Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969); People v. Lewerenz, 42 Ill. App. 2d 410, 192 N.E.2d 401 (1963);
Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Ill. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957); Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43,
75 N.E.2d 548 (1947); State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 834, rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 858 (1948); Coppock v. Reed, 189
Iowa, 581, 178 N.W. 382 (1920); Miller v. Gillespie, 196 Mich. 423, 163 N.W. 22 (1917);
Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9, 89 A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944); Statman v. Kelly, 47 Misc. 2d
294, 262 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Weisberg v. Police Dep't, 46 Misc. 2d 846, 260 N.Y.S.
2d 554 (Sup. Ct. 1965). See also Village of Homewood v. Dauber, 85 111. App. 2d 127,
229 N.E.2d 804 (1967); In re Molineux, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (1904); People ex rel.
Joyce v. New York, 27 Misc. 658, 59 N.Y.S. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Hansson v. Harris, 252
S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
Cf. Note, 27 Temple L.Q. 441 (1954).
21 One court did explain that retention was necessary in order to furnish superior
police officials with definite and authoritative data concerning the activities of the department. Miller v. Gillespie, 196 Mich. 423, 163 N.W. 22 (1917). However, after disposition of the case, purely statistical data should be sufficient for this purpose.
22 See, e.g., Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969); Fernicola v.
Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944).
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Practical considerations support this broad rationale in most cases. 23
Neutral identification information contained in the records, such as
fingerprints and photographs, can be quite helpful to local police if
the individual is ever under investigation again. Positive identification
is often essential to link a suspect to a crime or to protect a person who
is innocent. Also, imputational information such as the arrest notation
can indicate a pattern of conduct that may be the basis for a future arrest or for a decision to press charges. If a rearrest is made, the arrest
record may furnish facts concerning prior conduct which, although not
sufficient to warrant conviction in the previous case, may still be useful
to trained interpreters of records.
Presently, law enforcement officers utilize the record in subjecting
the individual to rearrest on the basis of past arrests 24 and in deciding
whether to bring formal charges. 25 Prosecutors consider past arrests in
determining the category of offense to be charged and in deciding
whether to plea bargain. 26 Courts use the record in denying release prior
to trial or appeal,2 7 in setting bail 8 in determining whether a defendant's testimony is impeached by prior convictions, 29 and in sentencing.30 Parole boards evaluate the record in deciding whether to grant
parole.3 '
While each of these law enforcement uses may be questioned, police,
prosecutors, and courts in every jurisdiction have an equal need for
this data. Free interchange of arrest records facilitates these functions. Although injury to innocent persons may result from retention
and use of the records, this risk is outweighed in most cases by society's interest in the performance of these activities to protect the
general public.
B. Retention or Return: A Reexamination
1. Retention of an Arrest Record Without Probable Cause. The
Menard court did not decide whether further retention and use of the
23 It should be noted that usefulness of arrest records remains unproven since the
closed system maintained by police impairs the ability to document usefulness. Therefore, only potential uses are considered here.
24 W. LA FARE, ARREsr 287-88 (1965).
215 Id. at 141.
26 See D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL 116 (1966) (lack of a "criminal record" often a reason for charge reduction).

27 See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Rhodes v.
United States, 275 F.2d 78, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1960).
28 Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
29 See, e.g., Suggs v. United States, 407 F.2d 1272, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
30 See, e.g., Powell v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 1, 229 P.2d 230 (1951); Murphy v. State, 184
Md. 70, 40 A.2d 239 (1944).
31 See DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 16.
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arrest record within the criminal justice system would be justified if
32
Menard actually were -arrested without probable cause. An examination of the nature of a record of arrest without probable cause in light
of the common law rationale for retention of arrest records may suggest an answer.
The core of the arrest record is the notation of arrest. This notation
either memorializes the arresting officer's perception connecting the
arrested person with a particular crime or signifies a connection based
upon a warrant. For the arrest to be legal, the connection with the
crime must be reasonable or the warrant must be based on probable
cause.3 3 The arrest notation thus becomes the basis for a continuing
inference by law enforcement officials that there were reasonable
grounds at the time of the arrest for associating the arrested person
with the crime. When an arrest is made without probable cause, however, the arresting officer's perception is by definition unreasonable
and the continuing inference based on his perception is invalid; the
arrest notation thus will not be useful. Furthermore, retention may
unjustifiably injure the individual by subjecting him to law enforcement decisions based on the misleading record.3 4 To require the notation to be completed or changed to "detention only" would not
eliminate these possibilities since even a police user might overlook
such a qualification or regard it as a mere formality.
. Of course, such neutral identification data as fingerprints and photographs are still accurate and will be at least as useful as the same data
of a person who has never been arrested. However, when they are
stored and used in conjunction with the misleading arrest notation,
these data lose their neutrality and the same unjustified consequences
flow from their use. To prevent these results, the courts could either require that the arrest notation be removed and that the neutral identification information be kept in completely separate files, or order
'returnof all records relating to the unjustified arrest. If the first alternative were administratively infeasible, return of the entire arrest
record would be warranted.85
2. Retention in Other Cases. The above analysis applies not only
to an arrest made without probable cause, but also to several other
32 As Judge Bazelon pointed out, in Menard probable cause was not demonstrated.
430 F.2d at 492 n.28. There, the'plaintiff had challenged the FBI's statutory authority
to retain his record as a "criminal record." Id. at 489. Although the court dismissed this
claim, the FBI's statutory authority should be interpreted on the basis of the common
law purpose for retaining arrest records, as is discussed below.
s LaFave; supra note 24, at 17-82.
34 Contra, Sterling v. Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
35 See Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C. 1969). But cf. Herschel v.
Dyra, 865 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966).
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situations. If an arrest is made with probable cause and it is later discovered that the arrest was based on mistaken identity or that no crime
had occurred,36 the validity of the inference based on the arrest notation is destroyed. For the same reason applicable to an arrest without
37
probable cause, retention is unjustified and return is warranted.
On the other hand, this analysis does not apply directly to harassment
arrest cases. In such cases the arrest is usually made with probable cause
and nothing happens later to vitiate the continuing inference; the arrest record satisfies the usefulness criterion. Nevertheless, the motivation for a harassment arrest is unlawful and unrelated to the grounds
for the arrest. The equitable notion of placing the individual who has
been subject to abuse of police authority in status quo ante outweighs
any usefulness that might result from retaining the records, and return is warranted. 38 Indeed, in light of the willingness of the criminal
justice system to let a potential criminal go unprosecuted as a means
of deterring this type of police abuse, retention of arrest records in
harassment cases would be anomalous.
Finally, it might be thought that a disposition of acquittal, dismissal,
charges dropped, or no charges brought would itself be sufficient to
justify return. If the law were consistent with the presumption of innocence, no disabilities would be permitted to occur without conviction and all records of arrests not resulting in conviction would be
destroyed. With few exceptions,3 9 however, the only effect the courts
have given the presumption of innocence is as a burden of proof. 40
Moreover, these dispositions do not necessarily controvert the usefulness of the record. Acquittal means only that the defendant was not
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Other dispositions can result from the death of an only witness, prosecutorial discretion, or the
illegal seizure of evidence. Because of these considerations, the simple
fact that a person has not been found guilty should not be sufficient to
compel return of the record. If, however, an individual can show that
the potential harm to him outweighs the usefulness of the record to
4
the criminal justice system, he should be able to require return. '
Otherwise, this decision should be left to police discretion.
386This also may have been the case in Menard. 430 F.2d at 488.
37 United States v. Jones, Crim. No. 36388-69 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., April, 1970) (return

required of all records after dismissal because of mistaken identity).
38 Several courts have required return in harassment arrest cases for this very reason.
United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp.
935 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
39 See, e.g., Gow v. Bingham, 57 Misc. 66, 107 N.Y.S. 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
40 See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 269 Minn. 843, 130 N.W.2d 623 (1964).
41 If data were available, it might be possible to use the "future usefulness" analysis
to decide whether arrest records for certain types of crimes, such as disorderly conduct,
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Even when the record should be retained, Menard raises the subsidiary question of whether law enforcement officials are under a duty to
complete the record.42 Because of the possibility of misinterpretation
resulting in unjustifiable injury, retention of the record should be permitted only if the arrest notation and any subsequent notations of the
processing of the individual through the criminal justice system-especially the final disposition-were both complete and accurate. 43
C. Legal Foundationfor Requiring Return
Several legal theories may compel the return of arrest records that
are not useful to police. In Menard, Judge Bazelon suggested that if
an arrest is without probable cause, it is doubtful whether the Constitution can tolerate "any adverse use of that information." 44 Indeed,
one might argue that because the arrest was in violation of the fourth
amendment, all "fruits" of that arrest should be eliminated.45 While
this argument is compelling, the courts have hesitated to extend the
application of the fourth amendment beyond the exclusion from trial
4
of illegally seized evidence.

Although most courts have not yet accepted the principle that retendon and use of arrest records constitutes a common law invasion
of privacy, 47 this right, when examined in the context of the previous
should be returned after disposition. Statistics might prove that notation of certain
crimes serves little or no usefulness in crime prevention. The probability of adverse consequences could be weighed against future usefulness of neutral identification data in
deciding whether retention after disposition is justified. Without empirical data, however,
discretion to maintain records must remain with the police.
42 Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
43 For an excellent discussion of the problem of accuracy of records in general, see
Karst, supra note 12, at 353-59.
44 Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Case Comment, 46
NoTRE DAmE LAW. 825 (1971).
45 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Smith v. United
States, 344 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
46 In Menard, Judge Bazelon cited Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), for the
proposition that the Constitution might not tolerate "any adverse use" of the arrest
record. 430 F.2d at 491. The Supreme Court in Davis intimated that although fingerprints taken pursuant to an arrest without probable cause are inadmissible in a state
court trial, detention for fingerprinting may under certain circumstances comply with
the fourth amendment even without probable cause in the traditional sense. 394 U.S. at
727. Applying fourth amendment considerations to use of the entire record would present a different case because use of the misleading arrest notation would be involved.
However, Davis appears to suggest that there may be limits to the Supreme Court's
willingness to extend the fourth amendment.
47 See cases cited note 20 supra.See also Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 203, 276 (1970). In rejecting
invasion of privacy contentions in these cases, the courts have concluded that any invasion of privacy involved in retaining and using records is outweighed by the interest of
society in having the police perform these functions. See, e.g., Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 In.
App. 2d 81, 91, 142 N.E.2d 818, 824 (1957), in which the court held that Chicago police
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analysis, affords a basis for requiring return in all cases discussed above.
An unreasonable intrusion into an individual's private affairs is commonly considered to be an invasion of his right of privacy. 48 When an
arrest without probable cause occurs, the initial intrusion is unreasonable. Retention and use of the arrest record would seem to be a part
of that initial unreasonable intrusion and therefore unjustified. In
cases of mistaken identity, on the other hand, the initial intrusion is
reasonable. Discovery of the fact of mistaken identity, however, indicates that retention can serve no valid purpose and would constitute a
new intrusion into private affairs.
Several problems still remain regarding a return requirement based
on the right of privacy. While the right is widely held to exist at common law, it is not recognized in several states.49 In some instances it
has been found to be either an implied constitutional right or a natural law right incorporated into the Constitution. The actual application of the constitutional right of privacy, however, has been limited
to special situations, such as intrusion into an individual's intimate
marital life. 50 Finally, the types of actions that constitute an invasion
of privacy are the subject of great debate. 51 In many cases privacy aphad the right to retain the plaintiffs' records after acquittal or dropping of charges,
declaring that "[t]he rights of the individual must be subordinate to the safety of the
public." See also Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 S.2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Village of
Homewood v. Dauber, 85 Ill. App. 2d 127, 229 N.E.2d 304 (1967); People v. Lewerenz,
42 Ill. App. 2d 410, 192 NE.2d 401 (1963); Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548
(1947). But see United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967) (return of record
required on privacy grounds after unsuccessful assertion of a constitutional right).
48 The concept of privacy was early recognized in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HAv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Since its publication the right has grown far beyond
the authors' original conceptions. Prosser has organized the actions presently constituting
invasion of privacy into four categories: (1) intrusion into the plaintiff's private affairs,
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff, (3) publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and (4) appropriation for defendant's advantage of plaintiff's name or likeness. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. RaV. 383
(1960).
49 See Prosser, supra note 48, at 388.
50 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a
Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the marital right of privacy,
which falls within the penumbra of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.
The case has given rise to much speculation about the scope of the constitutional right
of privacy. See Comment, Privacy after Griswold-Constitutionalor Natural Law Right?
60 Nw. U.L. Rv. 813 (1966); cf. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). In
United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio 1968), in which the defendants in a federal criminal antitrust prosecution moved for a protective order relieving them from being photographed and fingerprinted by a federal marshal, the court,
limiting Griswold to marital privacy, rejected the theory that a constitutional right is
violated by the taking or retention of such records. Cf. Note, Discrimination on the Basis
of Arrest Records, 56 Co.muLr L. Rv. 470 (1971).
51 One commentator insists that privacy is not easily categorized and, indeed, that it
is virtually impossible to describe the component parts of the tort. Kalven, Privacy in
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pears to be no more than a label determined by a balancing process in
which a variety of personal interests are weighed against the need of
society or of other individuals to intrude on those interests.5 2 Nevertheless, the magnitude of the individual's interests would seem to justify application of this right here.
Even if the privacy rationale were not adopted, return might be obtained in the cases previously discussed on the grounds that retention
is outside police authority and that the individual has substantial interests that need protection. 53 The traditional equity powers of a civil
court in a new proceeding, or of a criminal court upon disposition of
the case before it, 54 should be sufficient to protect the individual from
the threat of unjustified injury which would result from use of a record and to place him in status quo ante. Several arrest records have actually been ordered returned on this basis. 55
D.

Effects of Requiring Return in These Cases

Return of a record of an arrest made without probable cause or of
a record in which the continuing inference is for some other reason
invalid prohibits all further use of that record in law enforcement decisions. The return of only those records which are inherently.misleading might be preferable to the return or sealing of all records, as
provided in expungement statutes, since records of valid arrests may
still be useful to police. 56 Another advantage over expungement statutes is that return could be required from all criminal identification
bureaus.
Some of the problems inherent in expungement statutes also plague
a common law solution. 57 First, placing the burden on the individual
Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW & CoNTErt'. PROn. 326 (1966). See
generally S. HOFSTADTER & G. HoRowITz, TaE RIoGrr OF PRiVACY (1964); A. Wtsrm, PmvAcy AND FREDom (1967); Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 253 (1966); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 962 (1964).
52 See note 47 supra.
53 In a case like Menard, if the plaintiff can prove an immediate threat of irreparable
injury due to retention of his arrest record, he may have standing to assert that his record
should be returned simply because retention is action outside the scope of law enforcement agencies' statutory or common law authority. The Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. II, 1967), it has been argued, confers standing on individuals for
judicial review of agency action, except as by law committed to agency discretion, which
adversely affects them in fact. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REV.
450 (1970). See also 3 K.C. DAvis, ADMINST ATrvE LAW TREATISE § 22.01, at 210 (1965, Supp.
1970).
54 See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
55 See cases cited notes 37 & 38 supra.
56 But see text at notes 60 & 125 infra.
57 For a discussion of the difficulties faced in expungement statutes, see articles cited
note 17 supra.
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to initiate action functionally hampers his ability to vindicate his
rights. Second, return is dependent on judicial action; an administrative remedy would be more efficient and less expensive. Third, the
ability of police accurately to dispose of a matter by a complete record
is sacrificed when the record is returned.5 8 Fourth, although the return
of a record from local files provides a partial remedy by precluding
continued reference to that record, future use is not eliminated unless
duplicate records sent to other law enforcement bureaus are also returned. Since copies of the record are forwarded to individuals and
agencies throughout the nation, it is often impossible to identify everyone who has a copy. Moreover, it is difficult for a court to obtain jurisdiction over an outside law enforcement agency known to have a copy.5"
A partial solution to this problem might be to include a provision in the
injunctive order requiring the original disseminating party to be responsible for return of records sent outside the jurisdiction. Although
proving continued retention in violation of the order would be difficult, the individual might be able to enforce compliance by initiating
either a civil contempt proceeding or an action in tort for damages. 60
A final point that must be made is that minimization of unfairness
to those whose records are retained is entirely dependent on limiting
the scope of dissemination and the range of use outside the criminal
justice system. If this proves administratively impractical, the balancing of usefulness against harm to the individual will have to be recalculated.
II.

DISSEMINATION OF ARREST RECORDS OUTSIDE THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
For the large majority of individuals whose arrest records are retained and for whom continuing inferences concerning the arrest are
valid, difficult problems largely unresolved by the courts still exist. As
dissemination of arrest records expands beyond the criminal justice
system, the number of people who have access to records, the uses that
are made of them, and their consequent adverse effects on individuals
multiply dramatically. Before determining whether police discretion
in this area should be limited, however, the present legal status of access to and dissemination of arrest records should be examined.
58 Return of records should be favored over their destruction because the individual
will have the record if some matter arises later for which it is needed.
59 See, e.g., Walker v. Lamb, 254 A.2d 265 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 259 A.2d 663 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1969), in which the plaintiff requested an order requiring local police to obtain and
return all copies of an arrest record they had sent to the FBI; cf. Roesch v. Ferber, 45
NJ. Super. 149, 131 A.2d 807, rev'd on other grounds, 48 N.J. Super. 231, 137 A.2d 61
(1957).
6O See text and notes at notes 117-121 infra, discussing similar enforcement remedies.
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The PresentPractice,

Public record statutes and information acts generally provide that
records whose retention is required by law shall be open to reasonable
public inspection.6 ' However, police investigative files compiled and

preserved for law enforcement purposes are usually excluded. 62 Even
where statutes do not specifically exempt police records, courts have
held such records confidential to protect current police investigations
and persons submitting information to police.6 3 Arrest records are in64
cluded under this public policy umbrella of confidentiality.
Classification of arrest records as confidential means in practice that
although arrest records are not subject to public inspection, police can
disseminate the records to virtually anyone at their discretion. 5 Dissemination of FBI records is allowed by statute to "authorized officials,"' 66 but a regulation of the Attorney General sets forth a rather
broad list of authorized recipients, including governmental agencies
67
in general, railroad police, insurance companies, and most banks.
61 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1967); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.

§

113-2-1 (1963); IND. ANN.

STAT. § 57-601 (Supp. 1970); N.J. REv. STAT. § 47:1A-2 (Supp. 1971). See generally H. CROSS,
THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953).
62 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (1967); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 625-4(f); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3(b)(i) (Supp. 1969).
63 See United States v. Mackey, 36 F.R.D. 431 (D.D.C.), aft'd, 351 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir.

1965); People v. Pearson, 111 Cal. App. 2d 9, 244 P.2d 35 (1952); Runyan v. Board of
Prison Terms & Paroles, 26 Cal. App. 2d 183, 79 P.2d 101 (1938); Lee v. Beach Publishing Co. 127 Fla. 600, 173 So. 440 (1937); State v. Mattio, 212 La. 283, 31 So. 2d 801, cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 818 (1947); State v. Dallao, 187 La. 391, 175 So. 4 (1937); Whittle v.
Munshower, 221 Md. 258, 155 A.2d 670 (1959); Hale v. City of New York, 251 App. Div.
826, 296 N.Y.S. 443 (1937); Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nassau County Fire Marshal, 55
Misc. 2d 951, 287 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1967); People v. Carro, 199 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Oneida
County Ct. 1960). But see Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 So.
739 (1941); Scott v. County of Nassau, 23 Misc. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
In re Story, 159 Ohio St. 144, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953); Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510,
153 N.W.2d 501 (1967); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 32 Wis. 2d 11, 144 N.W.2d 793
(1966). See also Cross, supra note 61, at 95-121.
64 Whittle v. Munshower, 221 Md. 258, 155 A.2d 670 (1959); cf. United States v. Mackey,
36 F.R.D. 431 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 351 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Lee v. Beach Publishing Co.
127 Fla. 600, 173 So. 440 (1937). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 88513 (1968); ILL. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 206-3 (Supp. 1970); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1631 (1964); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 88B, § 10 (1957); ORE. Rav. STAT. § 181.540 (Supp. 1970); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 72.50.140 (Supp. 1970).
65 See notes 12 supra & 79 infra.
66 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
67 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1970). Compare United States v. Kelly 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932),
the leading case authorizing federal agents to take fingerprints, in which the court dedared, "It should be added that all United States attorneys and marshals are instructed
by the Attorney General not to make public photographs, Bertillon measurements or
fingerprints prior to trial, except when the prisoner becomes a fugitive from justice, and
are required to destroy or to surrender to the defendant all such records after acquittal
or when the prisoner is finally discharged without conviction. There is therefore as care-
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Several state statutes explicitly authorize dissemination to all governmental agencies. 68 Although some statutes attempt to limit dissemination by state agencies, 69 most do not and none apply to local police or
the FBI.
Courts usually refuse to interfere with the police practice of limit-

ing public access to arrest records but circulating the records at their
discretion.7 0 Yet the rationale for this practice-to protect police investigations-obviously should not apply to arrest records after the
investigation has terminated.7 1 Although no other reason has been
given for the present practice, it might be explained by two other considerations: (1) police should not be exposed to excessive demands for
information, and (2) records include certain investigative data access
to which should be restricted but separation of which would be administratively impractical. The first reason appears trivial because even
where records are public the inquirer must show a specific interest in
the records.7 2 Moreover, police are already under an obligation to furnish other similar information.7 3 The second reason may have some
practical significance, but it should not be controlling as a matter of
law, especially since some courts hold storage of secret information
together with records to be no bar to public inspection.7 4 The present
practice of uncontrolled police discretion should, therefore, be rejected;
ful provision as may be made to prevent the misuse of the records and there is no charge
of any threatened improper use in the present case" (Emphasis added.) In Menard, the
District Court for the District of Columbia has on remand severely restricted the scope of
this regulation. See note 4 supra.
68 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4807 (Supp. 1969); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-712 (1969); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.1 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-29(d) (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 165.83 (Supp. 1971).
69 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 206-3 (Supp. 1970) (information furnished
to "peace officers"); Cf. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 72.50.140 (Supp. 1970), which is unique
in that it allows a cause of action to one whose record is released in violation of the
statute, with recovery of damages-including injury to reputation-caused thereby. The
major failure of other statutes which attempt to provide for confidentiality is their total
lack of enforcement provisions.
70 Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Ill.
App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957); Poyer v. Boustead, 3
Ill. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d 838 (1954); State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153
S.W.2d 834 (1941); Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (rex. Civ. App. 1952); see Marby v.
Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 117 S.W. 746, aff'd, 92 Ark. 81, 122 S.W. 115 (1909); People ex rel.
Joyce v. York, 27 Misc. 658, 59 N.Y.S. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1899); cf. State ex Tel. Burns v. Clausmeier, 154 Ind. 599, 57 N.E. 541 (1900). See also McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N.J. Eq.
341, 54 A.2d 469 (Ch. 1947); Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
71 Cf. Scott v. County of Nassau, 23 Misc. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
72 See, e.g., Moore v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 76 NJ. Super. 396, 184 A.2d 748,
modified, 39 NJ. 26, 186 A.2d 676 (1962).
73 See note 11 supra.
74 See, e.g., Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 So. 739 (1941).
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either arrest records should be made public or both access and dissemi75
nation should be restricted.
B. Limiting Dissemination
1. The Competing Interests. In deciding whether arrest records
should be made public, several factors become relevant. The individual with an arrest record, of course, has strong interests in limiting
dissemination. First, unrestricted dissemination is likely to damage his
reputation seriously. In some cases the record is either incomplete as
to disposition or inaccurate, 71 thereby increasing the probability that
it will be misinterpreted as evidencing guilt. Even if the record is complete, the reader will often infer that the individual is in some way a
"criminal." Second, the consequences of such dissemination can be
economically disastrous. Licensing boards at all levels usually obtain
copies of the record and consider them in deciding whether to deny or
revoke a license.77 The arrested individual faces difficulties in obtaining insurance, credit, education, and even entry into the armed services. 7 8 Most important, governmental agencies and private groups

with access to records frequently use them to refuse the individual employment.7 9 Finally, and independent of these harms, unrestricted dis75 Presently an individual does not have access to his own arrest record. In view of the
discussion above concerning limited public access, however, there seems to be no good
reason for this practice. See, e.g., Scott v. County of Nassau, 23 Misc. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d
135 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Even if public access were limited, it would seem essential that the
individual and his attorney have unrestricted access to his record for the purpose of
checking accuracy, especially in light of recent federal legislation concerning an individual's access to his own credit files. But see text at note 93 infra.
76 See Miller, supra note 12, at 34, noting that court proceedings following an arrest
are not furnished for about 35% of the "rap sheets" in FBI files. See also INTERNATIONAL
ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, A SURVEY OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 824
(1970), noting that many case reports in the Chicago files were inaccurate or misclassified.
77 DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 14-15.
78 See, e.g., Gough, supra note 11, at 153-57.
79 For evidence of this practice and a discussion of the consequences for the individual,
see DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 9-15; Hess 8- LePoole, Abuse of the Record of
Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIMaE & DELINQ. 494, 498 (1967). One study indicates
that approximately 75% of the New York City area employment agencies sampled do
not refer an applicant with a record, regardless of whether the arrest was followed by
a conviction. E. Sparer, Employability and the Juvenile "Arrest" Record (unpublished
study by the New York University Center for the Study of Unemployed Youth, 1966). In
another study, two-thirds of the employers surveyed would not consider employing a
man acquitted of assault charges. Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10
SoCIAL PROB. 133, 136 (1962). These economic consequences are likely to weigh heaviest
on those who can least bear the burden-the poor and the black. DUNCAN REPORT, supra
note 12, at 7. Moreover, a person may be arrested for a variety of reasons. In Menard,
Judge Bazelon noted that many people are arrested for "investigation," or en masse, or
for harassment purposes with no hope of ultimate conviction. 430 F.2d at 493-94. Police
administrators have even admitted that three out of four arrests are probably illegal.
Hess & LePoole, supra, at 495-96.
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semination of the arrest record disregards the individual's psychological
interest in preventing disclosure of "personal information" without his
consent.8 0 The concepts of intimacy, identity, role-playing, and autonomy all involve the notion that the individual ought to have some
control over what others know about him.81
Militating against the individual's interests are those of police and
the public. First, both police and the public have an interest in dissemination to persons outside the criminal justice system who may help
police prevent crime and apprehend criminals. Second, the public has
an interest in unlimited access in order to minimize business risks by
basing decisions on full disclosure of facts concerning an individual. 2
Since the common law rationale for use of arrest records is premised
on law enforcement purposes, "business risk" interests should not be
determinative unless they are relevant to law enforcement. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the general public is capable of utilizing
arrest records in an intelligent manner to minimize the incidence
of crime. More probably, the presence of an arrest record becomes
a convenient excuse for denying employment. Even if no inference
84
of guilt is drawn,8 3 a businessman may still refuse employment
on the basis of a high probability of rearrest,8 5 an event that would
cost the employer time and money. This rationale may, however,
become a self-fulfilling prophecy: denial of employment because of the
80 Since the person is no longer cast in the public eye, the arrest record might be
considered "personal information" in relation to certain people. See text at notes 108-10

infra.
81 Project-Computerizationof Government Files-What Impact on the Individual? 15
U.C.LA.L. Rv.1371, 1411-1422 (1968).
82 Karst, supra note 12, at 566, suggests that all arrest and criminal records be made
public to end the "corroding, demoralizing occupation of information peddling within
police departments," and that emphasis be placed on legislative proposals restricting
certain uses of this data. Indeed, this alternative may be more consistent with the "free
flow of information." However, any prohibition on use would have the same problems
regarding proof and control as those regarding limitation of dissemination, and there is
evidence that making arrest records public would invite disaster for those with records
if no legislative guidelines were established. For example, in the District of Columbia in
1963 a new policy of almost total public dissemination resulted in a total of more than
3,500 records disseminated a week. DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 15. The overwhelming effects of this practice have already been noted. See note 79 infra. If these practices
are to be curtailed, controls on both dissemination and use seem necessary. See also text

at notes 127-29 infra.
83 As Judge Bazelon noted in Menard, "Even if we assume that the cryptic reference
on appellant's fingerprint card to release 'in accordance with 849(b)(1)' would be under-

stood by police, it is questionable whether it would be understood by potential employers
or the general public." 480 F.2d at 492-93.
84 See PRESIDENT'S COMAI'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION

OF JUsICE, supra

note 5, at 75-76 (1967).
85 An FBI study showed that 92% of those arrested but acquitted or dismissed in 1963

had been rearrested by 1969.
supra note 5, at 38.
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possibility of rearrest can itself become a cause of rearrest.8 6 In this
context the individual's interests, because they are more direct and substantial, should prevail over the interests of the business enterprise.
There are, of course, some instances in which dissemination outside
the criminal justice system promotes crime prevention. For example,
a school board may use an arrest record to deny a job as a school bus
driver to a man repeatedly arrested for drunk driving and child molesting. Selective distribution to such agencies as railroad police or state
licencing boards certainly has greater crime prevention possibilities
than distribution to a credit bureau or private employer. Yet it should
be noted that persons outside the criminal justice system have no particular responsibility to use records for law enforcement purposes.
Their objectives may be unrelated to the police function, and they can
use arrest records for a variety of purposes, a power that carries with it
strong possibility of abuse. Additionally, private individuals or groups
can freely distribute the record once it is given out. While theoretically the question whether to disseminate can be decided fairly by
weighing the probability of crime prevention in each case against that
of potential harm to the individual, the exercise of unfettered discretion by police has so far produced rather unsatisfactory results. The
present widespread dissemination of arrest records seems to indicate
that the interests of the individual are either discounted or disregarded
entirely.
2. A Standard for Limiting Dissemination. Recently, in Morrow v.
District of Columbia,8 7 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in an opinion by Judge Wright evaluated some of these considerations. The case sustained the power of the District of Columbia
Court of General Sessions to assume ancillary jurisdiction after dismissal of a criminal case and to issue an order prohibiting dissemination
of the defendant's record. Reversing and remanding for a decision on
the proper scope of restriction on dissemination, the court incorporated
the Duncan Report 8 in an appendix to its opinion.8 9 The Report,
eventually enacted by the District of Columbia, recommended that dissemination of arrest records where there had been no conviction or
86 There is reason to believe that the probability of rearrest is a function of unemployment and that existing rearrest probability figures are based on a high unemployment
population sample. For example, one group noted that in a "spedal study made for the
President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, it appeared that over
50 percent of the offenders studied were unemployed at the time of the crime." National
Capitol Area Civil Liberties Union, The Maintenance and Use of Arrest Records (unpublished report, 1967).
87 417 F 2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
88 Supra note 12.
89 417 F.2d at 745.
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forfeiture of collateral be limited to "law enforcement agents" for "law
enforcement purposes."90 On remand, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals decided that the rules established by the Duncan Report
were sufficient to protect the record in question. 91
This "insider-outsider" standard seems to be the most appropriate
one for restricting access and dissemination in a manner consistent
with the policy previously discussed-it protects the individual while
serving the necessary law enforcement purposes. Since there is latitude
in determining what are law enforcement agencies and purposes, the
rule is sufficiently flexible. Such organizations as licensing boards might
obtain records if they specified reasons and subjected themselves to
rules insuring complete confidentiality. 2 The Duncan Report standard
is also important because it allows access to defense attorneys, who
under present practice frequently obtain records only at the prosecutor's discretion. 93 Furthermore, it would seem essential to allow the
arrested individual access to his own record in order to insure its
completeness and accuracy. However, because employers often require
police clearance as a condition of employment, such a provision may
allow the employer to circumvent normal prohibitions unless measures
are taken to protect the individual from pressure to produce the record.
Additionally, if the record is disseminated to anyone other than law
enforcement agents, notification should be given to the individual
affected; at least then he would be in a position to challenge the decision if he so desired. 94
C.

Limiting Dissemination:Individual Rights and Remedies

1. Rights. Several legal theories are available to a person seeking
to enjoin, or to obtain damages for, the dissemination of his arrest
record to "outsiders." The first arises from the law of privacy and is
90 DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 23-27.

91 In re Alexander, 259 A.2d 592 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
92 This practice might take care of examples such as that of the school bus driver
since many jobs of public trust nature must be licensed. However, it might also invite

abuse by licensing boards. Inequities would be decreased if the law stringently required,
according to the equal protection clause, a reasonable connection with the arrest and the
denial of the license. Compare cases cited note 129 infra with Pincourt v. Palmer, 190
F.2d 390 (3rd Cir. 1951); Camp v. Brock, 75 Cal. App. 2d 169, 170 P.2d 702 (1946); Hora
v. City & County of San Francisco, 43 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). But see Menard
v. Mitchell, 39 U.S.L.W. 2725 (D.D.C. June 15, 1971) (dissemination to licensing agencies
prohibited).
93 Additionally, records should be available to independent study groups if precautions

are taken to insure confidentiality or anonymity. Greater flexibility in administering the
standard might be insured if records were also available by court order.
94 Morrow also notes that in addition to the Duncan Report standard arrest records in
unusual cases may be returned. 417 F.2d at 741. The above discussion of retention may
provide a guide to these cases.
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exemplified by a case in which a court restrained the display of an
arrested person's photograph in a public "rogues' gallery" after charges
had been dismissed.95 The publication of an "innocent complaintant's
photograph in juxtaposition with hardened criminals" placed the plaintiff in a "false light" in the public eye.96 Since the "false light" privacy
theory is an outgrowth of the law of defamation, it is not surprising to
find libel principles arising in cases of publication of arrest facts and
records. For example, publication in a public "rogues' gallery" of a
photograph of a person who had not been arrested has been held libel
per se. 97 If the fact of arrest is true, of course, publication thereof is not
libelous. 98 Nevertheless, in an analogous context, newspaper publication of a true fact of arrest with additional information which unambiguously conveys to the reader an imputation that the arrested
individual is guilty of a crime has been held libelous as a matter of
law.9 9 Where the article is capable of two interpretations, only one of
which is libelous, the defamation issue has been held to be a question
for the jury. 0 0
These defamation or "false light" privacy cases suggest that at least
two elements must be satisfied to constitute a cause of action: (1) the
information released must have at least one libelous interpretation, and
95 State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755, cert. denied, 333 U.S.
834, rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 858 (1946); cf. Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So.
737 (1905); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Downs v. Swann, 111
Md. 53 (1909) (dictum). See also State ex rel Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d
834 (1949).
96 State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 281, 66 N.E.2d 755, 762, cert. denied,
333 U.S. 834, rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 858 (1946).
97 Wisher v. City of Centralia, 273 Ill. App. 168 (1933).
98 Compare Rein v. Sun Printing & Publishing Co., 196 App. Div. 873, 188 N.Y.S. 608
(1921), with Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526, 80 N.W. 575 (1899) (false publication charging
guilt); Martin v. Orange County Publications, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 84, 266 N.Y.S.2d 875
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 471, 266 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1965) (false publication charging
arrest). See also Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959); Hanson v. Krehbiel,
68 Kan. 670, 75 P. 1041 (1904).
99 Smith v. New Yorker Staats Zeitung, 154 App. Div. 458, 139 N.Y.S. 325 (1913); Lancour v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 111 Vt. 371, 17 A.2d 253 (1941).
100 Commercial Publishing Co. v. Smith, 149 F. 704 (6th Cir. 1907); cf. Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1966); Steward v. World-Wide
Automobiles Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 188, 189 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (congressional committee lumping "innocent" with
"guilty").
Although a privilege is extended to the reporting of official judicial proceedings involving arrest facts, it is a qualified privilege which may be lost if additional facts are
added. Smith v. New Yorker Staats Zeitung, 154 App. Div. 458, 139 N.Y.S. 325 (1913).
Also, a report based on an arrest record is not based on a "public record" and should
not be subject to the public record privilege. See text at notes 82-84 supra. Furthermore,
if the publication imputes guilt it is not privileged even if based on a police report.
Lancour v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 111 Vt. 371, 17 A.2d 253 (1941).
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(2) it must be published or made available to the general public. The
former element is easily satisfied where the arrest record is comprised
largely of cryptic notations, or phrased in terminology which would
be of doubtful intelligibility to persons outside the criminal justice
system. 101 In this context, the reader would probably infer guilt rather
than merely the true fact of arrest. Moreover, if the record is incomplete
-for example, if the disposition is lacking-the likelihood that a
reasonable man would infer guilt may be so great that dissemination
10 2
could be restrained.
There may, however, be crippling limitations on use of defamation
and privacy theory. 10 3 Dissemination to a restricted audience may
not be sufficient to qualify as the "publication" required by traditional
privacy doctrine. Furthermore, the courts have declined to entertain
plaintiff suits because of a reluctance to limit police discretion. 10 4 Particularly striking are cases in which courts have refused to sustain invasion of privacy claims where records were made available to employers 0 5
and where arrest photographs were displayed to a large public audience
at a junior high school after charges had been dismissed. 10 6
However, a Maryland case, Carr v. Watkins, 0 7 presents a privacy
concept which may require limitation on dissemination of arrest records
regardless of their defamatory character. While the plaintiff was working for a naval ordnance laboratory, non-criminal charges were made
concerning the suitability of his continued employment, but he was
exonerated after an administrative hearing. Six years later a laboratory
security officer and two police officers transmitted this information,
including particulars of the charges, to the plaintiff's new employer,
realizing that the consequence would be his discharge from employment. The court sustained a cause of action for invasion of privacy,
holding that the officers had unreasonably and seriously interfered with
the plaintiff's interest in not having his affairs disclosed to others. Other
cases similarly recognize this right, requiring only that the subject be a
lol See note 83 supra.

102 If a plaintiff knew his arrest record was inaccurate or incomplete, he might use
these tort theories in conjunction with the analysis at note 43 supra at least to require
completion.
103 For a discussion of possible constitutional limitations on these rights, see note 118
infra.
104 See cases cited note 70 supra. These cases may not be controlling, however, because
usually there had been no allegation or showing that the arrest photographs or records
would be disseminated to parties other than law enforcement agencies.
105 Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947).
106 Hoag v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).

107 177 A.2d 841 (Nd. Ct. App. 1962).
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"private affair" and that the disclosure be "public" and offend a person
of ordinary sensibilities. 0 s
In the context of dissemination of arrest records, a record might be
considered a "private affair." Disclosure of the record to "outsiders"
would constitute an unreasonable interference with a plaintiff's right
not to have his affairs disclosed and would seem to offend a person of
ordinary sensibilities. Although there may not be "public" disclosure,
the breach of a confidential relationship might be sufficient to warrant
redress. 0 9 This type of tortious conduct has been recognized in similar
situations. 110
Finally, even if the privacy rationale is not expanded to reach dissemination cases, a person with an arrest record might be able to invoke
the equity powers of a court"' to limit dissemination because he may
be harmed without any direct countervailing social gain.112 This is
3
precisely what occurred in Morrow."
2. Remedies. An arrested individual might be able to prevent
improper dissemination to "outsiders" by injunctive relief on one of
several grounds. He could request such relief under the "unauthorized
108 See Prosser, supra note 48, at 392-98; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91
(1931); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
109 Redress is often provided against one who breaches a confidential relationship and
divulges privileged communications. Lawyers, physicians, bankers, employers, spouses, and
others have been held liable. J. SHARP, CRErr REPORTING AND PRIVACY 62 (1970). See, e.g.,
Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div.
970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1945); Brex v. Smith, 104 NJ. Eq. 386, 146 A.34 (Ch. 1929). The
difference between the relationship in these cases and the "confidential relationship" between an arrested person and police is that arrest facts are public at the time of arrest.
They do not become confidential until they become part of the arrest record. However,
if the record is truly confidential, there should be a similar duty imposed on an "insider" not to divulge information to persons outside the confidential relationship. But see
Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1956). Moreover,
this invasion of privacy theory is dosely related to the "intrusion" line of privacy cases.
Dissemination to or use by persons not justified in having access may be a new intrusion
into what should be considered "private affairs." See Prosser, id. at 396.
110 See Annot., 165 A.L.R. 1302, 1304-05 (1946).
111 See notes 53-55 supra.
112 Recent developments indicate that a person with an arrest record might have a
constitutional right to have dissemination limited. In a recent case, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 91 S. Ct. 507 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin statute which
allowed the posting of notices in liquor stores declaring plaintiff to be an "excessive
drinker" and forbidding the sale of alcohol to her without prior notification or hearing
was unconstitutional on its face as a denial of due process. For the majority, Justice
Douglas wrote: "Yet certainly where the state attaches a 'badge of infamy' to the citizen,
due process comes into play. . . . Where a person's good name, reputation, honor or
integrity are at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential." Id. at 510. Dissemination of arrest records beyond
law enforcement agencies without notice to the individual does not seem much different.
113 See text at note 87 supra.
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disclosure" privacy rationale of Carr"1 4 or invoke general equitable relief at the conclusion of his criminal trial, as in Morrow,115 or in a new
civil proceeding. The injury resulting from the threat of dissemination
would probably be sufficient to confer standing." 6 Presumably a decree
would be designed to prevent transmission of the record to non-law
enforcement organizations outside the jurisdiction entertaining the
suit. Injunctive relief would, of course, permit use of the contempt
power to insure official cooperation. 117
Where improper dissemination has already occurred, a suit for
damages based on a privacy or libel theory might succeed if the record
were misleading. Even if the record were clear, the Carr rationale suggests a basis for compensation. The possibility of damage recovery
against "insiders" is an important general deterrent to police misconduct in this area and would protect those who were too poor to sue,
who could not prove violations, or who would fail to sue because of
8
potentially insufficient damages."
Aside from these difficulties, however, a plaintiff might be prevented
from suing for damages by the privilege doctrine, which often bars
suits for misconduct by public officials. 119 This doctrine is designed to
insulate public officials from attack so that they may continue in the
"unflinching discharge of their duties."' 20 The privilege is often held
114 See text at notes 107-110 supra.

115 But see Maxwell v. O'Connor, 1 Ill. App. 2d 124, 117 N.E.2d 326 (1953). Aside
from Morrow, the controversy over a criminal court's power to limit dissemination or
require return of an arrest record of the person before the court continues. See United
States v. Penny, Civil No. 34-7270 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 25, 1970).
116 For a more detailed discussion of standing, see note 53 supra.
117 Hearings on compliance with the order are an alternative, but so far they have
met with difficulties. In Morrow, the court held the burden to be on the defendant to
show noncompliance before a hearing will be ordered. 417 F.2d at 744.
118 For a discussion of the general limitations of a damage suit as a means of controlling access and dissemination of files, see Karst, supra note 12, at 350-52. The author
notes that the first amendment privilege may be a constant factor to contend with in any
suit for injunction or damages based on the right to privacy. One requirement for the
privilege is that the matter be of "public interest." Current arrest facts, of course, are
of public interest. Arrest records, excluding present arrest facts, on the other hand, should
be less a matter of public interest for the reasons discussed in the text at notes 82-86
supra. But arrest records of such persons as public officials, who are cast into the public
eye, may warrant separate consideration. See Time v. Pape, 91 S. Ct. 633 (1971); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
119 In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), the Supreme Court held that the acting
director of the federal office of rent stabilization was absolutely privileged in a libel action and that the privilege extended to kindred torts.
120 Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). One reason for the privilege
is related to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the policy of holding individual
officers not liable for actions taken pursuant to their perceived duties. Enactment of indemnity statutes or abolition of the doctrine, which would permit holding liable the
government instead of its officers, might change the nature of the privilege. Recovery
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to be absolute, even where officers have acted willfully and with
malice.' 21 Nevertheless, some cases recognize a qualified privilege and
hold certain public officers liable where they have acted outside the
scope of their authority.122 Dissemination to "outsiders" by an officer in
willful violation of a clear standard would likely be outside the scope
of his authority and there, at least, the privilege doctrine would not
bar a damage action.
It is therefore of primary importance that a standard governing
dissemination be uniform and clearly defined. Otherwise, little protection can be offered the injured plaintiff in most cases. 123 Moreover,
compliance with injunctive orders would certainly be facilitated by a
standard which could be applied by law enforcement agencies without
unnecessary confusion.
The applicable standard could be formulated in a number of ways.
A court could adopt its own principle 24 or request a defendant law
enforcement agency to submit a proposal for judicial approval. Alternatively, a class action would allow a court to adjudicate the rights of
all persons with arrest records in a given jurisdiction. Of course, greater
uniformity would be achieved by adoption of a comprehensive legislative solution or viable administrative rules.
Certainly, the ultimate goal is uniform compliance. In the age of
instant photocopy and national computer data banks, the freedom of
a single party to breach an established standard with impunity could
render imposition of dissemination controls valueless. The creation of
nationwide guidelines limiting dissemination and concomitant establishment of remedies to enforce those guidelines would go far to effectuate uniform compliance.
D.

Limitations of This Approach

The benefit of limiting dissemination to "insiders" is that no decision
could be made by "outsiders" on the basis of the arrest record without
might then be had against the government for damages caused by dissemination to outsiders, creating economic pressure to enforce the standard.
121 See 3 K.C. DAVIS, supra note 53, at § 26.05.
122 See, e.g., Carr v. Watkins, 177 A.2d 841 (Md. Ct. App. 1962).
123 If the standard is breached because of outside monetary persuasions, bribery laws
should be available as a similar deterrent. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1971, at 60, reporting
that a New York City patrolman was indicted for accepting money in exchange for confidential information from police files. Of course, whenever a standard is breached, there
are two guilty parties-the seller and the buyer-and it may be unfair to place all the
burden of honesty on one side. But see text at note 126 infra.
124 In Morrow, the court declared that on remand the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals had full power to adopt an individual case approach, the Duncan Report standard, or its own standard, indicating that a court has full power to articulate a standard
in any case before it.
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first confronting the individual. Unfavorable credit ratings, difficulty
in obtaining insurance, and employment rejections based on data bank
information not supplied by the individual would decrease. However,
even if a uniform standard were adopted and enforced, restricting
dissemination would not completely eliminate "outsider" use. Employment questionnaires regularly ask whether a prospective employee has
been arrested, and there is great pressure on the individual to reveal
everything. 25 On the other hand, since the employer would not have
the official record for verification, the prospective employee could falsify
with impunity. Some leakage would, of course, seem to be inevitable.
If the harm resulting from retention of arrest records is great compared
with their usefulness, expungement remedies may warrant reconsideration; return of arrest records may after all be necessary.
An emerging problem to be confronted is that present judicial
response is aimed only at record keeping within the criminal justice
system. Such organizations as newspapers, which have legitimate access
to initial facts of arrest, can organize this information according to
name, in effect duplicate arrest records, and open the door to circumvention of limits on dissemination. 2 Expansion of the privacy theory
of unreasonable intrusion into private affairs and the ability to sue
"outsiders" might be sufficient to curtail such practices, but direct
limitations on use of arrest records appear necessary to eliminate them
completely.
One court has created a direct limitation on use by enjoining a
company from denying a job to a black man on the basis of numerous
arrests. The court held that since blacks are arrested more often than
whites, such a practice results in racial discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.127 A real problem in such situations is
proving use, but this case suggests that the difficulty is not insurmountable. However, the ruling may be limited in effect since presumably
the company could still deny employment to whites on this basis. The
federal government as an employer has made some attempt to reduce
125 There have been legislative attempts to prohibit employers from asking whether
prospective employees have been arrested, but so far they have met with failure. See Hess
& LePoole, supra note 79, at 499.
126 In fact, this practice may to some extent already exist. See the reference to "dipping agencies" in Note, supra note 50, at 477 (1971).
127 Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970). See generally
Comment, Arrest Records as a Racially Discriminating Employment Criterion, 6 HIAv.
Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LiB. L. Rxv. 165 (1971). The logic of this case, however, probably goes
too far. Males are arrested more often than females; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 also prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex; therefore, denying jobs to men
on the basis of numerous arrests also results in prohibited sexual discrimination. Yet to
deny employment to white females, the only group left, would probably be a denial of
equal protection.
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its use of arrest records by eliminating questions concerning nonconviction arrests from employment questionnaires. 128 Beyond that, the
government may be under a constitutional duty not to use the fact of
an arrest to deny employment or a license unless there is a reasonable
129
connection between the privilege denied and the cause of the arrest.
In order to regulate effectively the use of arrest records by both the
government and private persons, more comprehensive legislation will
probably be necessary.
III.

CONCLUSION

As computerization augments police capacity to gather and store
arrest records, an increasing number of people may obtain access to
and use of such records. Adverse effects on arrested individuals will
increase unless the law develops an effective means of regulating record
keeping. Although comprehensive legislation would have certain advantages, there is both the need and sufficient common law authority
for the development of judicial supervision in this area. Requiring
return of arrest records proven not useful would help eliminate continued reliance on them. Limiting dissemination of unreturned records
to "insiders" would not eliminate all use, but it would allow the
individual with the arrest record to escape, in part, its stigma and
place the legal system one step closer to a true presumption of innocence.
128 PRESIDENT'S .COMr'N

ON

LAW

ENFORCEIENT

&z ADMINISTRATION

OF JUsTIcE,

supra

note 5, at 75.
129 See, e.g., Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (termination of job as postal clerk because employee living with a woman and not
married unconstitutional because no rational nexus with job); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d
1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (alleged homosexual advance by civil service employee toward another insufficient to justify dismissal).
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Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court. PHILIP B. KURLAND.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970. Pp. xxv, 222. $9.75.
William M. Beaneyt
The occasion of the 1969 Cooley lectures at the University of Michigan
gave Professor Philip B. Kurland an opportunity to indict once again
the Warren Court (1954-1968) for what he considers its many failures
and its consistent misuse of judicial power.
There is nothing novel in sweeping indictments of the Court and
its jurisprudential products by both non-academic and professorial
critics. The pages of Charles Warren's The Supreme Court in United
States History1 chronicle a decade-by-decade series of attacks by those
who found the Court unwise or biased in its handling of important
social and political issues. Jeffersonians denounced the Marshall
Court's centralizing judgments, conservative spokesmen pilloried the
Taney Court for its decisions favoring police power, and anti-slavery
forces condemned the Dred Scott decision2 for thwarting an acceptable
political compromise of the slavery issue.
The trauma produced by Dred Scott has never completely disappeared but has, like an albatross, remained hanging over the Supreme
Court to give courage to its critics. The unusual and extreme character of that decision should "be carefully noted so that overly facile
comparisons of that judicial failure and other controversial decisions
may be avoided. Not only did the Court through Taney reach out
to destroy an existing agreement by the political representatives of
the nation on the slavery issue, but, by giving due process protection
to the ownership of slaves, it prevented any further legislative attempts to control the spread of slavery. The Court's insistence on a
final solution acceptable to only one of the major antagonists clearly
was a suicidal assumption of the power to govern that defies comparison with any Supreme Court decision before or after 1857.
In the post-Civil War era, as the Court diluted the freedoms from
racial discrimination incorporated in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments, and then proceeded to erect safeguards for the
free enterprise system against both state and federal social legislation,
t Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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C. WVARREN, THE SUPREmE CouRT IN UNrrEI

STATES HISTORY (1926).

2 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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controversy swirled around virtually every major decision. Liberals
continued in this century to decry pro-business decisions of the pre1937 Court. The gradual emergence of the Court's concern with civil
rights and civil liberties issues in the pre-1937 period failed on the
whole to satisfy liberals and hardly occasioned huzzahs from among the
general public, to whom protection of minority rights has rarely been
an appealing issue.8 Finally, the decisions of the pre-1937 Court, invalidating New Deal and state social legislation, once again raised the
hue and cry against the Court.
Academic critics of the Court have not been lacking in most periods
of our history, but it was not until the growth and flowering of the
Langdell model law schools around the turn of the last century that
academic criticism became a sustained process, with an increasing
number of law journals devoting probing comments and essays to
developments in the law, including constitutional decisions by the
Supreme Court.
The new criticism and analysis reflected more than its authors'
agreement or disagreement with the outcome of cases. The commentators carefully examined the logic of decisions and their compatibility
with precedents. In addition, a few attempted to define the role of
the Supreme Court in the larger scheme of American law and government. Among these, an important place must be reserved for James
Bradley Thayer, whose teaching and writings at Harvard before the
turn of the century have had continuing influence on later generations
of scholars, especially those who had contact with his thinking as students of Thayer or his intellectual successors at Harvard. Among the
leading Thayerites was the late Professor Felix Frankfurter, with
whom Professor Kurland enjoys intellectual kinship. To understand
Kurland, we must grasp the essence of the Thayer-Frankfurter approach.
Thayer's well known article, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," published in 1893 in the Harvard Law Review, 4 advocated a judicial policy of "hands-off" with
respect to enactments by the legislature. Only a clear mistake by the
legislature justified intervention. 5 Of course, this rule merely restated
3 See S. KRIsLo, THE SUPREBE COURT AND POLITICAL FEEDos 7-53 (1968), for a discussion
of the popular bias against freedom.
4 Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HAav. L. REV. 129 (1893).
5 Thayer always reserved the power of judicial review, that is, of "fixing the outside
border of reasonable legislative action, the boundary beyond which the taxing power, the
power of eminent domain, police power, and legislative power in general, cannot go
without violating the prohibitions of the constitution or crossing the line of its grants."
Id. at 148.
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the question of judicial review in a different form: What is a clear
mistake? Thayer spoke in an era that witnessed an increasing willingness by the Supreme Court to invalidate state legislation by finding
in due process of law a touchstone that in practice meant "whatever
the Justices find reasonable." Their insistence on preventing even slight
legislative intrusions into the comfortable economic and social order
of post-Civil War America aligned the Justices against those whose
slight share of power consisted principally in the privilege of voting
with like-minded citizens to gain occasional legislative victories over
the opposition of powerful interests. It was against these interferences
with the power to govern that Thayer railed, as in his biography of
Marshall, where he referred to judicial review of a legislative act in
almost reverent terms: "To set aside the acts of such a body, representing in its own field, which is the very highest of all, the ultimate
sovereign, should be a solemn, unusual, and painful act."6 This panegyric on legislatures sounds somewhat strange to modern ears, given
our greater understanding of the workings of legislatures and our
increasing knowledge of how the representative function is muted by
archaic procedures and distorted by special interest forces. Yet Thayer
certainly was correct in asserting that courts cannot govern-that only
our elected officials can create policy, leaving courts with their own
important role.
Felix Frankfurter tried to carry out Thayer's philosophy as a member of the Court. In many ways, he went further. At times he seemed
almost apologetic that an institution without an electoral basis had any
significant role in American government. As an advisor and planner in
Roosevelt's administration he gained a special appreciation of the
political branches and of their role when the Court obstructed social
legislation approved by the other branches. As a member of the Court,
Frankfurter followed his idol, Holmes, in believing that judges should
and could divorce their personal views from those which they took as
judges. Although opinion after opinion contains references to his personal views, Frankfurter did not allow them to color his decisions. In
civil liberties cases, in which Holmes would occasionally breach his
normal rule of self-restraint, Frankfurter found it difficult to abandon
his role of judicial diffidence. One of the clearest explications of the importance of judicial self-restraint in Supreme Court history is the Justice's effort to justify a school board's rule compelling school children
to join in a flag salute exercise that violated their religious beliefs7 On
6 j.

THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 87-8 (Phoenix ed. 1967).

7 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (dissenting opinion);
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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occasions, however, Frankfurter thought that a political organ had
made a "mistake" sufficiently grave to justify invalidation. The "released time" cases" come immediately to mind, as do the many criminal
justice cases where police action had violated due process standards of
fundamental fairness. 9 To Frankfurter there was a legitimate role for
the Court, but it was an extremely modest one. The Court's duty was
to allow political representatives to govern. Quite often he wrote as
though the United States enjoyed, or should accept, a parliamentary
system in which the courts would play a meager part analogous to that
of their British counterparts.
Justice Frankfurter, as well as his intellectual successor on the Court,
Justice John M. Harlan, and a number of academic exponents of the
Thayer-Frankfurter philosophy have found in the Warren Court the
personification of all that can be wrong in a court. They have condemned both its active support of important individual and social
values, and its insistence on providing judicial solutions to problems
that might better be handled by political organs. The critics also charge
that it uses sweeping announcements of broad principle rather than
closely organized, logical analysis to justify its positions. The academic
critics have been joined by spokesmen for groups angered by the substance of Warren Court decisions, among them school and other officials
opposed to desegregation decisions, local politicians displeased by the
outcome of the apportionment cases, law enforcement representatives
who resent court intrusion into the pre-trial process, and members of
patriotic groups who decry fair play for Communists, aliens, and war
opponents. It is the criticism of these groups that largely explains why
the Court has suffered in public opinion polls, which the academic
critics cite to show the failure of the Warren Court. It is unreasonable
to assume that better written opinions or greater respect for precedents
by the Warren Court would have satisfied groups whose chief values
and goals seemingly have been rejected by the Court. Moreover, although any Court must pay heed to public reactions to some extent, if
only because Congress may be moved to act against the Court, is it not
one of the virtues of a non-elected, life-tenured body that it can take
the long view, largely impervious both to public opinion polls-to
which Professor Kurland gloomily refers 0--and to the vote-seeking imperatives of the elected branches? Apart from their understandable
concern as pedagogues with the Court's opinion-writing abilities and
8 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320 (1952) (dissenting opinion); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (concurring opinion).
9 E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
10 P. xxiii.
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their dismay that so many precedents were overruled (were the precedents "correct," or is it wrong to reject so many precedents simply
as a matter of constitutional principle?), what exactly do the critics,
exemplified by Professor Kurland, regard as the chief faults of the
Warren Court? What are the "wrong" decisions of that Court, or, the
easier question, did it succeed in doing anything right?
The general mode of attack comes down to this: If the Court did
anything for which it might claim credit for courage or imagination,
its decisions simply built on the past (desegregation, apportionment,
Bible reading). 1 Where there might be wide agreement among knowledgeable observers on the desirability of a decision (school desegregation), the results have not been as satisfactory as one might wish.
Query: If the Court had been even more intrusive with respect to
state school policies, would this not have been a mistake in the eyes
of many critics since it would have helped bring about a higher degree
of centralized control?
Almost as an afterthought dictated by the demands of academic fair
play, Professor Kurland admits that "[o]ne must be careful, however,
not to overplay the ineffectiveness of the Court's actions. If it has used
old doctrines it has used them in new applications. And the Court must
be given its due in helping to spark and sustain the Negro social
revolution that engulfs us at the moment. And certainly, too, the
Court has made major contributions to the egalitarian ethos that is
becoming dominant in our society."' 2
This concession aside, Professor Kurland turns to his major critique,
divided, like Gaul, into three parts.
First, he faults the Court for failing "to adhere to the step-by-step
process that has long characterized the common-law and constitutional
forms of adjudication.... It preferred to write codes of conduct rather
than resolve particular controversies.' 3 The one-man, one-vote formula
in reapportionment cases is cited as an example. Yet the Court followed
a precisely opposite tactic in the desegregation decisions and has been
charged with being derelict as the result.' 4 Case-by-case adjudication
in the criminal justice arena, which began long before the Warren era
with the strong support of Justice Frankfurter and other pre-Warren
justices, left law enforcement officials and trial judges at sea as to the
requisite constitutional standards. At least the Warren Court tried to
11 Pp. xvi-xviii.
12 P.

xx.

13 Id.
14 This is not intended to applaud the Court's overly rigid approach to a complex
problem, but it does show the difficulty of appeasing critics.
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provide standards more explicit and more applicable than had been
provided by the case-by-case "fair trial" rule of predecessor Courts.
His second charge is that the Court "has failed to recognize the
incapacities that inhere in its structure."' 5 This criticism arises from
the obvious facts that the Court has no independent staff to assist in
shaping policy-oriented decisions, cannot administer its own decrees,
and, hence, must rely on lower courts and other branches. The lesson
seems to be that the Court should decide only those cases in which
the litigants are good sports and the loser will take his medicine like
a man. Apparently, the Court's duty, when it is presented with great
issues that require more than a Supreme Court decree based on briefs
of counsel, is to refer them to the political branches. What Professor
Kurland seems to ignore is that the states and other branches have carried out court mandates, however reluctantly. It is they, not the Court,
that bear responsibility for using staffs creatively.
The Warren Court's third weakness was its failure to persuade. "The
Court's opinions have tended toward fiat rather than reason.""', One
may wonder whether, law professors aside, the Court could have written any opinion that would convince most southerners (or northerners)
that segregated schools are discriminatory. Can judicial appeal to reason, unaided by the other branches, succeed in inducing the belief
in John Q. Public that those accused of crime have rights that must
be protected, or that freedom of expression is a right that protects all
of us, including spokesmen for unpopular views? Public opinion in
these matters is the product of the results of judicial decision. What
years of education and acres of public pronouncements have failed to
achieve-belief in equality, justice, and individual rights-is unlikely
to follow even the greatest of judicial opinions. Is the Court's proper
stance, then, one of selecting and deciding only those cases in which
popular approval will follow because of the result obtained? Is the
Constitution, then, far from an auxiliary protection against the excesses
of majoritarian rule, to serve only as a means of rationalizing whatever
vox populi demands? This may sound extreme, but what are we to make
of this plea by Professor Kurland about the Court's credibility gap?
"The Supreme Court has been and must continue to be a strong force
in the vital center that provides cohesion for a democratic society."' 7
And then comes the clincher: "Above all it must emphasize individual
interests against the stamp of governmental paternalism and confor15 P. xxi.
16 P. xxii.
17 Pp. xxiii-xxiv.
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mity. At the same time, it must retain the confidence of the American
8
people.'
This conclusion is paradoxical in light of the sustained criticism
of the Court by so many Americans (who don't read Court opinions)
because the Warren Court asserted and defended the rights of minorities and individuals against a conformist, and hardly paternalistic,
government. What individual interests can Professor Kurland have in
mind? Do any decisions of the Warren Court fit his prescription? We
are not given an answer. "It is not survival of the Court that is at stake,
but the survival of the primacy of individual liberty that is in question,"'19 Professor Kurland tells us. If this means anything, it is that
the Court must pull back, avoid unpopular decisions, and try to make
itself popular in order some day to do something in support of individual liberty which, if it does, will embroil it in the kind of troubles
experienced by the Warren Court. On the contrary, it is the role of
the Court to act as guardian of the rights explicitly and implicitly set
forth in the Constitution. So long as it does not thwart the power of
coordinate branches to govern, as did the pre-1987 Court, its insistence
that the ideals of the Constitution must become operative is in the
best tradition of a constitutional court.
The comments thus far are responses to the introduction which, in
this reviewer's opinion, has an abruptness of tone and judgment that
is not sustained in the body of the discourse, which, on the whole, is
relatively balanced and almost consistently interesting and informative.
Only a few of the many themes and conclusions can be touched on
here.
Some of Professor Kurland's political conclusions are debatable.
Students of the modem presidency will be startled to learn that the
"Congress.. . has tended to become the tool of the White House," 20 a
conclusion valid only for the first-term New Deal, during wartime, and
in the conduct of foreign policy. His comment that "if the history of the
origins of our Constitution teach us anything, it must be that one great
fear of the Constitution's makers was the danger of a strong and
arbitrary executive" 21 -which he cites to justify his plea for a stronger
Court role vis-4-vis the President-obscures the fact that the primary
purpose of the framers in setting up a government of balanced and
shared powers was to inhibit at the national level legislative dom18 Id.
19 Id.
20 P.

21 Id.

17.
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inance of the type revealed by post-independence state assemblies. 22
As to his desire to increase control with respect to the President, we
may ask whether Professor Kurland would have applauded the Warren
Court if it had chosen to examine the legality of the Vietnam War?
If not, what executive acts does he deem worthy of judicial rebuke?
We are not enlightened on this very interesting point.
In a chapter examining the Warren Court's relationship with the
Congress and the President, Professor Kurland concedes that although
a substantial number of congressional enactments were held invalid,
the Court's action did not cut into the power to govern-a point frequently overlooked by critics. He rightly notes that it was Brown v.
Board of Education23 that solidified the hard core of very influential
opposition to the Court.2 4 It was a series of decisions limiting the search
for and punishment of Communists that added to congressional ire.
The Watkins decision, 25 more an exercise in judicial rhetoric than a
real assault on the investigatory power, caused deep offense to those in
Congress who craved the favorable publicity that "red-hunting" provided. The narrow defeat of the Jenner bill, 26 which was designed to

reverse many of these unpopular decisions, showed how much the
Court had to fear from an aroused Congress. As a consequence, the
Court appears to have receded from its more exposed positions,2 7 although Congress, as Professor Kurland observes, "continues to be frenzied by the Court's opinions in the desegregation areas" and shows
"rancor at the decisions in the obscenity cases ....

,,28

Having examined Warren Court cases that subordinated state power
to national power, Professor Kurland concludes: "Federalism is dead
and the Supreme Court has made its contribution to its demise."29 He
treats this development as a blow to the protection of liberty, quoting
such worthies as Lord Acton and K. C. Wheare. Whatever the theoretical merits of federalism, there is much evidence to suggest the
failure of state and local governments in this country, handicapped as
they are by insufficient financial resources and impotence in dealing
with problems that cannot be solved effectively except on a national
basis. In addition, large economic interests (business and labor) seem
22 R.

BERGER, CONGRESS V.

=a SUPREME COURT 8-15 (1969), presents a succinct statemenr

of the fears of legislative "despotism."
23 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24 Pp. 26-7.
25 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
26 S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
27 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72
(1959).
28 P. 31.
29 P. 96.
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to mold the states readily to suit their own purposes. But where is
the empirical support for the pro-freedom fruits of federalism? The
federal justice system, whatever its shortcomings, is a model providing
a greater degree of justice than the systems of most states. Local welfare
departments and other agencies with power over the poor have shown
little sympathy, and at times an overt contempt, for legality in ministering to their charges. As to civil liberties, the threat has often been
greater the closer government has been to the people. The "red-hunts"
following World Wars I and II and the Japanese-American relocation
scheme of World War II are the most serious blots on the federal
record, while towns and cities throughout the United States have continually sought to suppress nonconformists and advocates of unpopular
causes.
The reapportionment cases, undercutting state legislatures' long-time
power to distort political representation, are criticized by Professor
Kurland, perhaps justly, as dealing with some of the less pressing problems of the post-World War II era. Yet in insisting on fairer representation, the Court at least recognized that the subject was important
enough to deserve something better than the grossly undemocratic
rules used in the past. Professor Kurland criticizes Lucas v. Colorado
General Assembly," ° in which the Court invalidated a referendum
allowing one house to be selected by a system other than, one-man,
one-vote, as an example of the manner in which "legal doctrine originated to assure majority rule was thus held to preclude a right of the
majority to establish its role."31 This analysis overlooks the limited
choice given the voters of Colorado in that referendum, since the more
equal system offered as an alternative required multi-member districts
of considerable size.
Both the chapter on "Egalitarianism and the Warren Court" and the
concluding chapter on "Problems of a Political Court" apply familiar
themes. Professor Kurland opposes the use of equal protection to limit
the legislatures' power to classify on the ground that the new substantive equal protection gives the Court too much power. No less an
authority than Geoffrey Gorer is summoned to testify to the dangers
of an overemphasis on equality,32 testimony that may seem mis-

placed to those shouldered aside by legislative classifications.
The concluding chapter raises new issues and reiterates a number
of themes mentioned earlier. "[T]he Court is not a democratic institution, either in make up or in function."33 Its chief task is "to protect
30
31
32
33

377 U.S. 713 (1964).
P. 85.
Pp. 168-69.
P. 204.
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the individual against the Leviathan of government and to protect
minorities against oppression,"3 4 but apparently it is not to do this in
ways that pose risks for the Court, either at the hands of the people or
of Congress. We need a Court in which the people can have confidence,
and yet, Kurland concludes, it must "match the Warren Court attainments in the protection of individuals and minorities ... ."35 So, at
the very end we learn that something valuable did result from the labors of the Supreme Court in the years between 1954 and 1968. Whether
the results will seem good, bad, or negligible to future generations
requires a judgment on the nature of our future society. My guess
is that the Warren Court will come through with relatively high marks.
While Presidents faltered and Congress blundered on its largely conservative way, the Court alone held fast to ideals that hopefully are
still a basic part of the American creed. It is no small achievement to
have kept alive and expanded the concepts of fairness, equality, and
freedom as part of the living law of our Constitution. Yet Professor
Kurland is right to remind the Justices of the risks they run when they
persist for long in taking an expansive view of their powers. They are
part of a complex web of relationships in which each branch is continuously under pressure to define and redefine its role in a national
system complicated by the demands and problems of a troubled federalism. While it may be wrong for the Court to assume that it should
reach out to solve all problems ignored or mishandled by the other
branches, it is, in this reviewer's judgment, equally erroneous to act
as though it were an essentially illegitimate partner in our tripartite
national scheme. The hardest fact to grasp-one taught by history
rather than by purely rational analysis-is that the dynamics of our
polity deny the luxury of a once-and-for-all definition of the role of
each of the constituent members of our government. Presidents, Congresses, and Courts have each acted and interacted to provide examples
of strong and weak institutional patterns. 86 Each must gauge the limits
of its reach, but there is no rigid and precise pattern of behavior
commanded by anything in our Constitution or our political system.
And in the long eye of history, results tend to count most heavily.
Professor Kurland's book deserves wide reading, for it deals with
matters of the first importance. Its theses, as the foregoing testifies,
are not those of the reviewer, but these are matters which reasonable
men have argued and will continue to treat contentiously. Students
34 Id.

35 P. 206.
36 An excellent recent account of this dynamism is H. SEIDMAN, PoLMcs, PosnoN, AND
PowER: THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATION (1970).
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of the Court will welcome it as a fuller statement of the position
Professor Kurland has sketched in numerous other writings. For these
and many other contributions, among them the editorship of Justice
Frankfurter's writings and, perhaps most of all, for his initiation and
editing of the Supreme Court Review, of which eleven annual publications have appeared, we are deeply in his debt. His ideas and his
conclusions deserve to be treated with the seriousness the subject
deserves. Students, especially law students, should pay particularly close
attention to what he and other academic critics of the Warren Court
are saying. For it is largely the students who will determine, by their
behavior as counsel, judges, legislators, and other officials, what the
Constitution shall mean in the years ahead. They will have to decide
whether the American people will accept a vigorous Court committed
to the protection of important social ideals and values, or will demand
a modest, compliant Court, mindful of the hazards of activism and
devoted to the belief that other political institutions must bear the
burden of governing.

